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8Executive summary
The Education for All movement has resulted in a rapid expansion 
in primary school places across the developing world. However, this 
expansion has not been accompanied by an equally rapid increase in 
the number of qualified teachers. It has led, instead, to the recruitment 
of increasing numbers of unqualified teachers, lowering the status and 
worsening the working conditions of teachers in many countries. Some 
authors have been prompted to talk of a crisis in teacher motivation. 
This literature review explores the contribution of teacher career 
models to this motivational crisis, and asks whether a change in their 
administration could improve the quality of teaching in schools 
by motivating teachers to improve, and increasing the appeal of the 
profession. This is in line with the suggested post‑2015 education 
goal that ‘By 2030, all governments ensure that all learners are taught 
by qualified, professionally‑trained, motivated and well‑supported 
teachers’. 
The most common career structure in both developed and 
developing countries is the single salary structure, in which teachers’ 
pay increases yearly, irrespective of teaching quality. The only 
other factors taken into account in calculating pay are additional 
qualifications, and promotions to administrative positions. 
Problems with this structure include: a lack of correlation between 
the factors used for promotion (certificates and experience) and 
teacher effectiveness; a lack of accountability for quality of teaching; 
the demotivating effect on colleagues of less‑dedicated teachers 
receiving automatic promotion; a flat salary structure that makes the 
profession less attractive to the most able; a lack of career progression 
opportunities for teachers who do not wish to leave the classroom; 
and the limited sense of self‑determination among teachers.
In a search for alternative structures, this report addresses the 
following research questions by reviewing psychological research on 
motivation, and examining the models of teacher career structure 
used in different countries:
1. How are motivation and the organization of careers linked?
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2. What are the specific problems linked to the organization of 
teacher careers in developing countries?
3. What are the different models of teacher career organization 
around the world?
4. Which are the most successful, according to the available 
research?
5. What are the lessons for the design and implementation of career 
ladder systems?
Herzberg’s dual factor theory of motivation suggests that the 
factors which cause dissatisfaction in a job differ from the factors that 
motivate us and cause satisfaction. The former tend to be related to the 
job environment (including salary), while the latter are things related 
to the job itself, such as recognition, responsibility, and growth. 
This theory implies that improving salary and working conditions is 
important in that it reduces job dissatisfaction, but beyond a certain 
point it is not money but job‑related factors which motivate. This is 
tentatively borne out by research in developing countries, though it 
requires further research. 
Deci and Ryan’s self‑determination theory contends that 
motivation can be classified along a scale, from controlled (where 
actions result from external pressure) to autonomous (where actions 
are the result of an intrinsic desire for a certain outcome). Extrinsic 
incentives, such as monetary bonuses for specific behaviours or 
outcomes, can undermine autonomous motivation when perceived as 
controlling. This should be avoided since autonomous motivation can 
have positive effects on problem solving, persistence, and creativity. 
The task for any career structure, therefore, is to support autonomous 
motivation through the creation of an environment that encourages 
competence, autonomy, and good interpersonal relations, while, at 
the same time, holding teachers accountable for the quality of their 
teaching. This can be achieved by including extrinsic incentives and 
disincentives for those that remain unmotivated in a way that is not 
perceived as controlling by those who are already autonomously 
motivated.
Despite psychological research suggesting that extrinsic 
incentives undermine autonomous motivation, performance‑related 
pay for teachers has received a lot of attention as an alternative to the 
single salary schedule. Some simple programmes reward teachers for 
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certain behaviours, such as attendance, but most use student results 
as a proxy for teacher quality. The evidence on performance‑related 
pay is mixed, with some programmes finding an improvement in exam 
results, but many identifying no positive change. Payment based on 
student results has also been roundly criticized for being unfair to 
teachers in challenging schools and being an unreliable way to judge 
teacher quality, as well as for disincentivizing collaboration between 
teachers and incentivizing ‘teaching to the test’ and cheating.  
An approach that avoids the problems associated with using 
student results as a proxy for teacher quality is summative teacher 
appraisal. Summative appraisal seeks to determine the current level or 
standard of a teacher for the purposes of bonuses or promotions, and 
can be contrasted with formative appraisal, which exists solely for the 
purpose of helping teachers improve. Methods used to summatively 
appraise teachers include lesson observations, interviews, tests of 
subject knowledge and pedagogy, portfolios of evidence, and parent 
and student surveys. As each method has its strengths and limitations, 
the most sensible approach is to use a combination of approaches to 
appraise teachers. 
The selection of personnel responsible for summative appraisal 
varies from country to country. In most cases, the school principal is 
involved, but assessors can include peers and external experts. The 
possibility of unreliability or collusion when only one, school‑based 
assessor is involved means that appraisal decisions should be made 
by at least two people, or made by one and approved by another. For 
high‑stakes appraisals, such as those used to decide on appointments 
to senior positions, an assessor external to the school should ideally 
be involved.
The design of summative teacher appraisal also varies across 
countries, in two main ways. Some countries allocate a certain 
weighting or point score to different elements of the appraisal process, 
for example a lesson observation and a test, and combine these to 
reach a final score (cumulative approach). Other countries use teacher 
standards, descriptions of what teachers are expected to be able to do 
or know at different stages of their career. Decisions as to whether or 
not a teacher has met these standards are based on evidence from the 
different elements of the appraisal process (holistic approach). The 
other main point of difference concerns whether teachers are judged 
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relative to each other (norm referenced), or relative to an independent 
benchmark (criterion referenced). The former approach has been 
found to reduce collaboration between teachers, while, with the latter, 
there is less central control over how many teachers get a bonus or are 
promoted.
There are three types of response to summative appraisal: 
bonuses, pay rises, and promotions. In practice, most programmes 
that use bonuses are based on student results rather than broader 
appraisal; those that do base bonuses on appraisal do so as part of 
a broader career structure that includes pay rises and promotions. 
Another model is a variation on the single salary structure, with 
staged salary rises (every three years, for example) dependent on 
passing an appraisal. Sometimes the standards teachers are appraised 
against become more challenging, the longer they’ve been in the 
profession. The final model is that of the career ladder. In this model, 
rather than simply rising up the pay scale when they pass an appraisal, 
teachers take on a new status or role, such as ‘lead teacher’, having met 
the required standards, and their pay increases to reflect their new 
position. There are, of course, variations within these three models, 
concerning who evaluates the teachers, the nature of the standards, 
whether professional development is mandatory, and whether new 
positions come with additional responsibilities.
According to the literature, the career ladder model is the most 
promising in that it allows the possibility of linking pay to performance 
indirectly, and offers teachers a pathway for professional growth. This 
means that it has the potential to overcome the many problems of the 
single salary schedule – such as the lack of recognition and lack of 
accountability for poor teaching – without introducing new problems 
of reduced collaboration or perceived control, which are inherent in 
the performance‑related pay model. 
However, this depends on careful design, and there are significant 
variations within the career ladder structure used in different countries, 
leading to different outcomes. Moreover, it is likely that this model 
requires strong administration to be effectively managed, though more 
evidence is necessary. Only three career ladder programmes have 
been quantitatively evaluated. Arizona’s model was standards‑based, 
criterion‑referenced, and had multiple, external evaluators involved 
in promotion decisions. It was successful in reducing the drop‑out 
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rate, improving the graduation rate, and improving student scores, 
compared to districts that did not take part. 
Missouri’s model included teacher standards, but did not apply 
different standards at different levels of promotion, while teachers were 
assessed only by administrators in their own school. Results in maths 
improved only marginally, and in reading not at all, which evaluators 
put down to a lack of rigour in the application of the evaluation 
procedure, due to collusion between administrators and teachers. 
Portugal introduced a nation‑wide career structure in which 
teachers had to pass an evaluation to move from a lower pay scale to 
a higher pay scale. This evaluation was cumulative (points‑based), 
and norm‑referenced, putting the teachers in competition with one 
another. Student scores actually decreased after the introduction of 
the programme. 
Based on the available evidence and countries’ experiences 
of implementing career structures to date, it seems that holistic 
(standards‑based), criterion‑referenced designs lead to happier staff 
and better results. The issue of not knowing how many staff will 
reach the standards can be overcome through careful design of their 
difficulty, and initial piloting of the scheme. If further budgetary 
caution is needed, specific pay increases related to promotion could 
be set to vary depending on the numbers promoted. Norm‑referenced 
promotion can also be brought in at the highest levels where teachers 
will be competing with teachers from other schools, rather than their 
own colleagues.
It is important that teachers ‘buy in’ to the reform. Without the 
support of unions, new career structures may never be implemented. 
Teacher representatives should be involved in the design of the career 
structure, and, in particular, the design of the teacher standards. 
However, they should not be solely responsible, and experts in 
evaluation design should be included in the design team. Other 
potential obstacles to reform include a lack of financing. Even though 
the long‑term costs of implementing a career ladder need not be 
greater than a single salary structure, initial funds will be needed for 
design, training, and implementation. These need to be budgeted for 
by the appropriate ministry. 
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Countries considering a change to the administration of their 
teacher careers would benefit from further evaluation of the career 
structure models already in existence, as well as reports on the progress 
made and problems faced by countries in the process of implementing 
new structures. These evaluations could include quantitative 
comparisons of key metrics with former structures or similar regions, 
as well as qualitative comparisons regarding teacher motivation and 
individual country case studies.
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Introduction
Why it is important to look at teacher careers in today’s 
development context
The pursuit of universal access to primary education, the second of 
the Millennium Development Goals, has enabled many more children 
to attend school across the developing world. However, this gain has 
come at a cost. The rapid expansion of primary school places has led 
to greater demand for qualified teachers, and, as demand outstrips 
supply, untrained and less‑educated teachers are being recruited to fill 
the gap. More recently, the world has rightly turned its attention to the 
quality of the education these children are receiving, and it has been 
suggested that the massive recruitment of less qualified teachers may 
have led to poorer teaching and learning outcomes (Orr et al., 2013).
The recruitment of increasing numbers of undertrained and 
less‑educated teachers has also had an effect on the status and 
motivation of teachers. Whereas, previously, teachers were respected 
as having attained a certain level of education or having undergone 
teacher training, this no longer applies to teachers as a group, and, as 
a consequence, they feel that their status is in decline (VSO, 2002). 
In addition, despite recruiting more teachers than in previous years, 
many developing countries still struggle to recruit enough personnel 
to maintain previous student/teacher ratios, as the number of students 
accessing education has increased.1 This means that class sizes have 
grown, and, in the absence of sufficient additional funding, working 
conditions have worsened (VSO, 2002). 
This combination of factors has led to what has been described 
as a ‘teacher motivation crisis’ (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007), 
with teaching in many countries characterized by high attrition rates 
and ‘varying levels of professional commitment’ (VSO, 2002). It is 
very important that this lack of teacher motivation is addressed, 
as motivation plays a key role in teacher quality, and, consequently, 
1. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimates that without renewed action, teacher shortages will 
continue to deny millions of children the right to primary education. Seventy-four countries face 
an acute shortage of teachers (UIS Factsheet, October 2015, n°33). 
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student achievement (Michaelowa, 2002; VSO, 2002). This IIEP 
literature review explores several different factors that affect teacher 
motivation, but focuses on the administration of teacher careers as a 
promising area for research. 
The administration of teacher careers includes teacher 
recognition, teacher evaluation, and career progression. Not only do 
changes in these areas have the potential to improve the motivation of 
current teachers; they might also play a role in raising the status of the 
profession in general, therefore making teaching more appealing and 
increasing the numbers and quality of applicants. Several countries have 
experimented with changes to teacher career structures, some more 
successfully than others. Looking at and learning from the experiences 
of these countries could provide helpful insights for other countries 
seeking to motivate their teachers and re‑professionalize their teaching 
force. In fact, one of the suggested post‑2015 education goals relates 
to teacher motivation and qualifications: ‘By 2030, all governments 
ensure that all learners are taught by qualified, professionally‑trained, 
motivated and well‑supported teachers’ (Target 6).
Research questions, assumptions, and hypotheses
As an institute for educational planning, IIEP has identified the 
organization and management of teacher careers as a specific research 
area. The underlying interrogation seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
1. What are the specific problems linked to the organization of 
teacher careers in developing countries?
2. How are motivation and the organization of careers linked?
3. What are the different models of teacher career organization 
around the world?
4. Which are the most successful models, according to the available 
research?
5. What are the lessons for the design and implementation of career 
ladder systems?
The overall goal of the proposed research is to generate knowledge, 
provide policy options, and document promotion modalities and 
organizational management of teacher careers for primary and 
secondary teachers in a diverse range of countries.
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The assumptions and hypotheses underlying this review are:
1. Where teacher salaries are sufficient to meet their basic needs, 
specific models of teacher career organization can play a role in 
improving the motivation of teachers in their daily work. In the 
long run, this could help to improve the quality of education.
2. Where teacher salaries are sufficient to meet their basic needs, 
specific models of teacher career organization can play a role in 
making the profession more attractive. In the long run, this can 
help improve both the recruitment and retention of new teachers.
Scope and limitations 
As noted above, the characteristics of the people taking on the role 
of ‘teacher’ in developing contexts have become more varied. For the 
purposes of this literature review, ‘teacher’ refers to anyone employed 
on a permanent or short‑term basis to teach children in primary or 
secondary schools. This includes a range of people, from highly 
qualified civil service professionals to volunteers, some of whom 
have little or no training. Career structure considerations are, in all 
likelihood, different for primary and secondary teachers. However, the 
distinction was not elaborated in the literature, so this review usually 
refers to teachers as a whole. Furthermore, although most of the career 
structures explored are designed for civil servants rather than contract 
or community teachers, the findings could be relevant for countries 
that are looking to include contract teachers in their career structures. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a career as ‘an occupation 
undertaken for a significant period of a person’s life and with 
opportunities for progress’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). It differs 
from a ‘job’, which is defined as ‘a paid position of regular employment’. 
While a career includes opportunities for progress, a job need not 
offer such opportunities.2 The administration of teacher careers 
2. Similarly, the OECD report (2005) on recruiting, preparing, and retaining teachers distinguishes 
two models of teacher recruitment: career-based employment and position-based employment. 
Under the career-based model, teachers usually stay in public service throughout their working 
life; entry is based on academic qualifications or examinations, and promotion modalities follow 
seniority and clearly laid-out requirements. Under the position-based employment, teachers are 
not hired as civil servants, being instead recruited into teaching positions with an unpredictable 
career-long progression of assignments and uncertain career prospects. In developing countries, 
the need to hire large numbers of teachers has led to hybrid systems where some teachers are 
designated civil servants while others are recruited under contract, the latter representing in some 
cases a significant proportion of the teacher workforce (Schwille and Dembélé, 2007: 39–41).
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therefore encompasses policies concerning how people progress 
from their first teaching role to becoming an experienced teacher. 
This includes progression in the areas of pay, skills, qualifications, 
and responsibilities, and how these things relate to one another. This 
review does not cover the areas of initial teacher training, or go into 
detail about methods of professional development. Although both are 
very important, they are reviewed at length elsewhere.3 It also does 
not consider group‑level incentives for teachers, which, while relevant 
to teacher motivation, are not directly relevant to individual teachers’ 
careers. 
This literature review is ambitious in its scope with regards to 
the countries considered. The literature search was carried out using 
key terms that were not country specific, and all search results which 
reported an atypical4 career structure design were included, regardless 
of the country of origin. As a result, the review includes a wide 
range of career structures from developed and developing contexts. 
However, career structures for teachers in countries in crisis situations 
were not included, as this would complicate matters considerably. 
Where countries were identified in the literature searches as having 
atypical career structures, but detail was missing from the reports, the 
author made contact with policy‑makers in those countries and asked 
questions, either by email or phone.
While the review is broad in terms of the countries considered, 
particular care should be taken to consider the socio‑cultural and 
socio‑economic contexts of developing countries. Although examples 
from developing countries are included, a more in‑depth analysis 
of how these aspects influence the functioning of teacher careers, 
especially under the career ladder model, requires further research and 
goes beyond the scope of this literature review. A related limitation is 
that of teacher compensation. In order to narrow the focus, the issue 
of the starting or medium teacher salary is deliberately not considered 
in detail, even though it constitutes an important aspect of teacher 
3. See, for example, Caena (2011) on continuing professional development and (McKenzie et al. 
(2005) on initial teacher training.
4. ‘Atypical’ here refers to any career structure that does not follow the common single salary 
schedule of automatic progression based on years in the job. This is described in Chapter 1.
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motivation.5 The review thus presumes that in the different contexts 
considered, teacher salaries are sufficient to meet their basic needs. 
Structure of the study
Chapter  1 examines the current ‘typical’ career administration and 
its associated problems, while Chapter  2 introduces some relevant 
psychological theories regarding motivation, and sets out the evidence 
as to what motivates teachers and in what way. Some common 
approaches to motivating teachers that attempt to incentivize 
particular behaviours are considered in Chapter  3, while Chapter  4 
examines different methods, approaches, and uses of summative 
teacher appraisal. Chapter  5 focuses on career ladder programmes, 
outlining various approaches in different countries and the different 
considerations that need to be taken into account in their design. 
Chapter  6 reflects on lessons for design and implementation and is 
followed by some general conclusions.




Problems with the administration  
of teacher careers 
The teacher motivation crisis
Researchers have argued that the changes in teacher status and working 
conditions described above have resulted in a crisis in the teaching 
profession in many developing countries. The teaching workforce is 
demoralized and demotivated. As early as 2002, a Voluntary Service 
Overseas (VSO) study, based on interviews with teachers in Malawi, 
Papua New Guinea, and Zambia, warned:
Education in developing countries is at a critical juncture: a 
potential crisis in the teaching profession threatens the ability of 
national governments to reach internationally agreed targets to 
expand and improve education. In many developing countries, 
the teaching force is demoralised and fractured ... As a result, the 
teaching profession in developing countries is characterised by 
high attrition rates, constant turnover, lack of confidence and 
varying levels of professional commitment (VSO, 2002: 1).
In 2007, another study, based on the experience of 12 countries 
in sub‑Saharan Africa and South Asia, used similarly strong language 
to describe the state of teacher motivation:
The unavoidable conclusion is that most schooling systems are 
faced with what amounts to a teacher motivation crisis, which 
has far reaching implications for the education Millennium 
Development Goals for basic education and for development as 
a whole (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007: 8).
This crisis in teacher motivation has been described as a 
‘colossal problem’ in Pakistan (Pakistan, 2000: 61) and as ‘a major 
contributory factor to the abysmally poor learning environments of 
primary and secondary students’ in ‘most low‑income developing 
countries’ (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005: 34). What is more, this 
problem appears to be getting worse rather than better: ‘The evidence 
on motivation trends is more mixed ... However, sizeable proportions 
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of teacher respondents indicated that teachers at their schools are 
increasingly de‑motivated’ (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007: viii).
There is cause to be concerned by this demotivation of the 
teaching workforce, if only for the sake of the teachers and their 
well‑being. But there is also further cause for concern. A body of 
literature shows that teacher motivation is critical for student learning 
outcomes (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Michaelowa, 2002; 
VSO, 2002). Based on their 12 case studies of African and South 
Asian countries, Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) conclude that the 
commitment of teachers is one of the most important determinants 
of learning outcomes, while low motivation results in absenteeism, 
under‑utilization of class time, professional misconduct, and poor 
preparation. Michaelowa (2002) carried out a regression analysis 
on standardized data for student achievement in Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Senegal, and found that 
teacher job satisfaction (based on self‑reporting and days absent) 
exerts a positive and significant influence on student learning. In 
addition, a VSO (2002) study concludes, similarly to Bennell and 
Akyeampong (2007), that low teacher motivation in Malawi, Papua 
New Guinea, and Zambia results in high attrition rates, varying levels 
of professional commitment, and feelings of helplessness. 
This literature review examines the role of the current 
administration of teacher careers in contributing to this crisis of teacher 
motivation, and the possibility that a change in this administration 
might play a role in mitigating the problem. 
Limitations of the most common career structure
By far the most common way of organizing teacher careers, in 
developing and developed countries alike, is through the single 
schedule salary structure. Selection into the profession, where there are 
enough applicants for selection to take place, requires the completion 
of pre‑service training, and starting pay depends on level of education 
and formal certificates acquired. Beyond this, pay increases steadily 
year on year, irrespective of a teacher’s duties and responsibilities, 
being instead based on years of service. The only way for teachers to 
increase their pay beyond the fixed salary schedule is to attain further 
education and certification (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Bruns, 
Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011), or to take on additional administrative 
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responsibilities, which often means leaving the classroom altogether 
(Vegas, 2005).
There are a number of problems with the single schedule 
salary structure, frequently described in the literature on teacher 
effectiveness, teacher careers, and teacher motivation (Bruns and 
Luque, 2014; Heneman III et al., 2006; OECD, 2013). These are: a 
lack of correlation between the factors used for promotion (certificates 
and experience) and teacher effectiveness; a lack of accountability 
for quality of teaching; the demotivating effect on the colleagues of 
less dedicated teachers who are automatically promoted; a flat salary 
structure that makes the profession less attractive to the most able; 
a lack of opportunities for career progression without leaving the 
classroom; and a limited sense of self‑determination among teachers. 
Academic qualifications and experience are limited  
as predictors of quality
This research matters for the design of teacher career structures, 
because if teachers are incentivized by the single salary schedule to 
undertake further university study which is not effective in improving 
their teaching, they are using time, effort, and resources that could be 
better directed to help students.
Although further degrees and years teaching are the most 
commonly used criteria to determine teacher pay, these factors do 
not always correlate with teacher effectiveness, as measured by their 
ability to produce learning achievements among their students (Bruns 
et al., 2011).  
In their review of this relationship, Wilson, Floden, and 
Ferrini‑Mundy (2002) concluded that there is a threshold level of 
subject knowledge necessary for good teaching, but beyond a certain 
point, further academic qualifications do not improve teaching 
effectiveness.6 This would also explain Rivkin and colleagues’ (2005) 
6. Woessmann (2001) analysed data from the Third International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMMS) on 13-year-olds’ achievement in 39 countries, and found that teachers’ level of 
education to be positively related to student performance in both of these subjects. Goldhaber and 
Brewer’s (2000) study of American teachers found a positive relationship between student results 
and teachers having a bachelor’s degree in maths, though not in science. The same study found 
that having a teacher with a bachelor’s degree in education actually correlated negatively with 
students’ achievements in maths. 
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conclusion that there is no evidence that holding a master’s degree 
improves teaching skills.  
Years spent teaching is also a poor predictor of student results. In 
the first three or four years, experience has a positive impact on student 
outcomes, but beyond that, years in the classroom have little effect 
(OECD, 2009). The Latin America Laboratory study by Casassus and 
colleagues (2002) found no significant impact of teacher experience 
on student results in Latin America. This means that the highest paid 
teachers are not necessarily any more effective than teachers at the 
lower end of the salary schedule. 
Lack of accountability for teaching quality
As promotion up the salary scale – and, in many cases, into leadership 
positions – is based on number of years teaching rather than teacher 
effectiveness, bad or idle teachers are promoted along with their harder 
working colleagues. As a result, there is often no accountability built 
into teacher career structures or procedures for salary progression. 
Teachers can be late, and regularly absent (Akyeampong and Asante, 
2005), and still receive a salary increase. In addition to the obvious 
harm these behaviours cause to students’ education, it can be very 
demotivating for skilled and committed teachers to see colleagues 
who teach very poorly, or very little, promoted ahead of them (Bennell 
and Akyeampong, 2007). 
Even assuming that all teachers were present and on time, 
variations in teacher quality have an enormous impact on individual 
student achievement, more so than any other educational factor 
(Bruns and Luque, 2014). Hanushek and Rivkin (2012) measured 
the ‘value added’ by different teachers in American schools using 
student test data, and found that students with certain teachers 
mastered less than 50 per cent of the curriculum for that grade, 
while students with  other teachers advanced by 1.5 grade levels or 
more. Sanders and Rivers (1996) analysed the Tennessee student 
database and found that this effect was additive and cumulative. For 
example, if a student in Grade 2 was taught by three teachers with 
high ‘value added’, while a similarly performing student was taught 
by three teachers with low ‘value added’, their performance three 
years later could differ by as much as 54 per cent. In their summary 
of the research on teacher quality, Bruns and Luque concluded that 
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‘no other attribute of schools comes close to this impact on student 
achievement’ (2014:6). Lack of attention to teacher quality in teacher 
career structures therefore constitutes a missed opportunity. 
Lack of attraction to the teaching profession
For school or university leavers with grades good enough to provide a 
variety of job options, teaching is not an attractive prospect compared 
to other professions, as the salary increases only slowly over time 
without the possibility of increased earnings linked to hard work or 
talent. Podgursky and Springer (2007) found that graduates tend 
not to join the profession for this reason, and, if they do, soon leave. 
In countries where applicants are in short supply, this phenomenon 
could be contributing to the recruitment of teachers from among the 
weakest students in secondary and higher education (Bruns et al., 
2011), and the perception of teaching as an ‘employment of last resort’ 
by school leavers and university graduates (Bennell and Akyeampong, 
2007: ix; Gannicott, 2009). 
Lack of professional status
A lack of promotion opportunities also means that very able school 
leavers or graduates have no way of distinguishing themselves from 
those who joined the teaching profession because they had no other 
option, and therefore no way of gaining the ‘professional exclusivity’ 
that comes with other professions such as doctors, engineers, and 
lawyers (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). This consideration may 
also discourage prospective teachers from joining the profession in the 
first place. Experienced teachers have noted a decrease in the status of 
their profession since the increase in underqualified contract teachers, 
for similar reasons (Ramachandran et al., 2006).
Lack of objective criteria for career progression
With very few opportunities for promotion into different roles other 
than senior management (which means leaving the classroom), and 
years spent teaching in school the sole means to attain these posts, 
teachers in many countries often lack a sense of self‑determination 
and control over their own careers (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). 
If promotion was instead based on meeting objective, quality‑based 
criteria, teachers might be motivated to work towards these criteria.
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Bruns and colleagues (2011) sum up the problems with the 
single salary schedule thus: ‘The clear implication of available research 
is that most school systems are recruiting and rewarding teachers for 
the wrong things, failing to encourage the capacities and behaviours 
that contribute most directly to student learning results, and unable to 
sanction ineffective performance’ (Bruns et al.: 261).
In addition to the problems inherent in the single salary schedule, 
in some countries, particularly those in South Asia, the administration 
of teacher careers is highly politicized. Local politicians interfere 
with recruitment, deployment to different schools, and promotion 
(Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). Accordingly, promotion prospects 
depend not on a teacher’s ability, performance, and experience, but 
rather on who they know. In Nigeria, there is no standardized salary 
structure, so teachers can be paid different amounts even at the same 
level of promotion. Here, too, the crucial factor is who you know, and 
this infuriates teachers who lack the requisite connections (Sherry, 
2008). 
Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) have also reported the 
difficulties plaguing other methods of promotion. In Malawi, 
promotion is based on interviews, which have been criticized for their 
lack of transparency. Clear guidelines for promotion exist in Nepal, 
but are ‘rarely applied’. In Kenya, promotion is made difficult for 
teachers in remote areas, as inspectors rarely visit. These issues and 
some solutions to them are discussed further in Chapter 4.
One must in any case be careful of making unwarranted 
assumptions about what can or will motivate teachers. The next 
chapter looks at key theories in psychological literature which 
explicate human motivation, and reviews research into what teachers 
themselves think motivates them. 
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Chapter 2 
The psychology underlying teacher 
motivation
It is clear that there is a crisis of motivation among teachers in the 
developing world and that the conventional way of organizing teacher 
careers is contributing to this crisis. This chapter looks at psychological 
theories of job satisfaction and motivation, and examines whether 
they are borne out by research into the job satisfaction and motivation 
of teachers in the developing world.7 
Theories of job satisfaction
Research into human motivation in the area of work is closely 
linked to research into job satisfaction. This is because the concepts 
of satisfaction and motivation are distinct, but closely related, and 
sometimes used interchangeably. For the purposes of this review, 
satisfaction refers to the fulfilment of one’s wishes, expectations, or 
needs, and motivation to a desire or willingness to do something. The 
close relation between the concepts comes from the commonly held 
idea that the reason one is motivated to do something is because one 
has a need, the fulfilment of which brings satisfaction. 
However, it is important to emphasize that motivation cannot 
be readily measured. While recognizing the difference between 
satisfaction and motivation, a number of research reports (Bennell, 
2007; Michaelowa, 2002) therefore choose to refer to both 
motivation and satisfaction, arguing that satisfaction helps to account 
for motivation, and that satisfaction is more easily interpreted by 
respondents because it relates to recent events. Motivation, on the 
other hand, is future‑related and remains a broad concept open to 
interpretation. This is why many organizations choose to use the term 
7. The theoretical framework on which this review is constructed uses theories of job satisfaction and 
motivation. Other strands of work in psychology draw on the concepts of work and organizational 
commitment. These concepts could also be usefully examined for further work on teacher careers 
but could not be included within the scope of this review.
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‘satisfaction’ rather than ‘motivation’, arguing that the former is easier 
to measure.8
Figure 1. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
Source: 3D Eye, 2012.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
Abraham Maslow articulated this idea about the relation between 
motivation and satisfaction in ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’: ‘Any 
motivated behaviour… must be understood to be a channel through 
which many basic needs may be simultaneously expressed or satisfied. 
Typically an act has more than one motivation’ (Maslow, 1943: 370). 
Maslow distinguished between different types of need, ranging from 
basic physiological needs such as the need for food and sleep, to the 
need for creativity, respect, and meaning. He suggested that ‘human 
needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre‑potency. That is to 
say, the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction 
8. A good example of this is the OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS), 
conducted in 34 countries and representative of over 5 million teachers. Questions are deliberately 
framed in terms of teacher satisfaction.
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of another, more pre‑potent need’ (Maslow: 370). In other words, 
humans are not motivated to satisfy their ‘higher‑order’ needs until 
they have first met their more basic needs. Maslow arranged the 
various needs he identified into groups, which he then organized 
into a hierarchy based on the order in which the needs would be 
pursued. The most basic needs at the bottom of this hierarchy were 
physiological (breathing, food, water, shelter, sleep), followed by 
safety and security (health, employment, property, family, social 
stability), love and belonging (friendship, family, intimacy, sense 
of connection), self‑esteem (confidence, achievement, the respect 
of others), and self‑actualization (morality, creativity, acceptance, 
experience of purpose, meaning, and inner potential).
Dual-factor theory
Herzberg’s (1968) dual‑factor theory of job satisfaction also makes use 
of the idea of differing types of human need. In his original research, 
Herzberg asked an initial sample of engineers and accountants to 
describe events that had occurred at work which led to satisfaction, 
and events that led to dissatisfaction. He discovered that the factors 
most often referred to as producing job satisfaction were distinct from 
those most often reported as producing job dissatisfaction. Factors that 
dissatisfied people related to the job environment, including company 
policy and administration, supervision, interpersonal relationships, 
working conditions, salary, status, and security. However, these factors 
did not appear as often in descriptions of what made people most 
satisfied. On the contrary, these factors were related mostly to the 
nature of the job: achievement, recognition of achievement, the work 
itself, responsibility, and growth and advancement. In other words, 
it appeared that satisfaction was not the opposite of dissatisfaction; 
rather, the two states existed on separate scales altogether. Put another 
way, the things which made people dissatisfied were not simply the 
opposite of what made them satisfied. His findings were replicated 
on numerous occasions with different populations in America and 
Europe (Herzberg, 1968). 
Herzberg described the factors relating to working conditions 
and dissatisfaction avoidance as ‘hygiene factors’. Just as hygiene, while 
necessary for the prevention of disease, does not guarantee good health, 
so satisfactory working conditions, while necessary for the prevention 
of dissatisfaction, do not bring about true satisfaction. It is helpful 
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here to distinguish between something being satisfactory (which 
working conditions can be) and satisfying (which Herzberg claims 
they cannot). Those factors which do bring about truly ‘satisfying’ 
job satisfaction Herzberg called ‘motivators’. By motivators, Herzberg 
intended a specific meaning: rather than encompassing everything 
which leads to motivation (a desire to do something), the term meant 
only those things which were satisfying because they fulfilled higher 
needs, like opportunities for responsibility.
Figure 2. Factors affecting job attitudes as reported in 
12 investigations
Source: Herzberg, 1968: 90.
Based on Herzberg’s dual‑factor theory, hygiene factors and 
motivation factors are independent of each other. Accordingly, 
employees can experience four possible combinations at their 
workplace. These are shown in Table 1.
The psychology underlying teacher motivation
29
Table 1. Herzberg’s dual-factor theory
4 conditions Low hygiene 
(poor working conditions 
and pay)
High hygiene 
(good working conditions 
and pay) 
Low motivation 
(work does not fulfil 
‘higher needs’)
This is the worst situation 
where employees are not 
motivated and have many 
complaints.
Employees have few 
complaints but are not 
highly motivated. The job is 
viewed as a pay cheque.
High motivation 
(work fulfils ‘higher needs’)
Employees are motivated 
but have a lot of 
complaints. A situation 
where the job is exciting 
and challenging but 
salaries and work 
conditions are poor.
The ideal situation where 
employees are highly 
motivated and have few 
complaints.
Job satisfaction of teachers
Judging by the motivation crisis described in the first chapter of this 
review, it seems that in many developing countries teachers fall into 
the fourth of Herzberg’s categories of employee experience, with 
poor working conditions and few ‘motivator’ factors (achievement, 
recognition, responsibility, growth and advancement) present as 
part of the job.9 Dual‑factor theory implies that there are two ways 
governments can go about improving this situation, corresponding 
to the two ‘factors’. On the one hand, they can improve working 
conditions, which should lead to less dissatisfaction, but no extra 
motivation. On the other hand, they can change the nature of the 
job to improve ‘motivator’ factors such as opportunities for growth, 
responsibility, and recognition, which should improve teachers’ 
motivation to do the job, but would not address the causes of 
dissatisfaction among teachers. To achieve a state of high hygiene and 
high motivation, governments need to implement both changes. 
Although this is the implication of Herzberg’s theory, Herzberg 
himself didn’t test his theory on teacher populations, and most of his 
research was carried out in the developed world (although he did test his 
9. In terms of the nature of the work itself, it is generally assumed that observing their pupils learn 
intrinsically motivates teachers.
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theory in the then developing communist countries). There is reason 
to believe workers in poor contexts may respond differently compared 
to workers in richer settings due to the extreme levels of need in 
some developing contexts, even though teachers in both contexts can 
have strong intrinsic motivation. For example, it may be that certain 
hygiene conditions, such as decent salary levels, need to be met before 
teachers can gain any satisfaction or motivation from the fulfilment of 
‘higher‑order’ needs such as recognition and responsibility (Garrett, 
1999), as suggested by Maslow’s theory. If this is the case, changing 
career structure to allow fulfilment of higher‑order needs will not have 
an effect on motivation where pay is very poor. This section examines 
the evidence regarding which factors most affect teacher satisfaction 
and motivation, as reported by teachers, and using other sources of 
evidence where available.
Remuneration
In some developing countries, such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, and 
Zambia, teacher pay is so low that basic needs are not met, and 
this seriously undermines teacher motivation. Teachers in many 
low‑income countries earn poverty wages of between $2 and $4 a day. 
As teachers in Africa typically have at least five direct dependents, 
their wages do not cover their basic subsistence needs. Bennell and 
Akyeampong (2007) came to this conclusion based on their case 
studies of teacher motivation in 12 countries.
The broad consensus among occupational psychologists in 
developed country contexts is that pay on its own does not 
increase motivation. However, pecuniary motives are likely to 
be dominant among teachers in those low‑income developing 
countries (LIDCs) where pay and other material benefits are 
too low for individual and household survival needs to be met. 
Only when these basic needs have been met is it possible for 
‘higher‑order’ needs, which are the basis of true job satisfaction, 
to be realized (14).
In all but two of their case study countries (India and Nepal), the 
‘overwhelming consensus’ from teacher and stakeholder interviews 
was that teachers were underpaid, and that this was the main factor 
undermining teacher morale and motivation. Particularly stark was 
the finding that over a third of teacher respondents in Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, and Zambia agreed with the statement that ‘teachers in this 
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school come to work hungry’. Davidson (2007) found that Tanzanian 
teachers in both rural and urban areas thought that their salaries 
were too low and, for some of them, below the minimum required 
to live a basic existence. Alam and Farid (2011) gave a questionnaire 
to 80  teachers from 10 schools in Pakistan, and found that only 
23 per cent thought their income sufficient to meet their basic financial 
requirements; 64 per cent also thought that the low income affected 
their work.
Low teacher pay can affect the quality of education students 
receive, both when teachers are present at school (due to hunger, 
stress, or general demotivation) but also when teachers are absent. 
In Malawi, low pay results in teachers being absent from school in 
order to search for food, and there is a widespread acceptance across 
countries that the ‘labour process’ has to be organized so that teachers 
can generate additional income (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). 
In other words, teachers can be absent from school because they are 
working at other jobs to supplement their salary, which lowers their 
commitment to teaching.
It is clear then that low pay is a major cause of job dissatisfaction 
in many developing countries. The question then follows, would 
improving pay increase teacher motivation? The research available 
suggests that the answer is yes, but only up to a certain point. 
Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) suggest that significant pay 
awards stemmed plummeting motivation levels among teachers in 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia. They give the example of Kenya, where 
‘there was a major motivation crisis among teachers in the 1990s, but 
with improvements in pay and other conditions of service during the 
last five years, it is probably the case that this crisis no longer exists’ 
(26). As these are low‑income countries, this effect tallies well with 
Herzberg’s (1968) theory that improving hygiene factors reduces 
dissatisfaction, and Maslow’s (1943) theory that basic needs must be 
met before higher‑order needs can be pursued. Both theories would 
also predict that salary increases beyond the amount required to meet 
the basic needs of food, accommodation, and health (and the needs 
of one’s dependents) may reduce dissatisfaction, but will not improve 
motivation on the job. This seems to be borne out by the evidence, 
as, in relatively richer countries, further pay increases do not seem to 
motivate teachers. 
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In South Asia, for example, teaching is a relatively well‑paid job, 
and competition for teaching posts can be quite intense. However, 
many teachers invest very little professional energy into public schools 
(Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). In Egypt, Abd‑El‑Fattah (2010) 
found that a pay‑increase schema for primary teachers did not have a 
significant effect on job satisfaction. In Brazil, Delannoy and Sedlacek 
(2001) noted that across‑the‑board salary increases were ineffective 
in increasing teacher performance. Michaelowa (2002) analysed data 
from teachers in Francophone Africa – who are relatively well paid 
compared to their colleagues in most other African countries – and 
concluded that salary variables showed no noticeable impact on 
teacher job satisfaction. 
In conclusion, the limited evidence available suggests that 
raising teacher pay has a positive effect in those countries where pay is 
initially too low to meet basic needs, in that it reduces dissatisfaction 
and demotivation. Raising pay in countries which pay teachers better 
does not seem to increase job satisfaction or motivation. Of course, 
dissatisfaction is not the result solely of lack of money; there are other 
areas of dissatisfaction that affect teachers’ motivation. 
Working conditions
Workloads and class sizes have increased significantly in many 
countries as a direct result of universal primary education policy, as the 
recruitment of teachers has not kept up with the increasing numbers 
of children attending school. From their 12 case studies of teacher 
motivation, Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) report that: 
increasing hours of work, larger class sizes, more subjects, and 
constantly changing curricula are cited as major de‑motivators 
in many countries. What is expected from teachers (the ‘social 
contract’) is not pitched at a realistic level in many countries given 
material rewards, workloads, and work and living environments. 
Large class sizes and heavy workloads in relation to pay (the effort‑
price of work) also make teachers resistant to the introduction of 
new teaching methodologies and other innovations (12).
Large class sizes also caused dissatisfaction among teachers in 
Ghana, as reported by Salifu (2014), and in Malawi and Papua New 
Guinea (VSO, 2002). Another problem mentioned often by teachers 
in both of these reports was the lack of teaching and learning resources, 
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such as textbooks. However, VSO lists a number of factors not often 
mentioned as sources of dissatisfaction or satisfaction by way of 
contrast: well‑constructed classrooms, furniture, teacher resource 
centres, libraries, uniforms, and sports equipment. VSO also includes 
class size on their list, although, as noted above, this is a source of 
dissatisfaction for teachers elsewhere.
Lack of teacher responsibility/autonomy
A number of studies into causes of teacher dissatisfaction report 
complaints relating to a lack of autonomy and involvement in 
decision‑making. Salifu (2014) focused specifically on what teachers 
perceived as de‑motivators in their professional practice in Ghana, and 
found abuse of authority by some principals, non‑responsiveness to 
teachers’ needs, and lack of teacher involvement in decision‑making 
to be among the factors participants perceived as de‑motivators in 
their professional practice.
Teachers in Malawi, Papua New Guinea, and Zambia were 
similarly concerned by poor teacher management and insufficient 
involvement of teachers’ representatives in policy‑making (VSO). 
Similarly, one of the main complaints made by teachers in Cyprus, 
reported by Zembylas and Papanastasiou (2006), who describe 
Cyprus as essentially a developing country, concerns their lack of 
professional autonomy. One teacher complained that ‘The educational 
system is so centralized and conservative that a teacher does not have 
any power to change anything. Even if inspectors and ministry officials 
ask for our suggestions they never implement those’ (Zembylas and 
Papanastasiou, 2006: 241). 
This finding is consistent with the results presented in the OECD 
2013 TALIS report: ‘teachers who report that they are provided with 
opportunities to participate in decision making at a school level have 
higher reported levels of job satisfaction in all TALIS countries (…). 
The relationship between job satisfaction and teacher participation 
in school decision making is particularly strong for all countries.’ 
(TALIS, 2013: 182)
Occupational status
An important factor contributing to poor teacher motivation in all 
of Bennell and Akyeampong’s (2007) country case study reports 
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is the low and declining status of the primary school teacher. The 
general understanding of teachers and stakeholders across the African 
and South Asian countries was that teaching was an undervalued 
profession, partly due to the increasing numbers of under‑qualified 
teachers employed, which is changing perceptions of the selectivity 
of the job. 
Teachers interviewed for the VSO (2002) case study gave an 
additional cause for low teacher status. The lack of career progression 
opportunities for teachers who wish to remain in the classroom means 
that those who do progress move into administrative roles, which 
leaves those still teaching feeling their status and recognition is limited. 
Changes to career structure could have an impact on occupational 
status if teachers required certification, or were able to progress to 
different roles or levels based on evaluations, for example.
Lack of career development opportunities
The single salary schedule is not only a problem for policy‑makers. 
In all the surveys hitherto reported, teachers cite a lack of career 
development opportunities as a cause of dissatisfaction. 
Teachers in Ghana complain of promotions based on long 
service (Salifu, 2014), while teachers in Cyprus cite poor teacher 
evaluation and promotion prospects (Zembylas and Papanastasiou, 
2006). Teachers in Malawi, Papua New Guinea, and Zambia, highlight 
the problem of insufficient upgrading opportunities, and show a ‘real 
hunger for promotion’ (VSO, 2002: 29). Bennell and Akyeampong 
(2007) report that, in most of their 12 case studies countries, ‘being 
able to upgrade one’s qualifications is a critically important incentive 
since it is the only way to improve significantly incomes’ (41) and 
‘despite some improvement in recent years, teacher respondents 
at the survey schools are generally very unhappy with the available 
opportunities for qualification upgrading’ (41).
As the only route to promotion in many countries is through 
improved qualifications, the prohibitive costs of these qualifications in 
some of these countries (VSO, 2002) is a barrier to teachers bettering 
themselves.
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Conclusion
Increasing pay across the board seems to have stemmed plummeting 
motivation in some countries, yet in other countries it has made no 
difference to reported job satisfaction. This seemingly contradictory 
result could be explained by Herzberg’s (1968) dual‑factor theory, 
which says that an improvement in ‘hygiene’ factors such as pay can 
reduce dissatisfaction, but cannot contribute to genuine satisfaction 
or motivation. As the countries in which increasing pay across the 
board had the most effect (Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia) had lower 
initial salaries than those in which it had no effect (Brazil and Egypt), 
it could also be said that, in the former countries, the increase in salary 
allowed for the meeting of basic needs (the lowest rung on Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs), while, in the latter, basic needs were already 
met and an increase in pay did not help meet the remaining ‘higher‑
order’ needs of achievement or self‑esteem, and hence did not lead to 
increased satisfaction.
There is no empirical evidence that basic needs have to be met 
before teachers can be satisfied or motivated by higher‑order factors, 
such as the need for achievement, responsibility, and personal growth, 
though, based on their case studies, Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) 
suggest that this may be the case. The dissatisfaction among teachers 
with current possibilities for promotion might call this into question, 
as this could be understood as a need for achievement, responsibility, 
and personal growth. However, teachers could also be motivated 
by promotion purely as a way to improve their financial situation. 
Nevertheless, some of the teachers’ complaints – loss of status, lack 
of career progression, and lack of responsibility – could potentially be 
addressed by changes to career structure.
The chapter began by outlining the relationship between 
motivation and satisfaction. This section has examined the effects of 
increased pay on job satisfaction, but has not considered pay or other 
conditions as incentives. The following section examines this point 
and explores different types of motivation.
Theories of motivation
As explained in the previous section, there is more to motivation 
than the removal of dissatisfaction. Herzberg (1968) claimed that 
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only things which satisfied higher‑order needs (what he termed 
‘motivators’) could motivate people beyond this point. But he also 
acknowledged that another way of getting employees to do things was 
to use incentives, though he preferred not to term this ‘motivation’. 
Herzberg derogatively described incentives such as material rewards 
and punishments as KITA (kick in the ass) factors (Herzberg, 1968), 
and believed they were ineffective in truly motivating employees, 
based on his own research into job satisfaction. 
Cognitive evaluation theory
Deci and Ryan’s (1985) cognitive evaluation theory (CET) has some 
similarities to Herzberg’s (1968) theory in this respect, but focuses 
entirely on motivation, rather than satisfaction and dissatisfaction, 
and uses different terminology. The theory similarly distinguishes 
between different types of motivation based on the different goals and 
reasons that give rise to an action. The most fundamental distinction is 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, which corresponds to the 
distinction between Herzberg’s ‘motivator’ factors and KITA factors. 
According to Deci and Ryan, intrinsic motivation refers to doing 
something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, whereas 
extrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it leads to a 
separable outcome, such as a reward. 
Early theories on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (e.g. Porter 
and Lawler, 1968) suggested that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
were additive, and suggested structuring the work environment to lead 
to intrinsic satisfaction as well as external rewards. However, research 
by Deci (1971) found that tangible extrinsic rewards could actually 
decrease intrinsic motivation rather than adding to it, a result known 
as the ‘undermining effect’. While the promise of rewards increased 
motivation for a short period, when the rewards stopped, people were 
less intrinsically motivated to perform the task than they were before 
rewards were offered (Deci, 1971). This mattered, because the type of 
motivation which leads to an action has an effect on the quality and 
performance of that action, and early research suggested that intrinsic 
motivation was more associated with creativity, cognitive ﬂexibility, 
and problem‑solving (Amabile, Goldfarb, and Brackﬁeld, 1990; 
McGraw, 1978) than extrinsic motivation.
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The ‘undermining effect’ was hugely controversial at the time, as 
the implication was that external rewards and incentives, which were a 
common method of motivating employees, were actually detrimental 
to employee motivation. As a result of this controversy, many more 
studies were carried out on the topic, and, eventually, Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan (1999) carried out a meta‑analysis of 128 laboratory studies, 
confirming that tangible rewards significantly undermined intrinsic 
motivation.
Table 2. Deci and Ryan’s original theory (1985):  
Cognitive evaluation theory
Type of motivation Definition Associated with
Intrinsic motivation Acting because the action 
is inherently interesting or 
enjoyable.
Creativity, problem solving, 
cognitive flexibility, 
persistence.
Extrinsic motivation Acting because the action  
leads to a separate desirable 
outcome, such as a reward.
Initial increase in frequency of 
action, but leads to decrease in 
intrinsic motivation.
If the matter were to be left here, it would seem that the 
implication for teacher careers is that extrinsic rewards should never be 
used to motivate teachers, due to their detrimental effect on intrinsic 
motivation and, consequently, on creativity, cognitive ﬂexibility, 
and problem‑solving, which are essential for teaching. However, 
two further findings, both involving Deci, who discovered the 
‘undermining effect’, add nuance to this debate. First, Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan’s (1999) meta‑analysis showed that there were limiting 
conditions to the undermining effect: when rewards were given 
independently of specific task engagement (as might be the case with 
a salary as opposed to a bonus) or when rewards were not anticipated 
(such as with unexpected bonuses), they did not undermine intrinsic 
motivation. This hinged on the extent to which rewards were seen as 
controlling behaviour rather than affirming competence, since the 
latter did not undermine intrinsic motivation, but could even increase 
it. Second, Ryan and Deci (2000) have continued to carry out research 
into intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and have subsequently further 
developed their theory to the extent that they have given it another 
name.
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Self-determination theory
Although extrinsic motivation was initially found to be a ‘pale and 
impoverished’ form of motivation compared to intrinsic motivation, 
Ryan and Deci (2000) have refined the theory over several decades of 
research, and have more recently posited that there are different types 
of extrinsic motivation, some of which are indeed ‘impoverished’ 
forms of motivation, but some of which represent ‘active, agentic states’. 
The difference between these types of extrinsic motivation depends 
on the extent to which the individual feels the ‘locus of control’ is 
internal, in other words, whether they feel they are autonomously 
choosing that action. For example, a student who does her homework 
in order to gain rewards from her parents is extrinsically motivated, as 
is a student who does her homework because she knows it will help 
with her grades, and, subsequently, her preferred career as a doctor. 
Both are extrinsically motivated as neither is performing the activity 
because they enjoy it in itself. However, the first student is complying 
with her parents’ requests in order to obtain a reward, whereas the 
second student has made the choice herself, thereby making a more 
autonomous decision. The reason the second student has made the 
choice herself is that she has internalized certain values (desiring 
a career as a doctor) and behavioural regulations (I need to do my 
homework to get good grades). 
Ryan and Deci (2000) describe a taxonomy of motivation based 
on the degree of autonomy of actions, ranging from amotivation (no 
motivation), through different types of extrinsic motivation in which 
the goals are more or less internalized, to intrinsic motivation.
External regulation is the type of extrinsic motivation previously 
described where a person only carries out an action for a reward (I 
plan my lessons because I get paid to). Introjection is a more self‑
determined type of extrinsic motivation, which stems from a desire to 
be approved of by yourself or others (I plan my lessons because that’s 
what teachers are expected to do). Identification and internalization 
are the most autonomous types of extrinsic motivation where people 
recognize the value of (identification) or completely assimilate 
(internalization) the goals that their activity is contributing to (I plan 
my lessons because I care about the children’s learning and that is part 
of my identity as a teacher). 
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Table 3. Ryan and Deci’s (2000) updated theory:  
Self-determination theory
Type of motivation Reason for action Source  
of motivation 
Intrinsic motivation








The goals of action 





















Amotivation Non-compliance No motivation present
As extrinsic motivation is now understood to encompass different 
types of motivation with different effects on behaviour, Ryan and Deci 
(2000) now use new terminology to refer to the types of motivation 
at either end of the diagram. Motivations that are externally controlled 
are known as ‘controlled motivation’, while those motivations that 
come from an internal locus of control are known as ‘autonomous 
motivation’. 
Why does it matter what motivates people, as long as they carry 
out the required behaviours? Research in laboratory settings and 
field research in various organizations suggest that organizations 
which enhance their employees’ intrinsic motivation and promote 
full internalization of extrinsic motivation will bring about various 
positive effects:
1. persistence and maintained behaviour change; 
2. effective performance, particularly on tasks requiring creativity, 
cognitive ﬂexibility, and conceptual understanding; 
3. job satisfaction; 
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4. positive work‑related attitudes; 
5. organizational citizenship behaviours; 
6. psychological adjustment and well‑being (Gagné and Deci, 
2005).
The key to enhancing intrinsic motivation and ‘internalized’ 
extrinsic motivation – which together can be termed ‘autonomous 
motivation’ – is creating conditions that allow for the fulfilment 
of three human needs: the need for competence, the need for 
autonomy, and the need for relatedness (Gagné and Deci, 2005). 
Self‑determination theory would therefore predict that situations 
where teachers feel good at their jobs, in control of their careers, and 
involved in the school community are those in which they are most 
likely to internalize or identify with school goals, and therefore be 
motivated to work hard in pursuit of those goals. It would also predict 
that because these are human needs, teachers may be motivated to 
meet these needs by working to be good at their jobs, in control of 
their careers, and involved in the school community. 
Motivation of teachers
Existing autonomous motivation
It certainly seems the case that, in developed contexts, many teachers 
have (or describe themselves as having) internalized the broader 
goals of the school, and are therefore motivated to pursue these goals. 
The OECD (McKenzie et al., 2005) examined policy responses from 
25  countries in the areas of attracting, developing, and retaining 
effective teachers, and found that:
A strong conclusion from the work is that teachers are highly 
motivated by the intrinsic benefits of teaching – working with 
children and young people, helping them to develop, and making 
a contribution to society – and that system structures and school 
workplaces need to ensure that teachers are able to focus on these 
tasks (9).
An example of this type of motivation comes from Tin, Hean, 
and Leng (1996), who interviewed 27 highly motivated primary and 
secondary school teachers in Singapore to find out what made them 
that way, finding that: 
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the relationship between teachers’ motivation and students’ 
academic performance deserves special attention. The data 
gathered in this study reveal that students’ academic progress 
or achievement is the prime motivator. The teachers felt very 
satisfied and were encouraged to give more to their students 
when they saw progress in their work (4). 
In VSO’s (2002) surveys of Malawi, Papua New Guinea, and 
Zambia, teachers reported that their primary motivation for becoming 
a teacher in the first place was a desire to communicate with young 
people. 
Does this autonomous motivation apply to teachers in poor 
contexts once they start teaching, and are they motivated to fulfil the 
‘higher‑order’ needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness which 
lead to intrinsic motivation? Or are the working conditions and pay so 
unsatisfactory that they cannot be motivated by these higher needs 
until their basic needs are met? There is not one simple answer to this 
question, as conditions differ in each country, and individual teachers 
differ in their motivations. However, the limited evidence available 
suggests that many teachers in developing contexts are motivated to 
fulfil the needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness, based on 
what they report themselves. 
The need for competence
Research carried out by Keitheile and Mokubung (2005) for the 
Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational 
Quality (SACMEQ) found that opportunities for professional 
development were rated among the top concerns for teachers in many 
countries. Nearly 96 per cent of teachers in Botswana responded that 
opportunities for professional development were ‘very important’ 
(86). As professional development often does not lead to increased 
pay in developing countries in the absence of formal certification, 
this finding suggests that teachers are motivated to improve their own 
skills. 
VSO (2002) findings in Malawi support the view that interest 
in professional development derives at least in part from a motivation 
to improve at teaching. Across all three countries surveyed, there 
was a very strong desire for opportunities for teacher development, 
and when Malawian teachers were asked their reasons for this, they 
Exploring the impact of career models on teacher motivation
42
responded that they had not received sufficient preparation or training 
to implement the new curriculum (rather than citing opportunities 
for pay or promotion). The Inter‑Agency Network for Education in 
Emergencies’ guidance notes on teacher compensation in fragile states 
(INEE, 2008) similarly concluded that professional development was 
an important motivator across states.
The INEE study found student success to be a common 
motivating factor across countries. As students improve or change 
their behaviours, even gradually, teachers are motivated to continue 
the process and a ‘success cycle’ is established, benefiting both students 
and teachers. In such situations, the need for competence is met, and 
the fulfilment of this need overlaps with the goal of education, that 
is, to enable students to be successful in their learning. In the VSO 
(2002) countries too, the good performance of pupils was cited as 
a source of positive teacher motivation, and, for female teachers in 
particular, student achievement appeared to affect their self‑worth.
However, teachers do not always care about student learning, 
and are not always motivated to be competent at their jobs. In 
South Asia, for example, where there are few repercussions for poor 
teaching, Devcota (2005) says of Nepal that ‘primary school teachers 
at government schools seem to care little about the effect of their 
performance on student achievement … Whether they teach or not, 
they are paid’ (Devcota, 2005: 13). The challenge of any teacher career 
structure is to motivate these teachers to put in more effort, without 
undermining the autonomous motivation of teachers who already do.
The need for autonomy
As noted in the previous section, a common cause of dissatisfaction 
among teachers is lack of teacher involvement in school‑level decision‑
making (VSO, 2002; Salifu, 2014) and lack of professional autonomy 
(Zembylas and Papanastasiou, 2006), indicating that teachers do value 
and would like to have more autonomy. In all three case studies carried 
out by the VSO(2002), teachers reported the educational authorities’ 
disregard for teachers’ views and voices as a source of dissatisfaction.
This perceived lack of autonomy occurs at school level, where 
teachers are unable to influence decisions. Teachers in developing 
contexts actually do have a significant degree of autonomy over how 
they teach in their own classrooms, as most countries do not have 
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regular or meaningful teacher evaluation. This autonomy allows 
for situations such as that in Nepal, described above, where some 
teachers care little about their performance and poor teaching goes 
unchallenged. A key challenge in the design of any teacher appraisal 
system or career structure is how to encourage teachers to improve their 
teaching without making them feel controlled or lacking in autonomy. 
An innovative example of this is the small grants programme in Guinea, 
where teachers bid for grants to fund professional development 
needs that they themselves identify (Dembele and Schwille, 2006). 
Teachers formed themselves into teams, including experienced 
and novice teachers, and were visited by trained ministry personnel 
who provided regular school‑based support for the professional 
development activities. 
The need for relatedness
The need for relatedness is the need to feel connected to others, and 
is satisfied when people develop close and intimate relationships. In 
the case of teachers, this could be with students, colleagues, or the 
community. 
Three studies carried out by Klassen, Perry, and Frenzel (2012) 
on 1,049 teachers in the United States suggested that, for teachers, 
satisfaction of the need for relatedness with students leads to higher 
levels of engagement and positive emotions, and lower levels of 
negative emotions, than does satisfaction of the need for relatedness 
with peers. In fact, the TALIS 2013 results show that relationships 
between teachers and students are very strongly related to teachers’ 
job satisfaction. Similarly, relationships and collaboration with peers 
also appear to be an important motivating aspect as ‘teachers who 
report participating in collaborative professional learning five times a 
year or more also report significantly enhanced levels of self‑efficacy 
in almost all countries and higher job satisfaction in two‑thirds of the 
countries’. (TALIS, 2013: 182). It is worth keeping this factor in mind 
as some reforms designed to improve teacher motivation can lead to 
competition and discord among staff (Murnane and Cohen, 1986; 
Martins, 2009).
Interviews and focus groups carried out by VSO (2002) 
suggested that teachers derive a sense of worth and value from their 
status in, and contribution to, the communities around them and 
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society at large. However, teachers in all three of the countries studied 
(Malawi, Papua New Guinea, and Zambia) felt that communities did 
not value them as they had done in the past, for the reasons discussed 
in Chapter 1. Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) note that teachers 
who work at schools in their home areas tend to have higher levels 
of job satisfaction than colleagues who are posted to the locality. 
They suggest that this is because local teachers are more likely to have 
extended social and family networks, know the community, and be 
more committed to promoting education and development activities 
in the area.
The effect of types of motivation on student outcomes
This theory and research would be of limited relevance if autonomous 
and controlled motivation both had the same effects on teachers’ 
behaviour and student outcomes. There is, however, some research 
that suggests that autonomous motivation (often still referred to as 
intrinsic in the literature) leads to more positive teacher behaviours 
and more positive effects on student behaviours, compared to 
controlled motivation.
Roth and colleagues (Roth et al., 2007) found that teachers 
who were autonomously motivated to teach reported a greater 
sense of personal achievement and reduced emotional exhaustion. 
In addition to improving teacher well‑being, cross‑cultural research 
in five European countries suggests that having autonomous 
motivation is associated with a student‑centred teaching style, 
whereas non‑autonomous motivation is associated with a more 
teacher‑centred style (Hein et al., 2012). Lam and colleagues (Lam, 
Cheng, and Choy, 2010) similarly found that school environments 
which support competence, autonomy, and collegial support (which 
suggest autonomous motivation) predict teacher motivation towards 
innovative teaching. 
This change of teaching style is likely to affect students’ learning. 
In addition, intrinsically motivated teachers are more likely than 
extrinsically motivated teachers to support students’ own autonomy 
in learning, which leads to increased intrinsic motivation among 
students (Pelletier, Séguin‑Lévesque, and Legault, 2002; Reeve, Bolt, 
and Cai, 1999; Roth et al., 2007). 
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Finally, autonomous motivation is important for engagement and 
follow‑up in teacher training, particularly when it comes to learning 
about innovations in teaching (Gorozidis and Papaioannou, 2014; 
Van Eekelen, Vermunt, and Boshuizen, 2006). It is no surprise that 
autonomous motivation to learn something leads to better learning 
and performance, greater creativity, and greater persistence in the 
face of difficulty than being externally motivated to learn (Gagné and 
Deci, 2005), as in the earlier example of girls doing their homework 
for different reasons. The same applies to teachers’ learning (Shulman 
and Shulman, 2004).
Individual differences
Of course, the factors which motivate individual teachers may vary 
between countries, within countries, and among different types of 
teachers. Some of the differences in teacher motivation between 
countries have been discussed above, although current data are 
insufficient to draw any firm conclusions. Within countries, teacher 
motivation depends on the school context (Lam et al., 2010) and 
may also depend on the role of the teacher. For example, volunteer 
or contract teachers may be motivated to become qualified teachers, 
whereas qualified teachers are more likely to be motivated by money 
and/or altruism (INEE, 2008). 
In their self‑determination theory, Deci and Ryan (1985) argue 
that, even in the same situation, people have tendencies to be motivated 
in different ways. They describe ‘autonomy‑oriented’ people, who are 
more likely to see themselves as being in control of their situation, and 
therefore more likely to be autonomously motivated, and contrast 
them with ‘control‑oriented people’, who tend to experience social 
contexts as controlling and, therefore, be driven by ‘controlled’ 
motivation. Motivation therefore depends on both the environment 
(and the extent to which it supports competence, autonomy, and 
relatedness) and individual traits.
Some parallels might be drawn between these traits and Jessop 
and Penny’s (1998) ‘frames of understanding’, based on an analysis of 
the perceptions of primary school teachers in the Gambia and South 
Africa. They found that some teachers were more likely to lean towards 
understanding teaching as a technical process, and be more concerned 
about extrinsic incentives, while others tended to see education as a 
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moral activity and were motivated mainly by a nurturing relationship 
with the pupils. The former ‘frame of understanding’ they called 
‘instrumental’; the latter ‘relational’. 
Conclusion
In surveys of teacher motivation in developing countries, teachers 
rate opportunities for professional development as among their top 
concerns. At least some of them do so from a desire to develop their 
talents and become better at their job rather than just to earn more 
money. Teachers are also motivated by student learning, with many 
joining the profession because of a desire to work with young people. 
However, as recounted in the previous chapter, many teachers are 
demotivated, and a lack of accountability means that this demotivation 
can lead to a lack of effort. It remains unclear from the research 
whether teachers can be autonomously motivated by having needs for 
competence, autonomy, and relatedness fulfilled, without first having 
their basic living needs met. If autonomous motivation is achievable, 
despite poor living conditions, states with financial constraints could 
take steps towards better motivating teachers without having to invest 
heavily in salaries. If not, no change to career structure will help 
improve the situation until salaries have risen to meet basic needs. 
This is an area that would benefit from further research. 
It is important for teachers’ well‑being, persistence, job 
satisfaction, and quality of teaching (problem solving and creativity) 
that they are, as far as possible, autonomously motivated rather than 
motivated by extrinsic incentives. This would suggest that careers for 
teachers should be structured in a way that allows teachers to work 
towards competence, to have autonomy over the direction of their 
careers, and to work in an environment of relatedness where they work 
with and are supported by their colleagues. The latter, for example, 
would not be supported by a career structure that put teachers in direct 
competition with one another, but by one in which teachers shared 
resources and where mentoring was the norm. Research by Deci, 
Koestner, and Ryan (1999) also suggests that introducing extrinsic 
incentives, such as performance‑related pay, might undermine 
whatever autonomous motivation that teachers already have.
However, research into individual differences (and common 
sense) suggests that some teachers will never be autonomously 
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motivated, particularly where teaching is a career of last resort. 
Consequently, a well‑designed teacher career structure would 
encourage autonomous motivation where possible, but incorporate 
extrinsic incentives in such a way that they motivated the remaining 
‘control‑orientated’ teachers without undermining the autonomous 
motivation of everyone else. A balance needs to be struck between 
encouraging autonomous motivation in teachers, and holding them 
accountable for the quality of their teaching. A range of programmes 
have been implemented in different countries to improve the 
motivation of teachers. Some strike this balance, while others do not. 
The following chapters review different types of career organization, 
and, where data are available, their success. 
The psychology of motivation also has implications for 
recruitment into teaching. Herzberg’s research suggested that 
people are motivated by higher‑order needs such as the need for 
responsibility, personal growth, and recognition. At the moment, 
the career structure in countries with a single salary structure does 
not suggest to potential recruits that they would have these needs 
fulfilled. A career structure with required improvement accompanied 
by recognition, possibly through several career stages, might improve 
the appeal of the profession. 
The next chapter considers approaches that attempt to motivate 




External incentives for teacher input 
In order to overcome common problems in the areas of teacher 
recruitment, attraction to hard‑to‑staff areas, and teacher attendance, 
some states and researchers have implemented programmes designed 
to reward teachers for specific behaviours, such as working in rural 
areas, gaining qualifications, and becoming a teacher in the first place.
Incentives to become a teacher
A few countries offer to pay for teaching degrees in order to encourage 
more students to become teachers. This is the approach taken in 
Victoria, Australia, but it is limited to the extent that a substantial 
number of students take the degree without subsequently becoming 
teachers (Sclafani, 2009). Other countries such as Chile, and states 
such as Mississippi, Oklahoma, and the sovereign state of Singapore 
have overcome this problem by requiring graduates who have taken 
advantage of free or reduced tuition to teach for a certain number of 
years. If graduates choose not to teach, they are typically required to 
pay back the cost of the tuition. 
Incentives to work in rural areas
According to Bennell (2004), ‘The low proportion of qualified and 
experienced teachers working in rural schools is one of the most 
serious problems preventing the attainment of EFA with reasonable 
learning outcomes in most LIDCs’ (16). This was also the conclusion 
of Bennell and Akyeampong’s (2007) case studies: all of their case 
study regions cited ‘better incentives for rural teachers’ as a top priority 
for addressing teachers’ poor motivation. Teachers are reluctant to 
teach in rural areas, in part because of the living conditions. In Ghana 
for example, rural areas typically lack paved roads, electricity facilities, 
clean drinking water, health care facilities, decent accommodation, 
and food for purchase (Cobbold, 2006).
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Most countries pay various kinds of allowances to teachers 
working in rural locations, but in some countries, such as Nigeria, these 
incentives exist on paper only, as the money is rarely paid (Adelabu, 
2005). In Kenya, the hardship allowance of an additional 20 per cent 
of  teachers’ salary does not begin to make up for the difficulties faced 
in these regions (Hyde, Muito, and Muito, 2005). In Bolivia, teachers 
are also paid an additional 20 per cent for working in inaccessible areas, 
but, despite this, rural teachers are twice as likely as urban teachers to 
lack full teacher preparation (Vegas, 2005).
Incentives to attend school
Programmes that incentivize teachers to attend school have been 
designed and trialled by researchers and NGOs, rather than instigated 
by states at national level. However, evidence of their success is mixed. 
Kremer, Glewwe, Chen, and Moulin (2001, reported in Bruns 
et  al., 2011) evaluated an intervention programme in Kenyan 
pre‑schools which rewarded teachers with as much as 85 per cent of 
their salary as a bonus, based on attendance. However, they found 
that the programme had no effect on teacher attendance, test scores, 
or pedagogy. Head teachers were given the task of awarding bonuses 
based on teacher attendance, but the evaluation found that they 
regularly paid the whole bonus to teachers, even though absence rates 
did not decline.
Conversely, Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2007, reported in Bruns 
et al., 2011) evaluated a programme in Rajasthan (India), that left the 
attendance monitoring to cameras with tamper‑proof time and date 
functions, monitored by distant NGO workers. The teachers’ salaries 
were a function of their attendance. They received a bonus for each day 
they attended above the required minimum of 20 days a month, and 
were fined for each day they failed to attend below this minimum. As a 
result, teacher absence decreased by half and student scores improved 
compared to scores in control schools.
Incentivizing qualifications
The main issue with incentivizing qualifications for teachers was 
outlined in Chapter 1, as a key problem with the single salary schedule. 
Qualifications do not always lead to improved performance, so 
incentivizing teachers to pursue them by rewarding qualifications 
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with higher salaries can be an ineffective use of scarce funds. However, 
this is not necessarily the case, as it depends on the quality of the 
qualification, and whether passing it involves a suitable evaluation that 
can be failed. 
Many governments, including in England and Wales, the 
Republic of Korea, Israel, Switzerland, Northern Ireland, and parts of 
the United States of America, require the completion of professional 
development courses for re‑certification10 or promotion (processes 
discussed below) (OECD, 2013). In Ontario (Canada), teachers can 
take additional qualifications in order to move to a higher ‘certification 
rating statement’, on which their salary is based. These qualifications 
only count if they come from a provider accredited by the Ontario 
College of Teachers, which has strict guidelines for how the courses 
must be run, based on evidence of what constitutes effective 
professional development.
Since qualifications do not always lead to better teacher 
performance and student outcomes, some states and countries have 
attempted to improve teacher performance by offering bonuses based 
on student results. 
External incentives for teacher output – payment by results
The most common type of reform implemented with the intention 
of improving teacher motivation is often referred to as ‘merit pay’ 
or ‘performance‑related pay’ (PRP). These terms have been used to 
describe a wide range of approaches, including any programme in 
which evaluation can affect pay, however indirectly. For the purposes of 
clarity, in this review ‘performance‑related pay’ refers to programmes 
that award teachers one‑off financial rewards for desired performance, 
either as measured by student grades in standardized tests, or by 
broader teacher evaluation. ‘Payment by results’ (PBR) is used to 
describe programmes that base bonuses on student results only. Most 
PBR reforms have been implemented in developed countries, and, in 
particular, in the United States. However, the evidence base supporting 
this kind of reform is mixed, with only some reforms having an effect 
on student results, and those that do having questionable effects on 
10. Re-certification is a process whereby teachers have to undergo an evaluation to verify that they 
are still working at the standard required to be a certified teacher.
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teacher behaviour. This section begins with reviews of research into 
PRP across the public sector, before reviewing the research into PRP 
for teachers.
Performance-related pay across the public sector
As this is an area of great interest and some controversy, a number 
of empirical reviews have been carried out into the effectiveness of 
‘performance by results’ programmes across the public sector.
As far back as 1986, Perry reviewed the research on contingent 
pay for public managers and failed to find a single study that showed 
positive effects of the approach. The National Research Council was 
commissioned by the US government to review research on pay for 
performance in both public and private sectors, and concluded overall 
that there was a gap between the promise and the reality of pay‑for‑
performance programmes (Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991). Individual 
incentive programmes could motivate employees, the researchers 
found, but they were most likely to succeed for simple, structured jobs 
in contexts where fair performance goals could be set.
In 1993, Kellough and Lu carried out a major synthetic review 
of 14 empirical studies of merit pay, covering public sector managers, 
public school administrators, and local government employees. They 
concluded: ‘Generally, merit pay systems have had little positive 
impact on employee and organization performance’ (48). More 
recently, Perry (2009) and colleagues developed a comprehensive 
database of research on PRP including 57 studies, to see whether 
research carried out post‑1993 showed more promising effects of 
these types of reforms. They concluded, in line with research prior to 
1993, that PRP in the public sector ‘consistently fails to deliver on its 
promise’ (Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009: 7). 
Payment by results for teachers
Other research has investigated the effects of payment by results 
with a specific focus on teachers. The most up‑to‑date and thorough 
research, evaluating US programmes which give teachers bonuses 
based on student results, is being carried out by the National Centre 
on Performance Incentives (NCPI). The centre evaluates programmes 
that financially reward individual teachers or groups of teachers, and 
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consistently finds little or no difference between the scores of students 
in those schools that implement PBR and those that do not. 
For example, a three‑year long pilot in Nashville offered large 
bonuses (up to 400 per cent of a monthly wage) to individual maths 
teachers on the basis of student test scores. At the end of the trial, they 
found no difference between the scores of students whose teachers 
were eligible for the bonus and those in control schools that were not 
(Springer et al., 2010). The authors of another of the NCPI’s reports 
on a PBR programme (this time rewarding groups of teachers) suggest 
that the project may have failed for similar reasons: 
The financial awards were an add‑on to standard pay, performance 
was measured separately from the districts’ standard evaluations 
of teachers (except in one of the programs evaluated), and there 
was no professional development specifically connected to these 
programs (Springer et al., 2012: 21). 
Yuan and colleagues (Yuan et al., 2013) examined teacher surveys 
from three of the NCPI evaluated studies, and concluded that most 
teachers involved did not find the incentive programmes motivating, 
nor did it affect their instruction, stress level, or the number of hours 
they worked. 
Conversely, an evaluation of an individual teacher bonus 
programme by Lavy (2004) in Israel found that the test scores of 
students with teachers taking part in the programme increased, 
compared to the control group. In this programme, teachers were 
ranked according to the value‑added scores11 of their students, and 
the top‑performing teachers were awarded with large bonuses: up to 
30 per cent of a teacher’s base salary. Lavy investigated the behaviour 
of the teachers by carrying out a telephone survey with the teachers 
themselves. Teachers in the programme reported spending more 
time on student instruction out of school hours and running after‑
school classes, and were more likely to track their students by ability. 
Participating English teachers were more likely to focus their efforts on 
weaker students than non‑participating English teachers, while maths 
teachers were more likely to focus on average and strong students.
11. Value-added is a measure that takes into account the students’ previous scores, and calculates the 
impact the teacher has had on their final scores, relative to the initial scores.
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Only one ‘payment by results’ programme for individual 
teachers in developing contexts has been implemented and evaluated, 
though this is the case for other programmes that reward whole 
schools (e.g.  Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer, 2003). Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2009) evaluated a programme involving 100 schools 
in Andhra Pradesh, where bonuses were given to any teacher who 
raised the average maths and language test scores of their class by 
5 per cent or more, compared to a baseline. Any further improvement 
on this was rewarded incrementally, with the average bonus being 
35 per cent of a teacher’s monthly salary. Scores increased significantly 
in schools which operated the programme, compared to control 
schools. However, investigations into teachers’ behaviour change 
produced mixed results. The researchers assessed changes through 
classroom observations and teacher interviews, but found that while 
teachers reported having given more homework and classwork, extra 
classes, practice tests, and more attention to weaker children, the 
classroom observations reported no difference in these areas. The 
authors suggested that this was because many of the behaviours took 
place outside of class time. 
Glewwe, Holla, and Kremer (2009) suggest that there are two 
types of effort teachers can exert: ‘genuine teaching effort’ which 
promotes long‑term learning, and ‘signalling effort’ which improves 
scores in the short term but has little effect on long‑term learning. 
It is not too great a stretch to marry these different types of effort 
to the concepts of autonomous and controlled motivation from the 
psychological literature (Gagné and Deci, 2005). Glewwe, Holla, and 
Kremer suggest there are three ways to distinguish between these two 
types of effort in evaluations of incentive programmes. First, direct 
observation of teacher behaviour can provide clues, as some activities, 
such as greater teacher attendance and changing teaching styles, are 
more likely to lead to long‑term learning, whereas others, such as extra 
exam preparation, suggest ‘signalling’ behaviour. Second, the length of 
time the effects on learning last once a programme has ended provides 
a clue as to the kind of effort made previously by teachers. Third, the 
ways in which test scores increase can offer an indication: if subjects 
that are easier to memorize or test types which are easier to ‘game’ 
increase more than others, it suggests signalling effort; similarly if only 
the subjects directly involved in the incentive programme improve, 
this too suggests signalling effort. 
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Evidence of changes in teacher behaviour in the Andhra Pradesh 
programme is muddied by the contrasting findings of observations and 
self‑reporting interviews. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) 
suggest that the observers may have missed changes in the teachers’ 
behaviour on their visits, as they found that the students of teachers 
who reported giving extra classes, extra classwork, and practice tests 
had higher test scores. Glewwe, Holla, and Kremer (2009), however, 
urge caution. In a similar evaluation of PRP for groups of teachers in 
Kenya (2003), they found that teachers in the programme schools 
reported giving more homework, but that interviews with students 
suggested an increase in preparation sessions but no additional 
homework. More preparation classes and more practise tests, if they 
did take place as reported by the teachers, are indicators of a ‘signalling 
approach’ to effort. Lavy’s (2004) report of behaviour changes 
among teachers in Israel must also be interpreted cautiously given the 
possibility of teachers exaggerating their behaviour changes.
The results of the Andhra Pradesh programme on long‑term 
learning were not followed up, so it is not possible to ascertain 
whether the programme led to a permanent increase in learning or just 
a short‑term gain. Scores in subjects not involved in the programme 
did increase (but to a lesser degree), which could mean that there was 
a positive spill‑over effect from maths and language (Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman, 2009), or that students had improved their exam 
technique, with an impact on all subjects. 
Criticisms of payment-by-results programmes
Although 29 states in America had initiated some sort of merit pay 
programme by 1986, most were diluted or discontinued over the 
course of the next 20 years (Dee and Keys, 2005). It would appear that 
there are problems inherent in this approach, a number of which have 
been raised in the literature on performance‑related pay for teachers 
(Clotfelter et al., 2008; Cullen and Reback, 2006; Deere and Strayer, 
2001; Figlio and Getzler, 2002; Glewwe et al., 2009; Jacob, 2002; 
Koretz, 2002; Murnane and Cohen, 1986; Podgursky and Springer, 
2007).
The most obvious criticism of payment or bonuses based 
on student results is that teachers with less able students are 
disadvantaged, as the relatively low scores of these students preclude 
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teachers from receiving rewards for any improvements they have 
brought about. Most systems have attempted to avoid this problem 
by linking pay to improvement in scores rather than absolute scores, 
and through measures that purport to take into account background 
characteristics that might make students harder to teach (Podgursky 
and Springer, 2007). Nevertheless, this approach does not always take 
sufficient account of the relative difficulties encountered in improving 
some students’ results. Since the introduction of a school‑level 
bonus programme in North Carolina, there has been an increase in 
teachers transferring out of schools that serve disadvantaged students 
(Clotfelter et al., 2008). There are concerns too about the statistical 
reliability and robustness of these value‑added estimates (Podgursky 
and Springer, 2007). 
Student scores are also affected by multiple additional factors, 
which are difficult to control for. Home environment, parenting, 
and individual student characteristics all have an effect on test 
scores, and remain out of the control of teachers. For individual 
performance‑related pay, another difficulty is that students often have 
more than one teacher across different subjects, which can influence 
how they perform in other subjects (through personal motivation or 
improved English affecting history scores, for example). Finally, even 
if scores at the beginning of the year are taken into account, previous 
teachers may have an effect on children’s performance (Koretz, 2002). 
All of these additional factors affect the validity of using student results 
as a measure of teacher performance.
Beyond the difficulties associated with using test scores as a 
measure of teacher quality or effort, performance‑related pay has been 
criticized for its effects on teacher behaviour. Murnane and Cohen 
(1986) argue that performance‑related pay is particularly damaging 
in the education sector, as it encourages competition among teachers, 
thereby disincentivizing cooperation and collaboration. Murnane 
and Cohen (1986) suggest that group‑level bonuses may avoid this 
problem, but others (e.g. Prendergast, 1999) have criticized this 
approach, as it can lead to some teachers enjoying a ‘free ride’ and 
receiving bonuses based on the effort of others. 
Another concern regarding teachers’ behavioural response 
to PBR is the criticism alluded to above by Glewwe and colleagues 
(2009), who distinguished between different types of effort. 
Exploring the impact of career models on teacher motivation
56
Otherwise known as ‘multi‑tasking’ (Podgursky and Springer, 2007), 
this criticism of PBR concerns the fact that the desired outcomes of 
teachers’ work are broader than merely increasing test results. When 
test results are used as the sole measure on which bonuses are based, 
teachers may shift their attention to improving this outcome to the 
detriment of other outcomes. This narrowing of focus can be seen in 
the practice of ‘teaching to the test’, where teachers focus excessively 
on practice exams or the content of specific tests, as suggested by 
the increase in after‑school classes in PBR programmes in Kenya 
(Glewwe et al., 2003), Israel (Lavy, 2004), and India (Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman, 2009). It can also incentivize teachers to cheat by 
altering test scores, helping the students during tests ( Jacob and Levitt, 
2003; Koretz et al., 1996), and strategically excluding weaker students 
from taking tests (Deere and Strayer, 2001; Figlio and Getzler, 2002; 
Cullen and Reback, 2006). 
More fundamentally, payment‑by‑results programmes rely 
solely on extrinsic incentives, which psychologists (and, more 
recently, economists, such as Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) believe 
encourages extrinsic or ‘controlled’ motivation, at the expense of 
intrinsic or ‘autonomous’ motivation. This is the case because such 
incentives typically treat teachers as workers who must be managed 
into producing particular outcomes for the organization, rather than 
as professionals who are willing partners in achieving organizational 
goals. The result of undermining this intrinsic or autonomous 
motivation in other fields has been a reduction in persistence, well‑
being, problem‑solving, and creativity at work (Gagné and Deci, 2005). 
However, there is some nuance in the psychological theory – Ryan, 
Mims, and Koestner (1983) found that when rewards are contingent 
on high performance, they can be seen as affirmation of competence, 
which contributes to intrinsic motivation and so can offset some of the 
negative effects of feeling controlled. The balance between these two 
depends on the interpersonal relationships in that context: whether 
the teacher feels controlled in their daily work. Unfortunately, none 
of the performance‑related pay programmes that have been evaluated 
look at their long‑term effects on teacher motivation or behaviour, 
or examine their problem‑solving or creativity in lessons, so it is not 
possible to establish whether this effect plays out with teachers. 
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Those PBR reforms which have led to an increase in student 
results have offered significant bonuses: an average of 35 per 
cent of base salary in the Indian programme (Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman, 2009) and 30 per cent in Israel (not that large bonuses 
are a guarantee of improvement as was shown in the case of Nashville’s 
400 per cent bonus offer). If staff can be motivated by the provision of 
an environment supporting autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
(as suggested by Ryan and Deci, 2000), this money can be spent in 
a way that does more than simply bring about an increase in teacher 
effort (whether this takes the form of signalling effort or genuine 
effort) and results in better teacher quality too, for example, by paying 
for high‑quality professional development.
Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) make a distinction between 
‘will‑do’ and ‘can‑do’ motivation. PBR initiatives seem, in some 
contexts, to have the effect of increasing teacher effort, but this may 
not lead to substantial improvement in student outcomes if the 
teacher does not know how to improve their teaching methods. In this 
context, they may possess the ‘will do’ attitude, but not the ‘can do’ 
capabilities. 
PBR initiatives use only student results to judge how well a 
teacher is doing, and to decide how they should be paid. The next 
chapter outlines the possible use of broader measures of teacher 
performance, including programmes that continue to incentivize 
higher performance using bonuses, and programmes that move 
beyond the direct linking of pay with performance.
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Chapter 4 
Design of summative teacher appraisal
Methods of teacher appraisal
Some of the problems with payment‑by‑results programmes outlined 
in the last chapter concerned the use of student results as a proxy 
measure for teacher quality. Another problem concerned the potential 
lack of guidance in PBR programmes on how to improve teaching, 
leaving teachers willing but unable to better themselves. This chapter 
outlines approaches that overcome these problems by attempting to 
evaluate teaching quality directly, and by offering frameworks within 
which teachers can identify their development needs. 
In addition to evaluation by student results, as discussed in 
Chapter  3, teachers can be evaluated through the use of lesson 
observations, interviews, tests, portfolios, peer or administrator 
judgement, and parent and pupil surveys.
Lesson observations 
A common method of teacher evaluation is lesson observation. Senior 
teachers or external assessors observe a teacher’s lesson, often with 
some rubric against which the lesson can be judged, and consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of the teaching. This is one of the most 
common methods of evaluation used across countries (OECD, 
2013). Sometimes these observations are carried out by principals, 
and sometimes by external assessors, as is the case in Zurich where a 
specially trained team of school committee representatives assesses a 
teacher’s suitability for promotion.
Teacher interviews
In most cases, teacher interviews are carried out by a member of the 
senior leadership team. As part of the appraisal process, the teacher 
may have previously carried out a self‑evaluation and identified 
development goals. The discussion in the interview then centres 
around the progress the teacher has made towards meeting those 
goals. Teacher interviews form a part of the appraisal process in 
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Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Singapore, the Slovak Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (OECD, 2013).
However, if teacher interviews are used as the sole method 
of teacher appraisal, or the criteria for success are not clear and 
transparent, this method can lead to staff distrust of the process. 
Under Australia’s Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) scheme, decisions 
about promotion criteria were devolved to local authorities, which 
lacked the expertise or resources to develop appraisal standards and 
systems that were reliable. Ingvarson (2013) reports that promotion 
decisions were based on an interview by a panel including the school 
principal, a colleague, a local government representative, and a teacher 
from another school. As this was the sole method of appraisal, and 
evaluations of teaching were not considered, it was difficult for panels 
to grant AST status without seeming biased. As a result, they approved 
almost everyone who applied who was eligible, leading to a loss of 
credibility in the process and in AST status (Ingvarson, 2013). 
Teacher tests
As part of Chile’s Pedagogical Excellence Award, teachers have to 
take a written test to assess their pedagogical and subject knowledge 
(Vegas, 2005). This approach to teacher appraisal is more common in 
Latin American countries than elsewhere, although passing a test is 
a common requirement for entering the profession across the world. 
Brazil, Colombia, Equador, Mexico, and Peru use teacher tests for 
regular appraisal (Vegas, 2005), while Luxembourg, Slovenia, and 
Sweden use tests as part of their teacher probation or registration 
processes (OECD, 2005). In Japan, teachers have to take a pedagogical 
knowledge test in order to be considered for a principal position. As 
noted in Chapter 1, Wilson and colleagues (2002) concluded that 
there is a threshold level of subject matter knowledge necessary for 
good teaching, while Goldhaber (2007) found that some teacher 
licensure tests correlated with student achievement. However, this 
should not be the sole method for determining the quality of teachers, 
as Goldhaber (2007) also found that some less effective teachers did 
well on such tests, and some more effective teachers performed poorly. 
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Portfolios or reports
The second part of the evaluation for Chile’s Pedagogical Excellence 
award consists of a teacher portfolio (Vegas, 2005). Portfolios are 
commonly used across countries for the purposes of evaluation, 
and can include lesson plans and teaching resources designed by 
the teacher, self‑reported questionnaires, samples of students’ work, 
sample commentaries on that work, and reflection sheets. The 
particular items in the portfolio will be selected based on the criteria 
a teacher is being evaluated against, for example, teacher standards 
for newly qualified teachers. Portfolios form a key part of the teacher 
appraisal process in Arizona (Driscoll, 2015).
One drawback of using portfolios for teacher evaluation purposes 
is that they can take a long time to compile. The OECD’s Teachers for the 
21st Century report suggests that systems should encourage teachers 
to design portfolios that make use of work already in the process of 
completion. One alternative, employed in Zurich, is to have teachers 
write a report on their pedagogical practices, which they submit to the 
review board as part of their evaluation (OECD, 2013).
Parent or student surveys
Parent and student surveys are rarely used systematically as part of 
teacher appraisal within OECD countries. There are a small number 
of exceptions, however. Mexico uses student surveys, while Canada, 
New Zealand, Poland, and Slovenia use parental surveys.  
Jacob and Lefgren (2005) report that parents are more likely to 
rate highly teachers who promote student satisfaction, than they are 
those who simply generate high test scores. Including this dimension 
could, therefore, present an interesting addition to approaches that 
seek to capture a more holistic teacher output than high student 
scores. However, some parents have very little involvement with the 
school, a consideration which led Tekleselassie (2005) to question the 
validity of the use of parental surveys. 
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Approaches to summative teacher appraisal
As well as choosing which methods to use to evaluate teachers, 
designers of teacher accountability reforms12 must also decide how 
to use the outputs of those individual methods to derive an overall 
outcome. Some countries use a cumulative approach, allocating points 
to the outcomes of different methods and other factors; others use the 
outputs of each method to reach an overall judgement about whether 
the teacher has met a set of specified standards. Another decision 
concerns the allocation of bonuses, salary increases, or promotions 
on the basis of appraisal, and whether to offer these rewards to every 
teacher that satisfies certain criteria, or to compare teachers with one 
another, and only offer these rewards to the best among them. These 
decisions may have an impact on the success of the reforms, as they 
have differential effects on teacher behaviours.
Cumulative appraisal 
Mexico’s Carrera Magisterial Programme is an example of a cumulative 
appraisal system that uses points (Vegas, 2005). Teachers can attain 
higher levels of pay on the basis of their total point score, which derives 
from their educational qualifications, their professional development, 
their years of experience, their students’ performance, and peer 
review. A formula combines points from these areas to produce a total 
score of up to 100, with student performance accounting for one‑fifth 
of the available points. Teachers receive a salary premium depending 
on their score. 
Another cumulative system was introduced in Portugal in 
2007 (Martins, 2009). In an effort to move away from the single 
salary schedule, the government introduced a reform whereby 
teachers could progress from one salary scale to a higher one on the 
basis of an appraisal. This appraisal comprised a number of factors, 
each weighted differently, including feedback from parents, the 
academic performance of students, teacher attendance, completion 
of professional development courses, fulfilment of managerial duties, 
and involvement in research practices. 
12. Accountability reforms are those which hold teachers accountable in some way for the quality of 
their teaching.
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One strength of this approach is that the overall outcome is 
objective and transparent, as it consists simply of adding up points 
(though it may still depend on individual subjective methods). There 
is therefore less risk of favouritism or corruption in the allocation of 
teacher bonuses, salaries, or promotion. However, the downside to 
using a cumulative approach is that teachers do not have to perform 
well in all desired areas to receive a good appraisal. For example, a 
teacher may be given a reasonable score in a peer evaluation, with the 
only criticism being their lack of attention to the weakest students in 
the class. The same teacher may also receive a reasonable score from 
a parent evaluation, highlighting the same area of weakness. These 
two reasonable scores, combined with the teacher’s participation in 
professional development and the number of years spent teaching, 
may lead to promotion without any effort being made to address this 
area of weakness. 
Another problem with this approach is that it encourages teachers 
to try to gain the highest point score in ways that may be incompatible 
with improved educational outcomes. For example, in the case of 
the Portuguese reform, student results actually deteriorated after 
its introduction. One reason given for this by Martins (2009), who 
evaluated the policy, was that teachers awarded higher internal marks 
to students than were fair, in order to increase their own point scores. 
This is an example of the ‘signalling’ behaviour identified by Glewwe 
and colleagues (2009), and suggests that teachers were motivated 
extrinsically rather than by a desire to improve their practice for the 
sake of their own development or the good of the students.
Holistic appraisal
A more common approach to determining appraisal outcomes 
involves taking a more holistic view of the appraisal process, with a 
principal, for example, considering all the evidence before deciding 
whether a teacher is good enough to receive a salary increase and be 
promoted. In Chicago, Jacob and Walsh (2011) found that evaluations 
by principals based on lesson observations constituted an accurate 
reflection of teacher quality and a good proxy for student performance. 
Additionally, the OECD found that 83 per cent of teachers in their 
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TALIS survey felt this kind of appraisal to be a fair assessment of their 
work (OECD, 2013). This approach is open to abuse, however, and 
depends hugely on the quality of the principal.
Some countries try to make principals’ evaluations more reliable 
by training them in assessment procedures. Many others, though, take 
a more sophisticated approach, devising a framework or description of 
what is expected of teachers, against which teachers can be evaluated 
for the purposes of registration, professional development, pay, or 
promotion. Indeed, Dinham, Ingvarson, and Kleinhenz (2008) argue 
that it is essential to link appraisal systems to teaching standards in 
order for them to have a positive effect on the education system.
This is a common approach, with teachers in Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany (everywhere except 
Berlin), Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal (for 
classroom observations only), Slovak Republic, the United Kingdom 
(except Northern Ireland), and the United States all evaluated against 
national or regional teacher standards, sometimes in addition to 
school‑level frameworks and personal development goals (OECD, 
2013). In the Czech Republic and Hungary, teachers are assessed 
against internal school regulations, while in Estonia and Slovenia 
there are national regulations for promotion. In Finland, teachers are 
evaluated against the content and goals of the national curriculum and 
school‑level goals. In the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Poland, and Singapore they are assessed against a description of the 
general and professional duties of teachers (OECD, 2013).
Teacher standards in different countries vary in terms of their 
quality, and also in terms of their definition of good teaching, as this 
varies across different cultural contexts. Nevertheless, they do share 
key features, and most include standards that fall under the three 
domains of disciplinary knowledge, teaching practice, and teaching 
values (CEPPE, 2013). Table 4 is taken from the Centre of Study for 
Policies and Practices in Education’s review of teaching standards in 
14 countries and regions.
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Au Qn* Vc 
*








- Knowledge and understanding of the subject  
  (expressed in general terms)
- Knowledge and understanding of the subject (specified  
  for each particular subject and stages of schooling )






- Know, value, and teach according to student characteristics 
   (different cultures, past experience, educational needs, etc.)
- Understand and use knowledge about how students learn 
   (theories of learning and development)
- Hold high expectations about all students
- Know how to teach disciplinary content
- Develop higher order critical thinking and skills
- Plan, implement, and assess teaching and learning
- Create and sustain an environment that encourages 
   learning
- Value the families’ role in student learning and development
- Promote social values and ethics among students
- Know how to use ICT for learning
- Incorporate democratic values in classroom teaching 
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*
NZ
Values and professional teaching practice
- Be committed to students’ learning and development
- Reflect on his or her teaching practice
- Know the rationale for and implementation of current 
   educational policies
- Commitment to professional learning  
   (continuous learning)
- Contribute and be committed to the school community
- Contribute to the development of the teaching profession
- Know and apply guidelines for ethical behaviour
- Be capable of performing administrative tasks  

























































Au=Australia, Qn=Queensland, Vc=Victoria Au,  BC=British Colombia,  Ch=Chile,  US=United States, Cl=California, Tx=Texas, En=England,  
Mx=Mexico, NZ=New Zealand
NBPTS: National Board for Professional Teaching Standards
INSTAC: Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium
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Teacher standards also vary depending on whether they are 
general or specific. General teaching standards describe good teaching 
practices in terms that are supposed to apply to all teachers, without 
specifying what these might look like for different subjects and 
at different levels (e.g. primary and secondary). Specific teaching 
standards are more detailed and describe what good teaching entails 
for specific subjects, at specific grade levels, and at specific stages 
of a teacher’s career (CEPPE, 2013). Examples of standards that 
differentiate between subjects and grade levels are found in Chile, 
Texas, and in those developed by the National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards in the United States. Examples of standards that 
differentiate between career stages can be found in Australia. However, 
teaching standards that specify across all three dimensions (subject, 
grade level, and career stage) are rare. More often, national teaching 
standards are general, and are interpreted for teachers of different 
subjects and grades at a more local level. The CEPPE (2013) review 
suggests that one reason many countries have adopted generic rather 
than specific standards is that teachers with different approaches and 
strategies can achieve the same results. Teaching style should not, 
therefore, be over‑prescribed. 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that the most sensible 
approach to teacher evaluation is to use multiple methods, and match 
the outcomes against some variation of teacher standards or criteria. 
This aligns with the recommendations of Ingvarson and Chadbourne 
(1994), who also acknowledge that regardless of whether the final 
judgment is valid, the use of this approach depends on the authenticity 
of the individual methods. The Measures of Effective Teaching project 
run by the Gates Foundation (Kane et al., 2013) also supported 
the use of multiple measures to evaluate teacher performance, as it 
found that relying too heavily on one single measure makes it more 
likely that other valued behaviours will be overlooked. The project 
also found that a balanced approach, combining student ratings and 
classroom observation, has two advantages: it increases the likelihood 
that teachers with better outcomes on assessments other than state 
tests will be identified, and ensures that teacher ratings are less likely 
to fluctuate from year to year.
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Norm-referenced appraisal
The other significant consideration in the design of teacher appraisal 
systems for awards or promotions is whether to reward any teacher 
that meets the specified criteria (criterion‑referenced), or to compare 
teachers with one another and only reward the best (norm‑referenced). 
The former approach sits more naturally within a holistic approach to 
appraisal, as a holistic judgement can be made about whether a teacher 
meets the criteria, while the latter sits more naturally with a cumulative 
system, as it is easy to compare the points of different teachers (Table 5). 
However, these pairings are not essential. Cumulative systems can be 
used with a criterion‑referenced approach if all teachers that achieve a 
certain point score receive a reward or promotion, while some systems 
that appraise holistically using standards impose a quota on how many 
teachers get a reward or promotion, introducing a norm‑referenced 
element to the procedure for promotion.
Table 5. Cumulative versus holistic appraisal
Cumulative judgement Holistic judgement
Definition Each individual component of 
the appraisal process is given a 
weighting or allocated points. 
A teacher’s overall outcome is 
calculated by adding up their 
score for each component.
Teachers’ overall outcome is 
based on whether or not they 
have shown the necessary 
skills/competencies required. 
Evidence for the meeting 
of these competencies can 
be drawn from different 
components of the appraisal 
process.
Advantages The overall outcome is objective 
and transparent (though 
individual components may be 
subjective), so there is less scope 
for corruption.
Teachers have to meet all 
selected competencies to 
progress, so are motivated to 
improve their teaching.
Disadvantages Teachers don’t have to meet all 
competencies to progress. 
Teachers may seek to achieve a 
high score in an underhand way, 
rather than seeking to improve 
teaching.
As the overall outcome relies 
on the judgement of a superior 
(such as a principal) there is 
the risk of corruption. This 
can be overcome with clear 
statements of teacher standards, 
and with the involvement of 
external assessors.
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Norm‑referenced procedures commonly form part of systems 
that use payment by results. The system evaluated by Lavy (2004) in 
Israel ranked teachers based on their students’ value‑added scores, 
and only offered rewards to the top‑performing teachers. Norm‑
referenced comparison between teachers can also present itself in a 
less obvious way;  for example, in the early stages of Houston’s teacher 
pay reform, teachers received extra pay if their students’ value‑added 
scores were in the top two quartiles (Behrstock and Akerstrom, 2008).  
A strength of this approach to deciding who receives awards 
or promotions is lower information costs. As the system defines in 
advance the number or proportion of teachers that will receive an 
award, it is clear from the start how much the programme will cost 
and this allows for accurate budgeting. In contrast, systems taking 
a criterion‑based approach do not know in advance exactly how 
many teachers will reach the given standard, so run the financial risk 
that more teachers will do so than the budget can accommodate. 
Chile has an interesting solution to this problem – it uses a holistic 
and norm‑referenced system (Vegas, 2005). To gain a ‘pedagogical 
excellence award’, teachers have to submit a portfolio of their work 
and take a test, and are judged against performance standards laid 
out by the Ministry of Education. However, there is also a quota for 
the number of teachers that can receive this award, which results in 
a measure of comparison between eligible teachers to decide who 
shall receive one. This quota fluctuates from year to year, based on 
budget restraints. As the number is not usually large (approximately 
50 around the country) there is less likely to be competition between 
teachers at the same school.
Competition between teachers is the most often discussed 
weakness of norm‑referenced appraisal. Although competition per se 
is not necessarily a bad thing, successful schools require teamwork and 
collaboration between colleagues (Bryk and Schneider, 2002), and 
autonomous motivation requires strong interpersonal relationships, 
both of which are less likely in a competitive environment. 
For example, in Houston’s reforms, the initial programme of 
rewarding individual teachers with students with value‑added scores 
in the top two quartiles resulted in a fall in teacher morale, as teachers 
became angry and upset with what they saw as being a divisive and 
unfair policy (Behrstock and Akerstrom, 2008). This was replaced by 
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the Accelerating Student Progress Increasing Results and Expectations 
(ASPIRE) award programme, which placed greater emphasis on 
teamwork and less on individual teachers’ results. In the Republic of 
Korea, the proposed master teacher status is supported by 68 per cent 
of teachers, with the Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations 
supporting the proposal, with the proviso that there is no limit on the 
number of teachers that can be promoted to this position (10 per cent 
of teachers is suggested as the upper limit) (Coolahan et al., 2004). 
In Portugal, the introduction of a quota for the number of teachers 
that could move to the upper pay scale encouraged competition and 
reduced cooperation among teachers, which lowered teachers’ job 
satisfaction and had a detrimental effect on student learning (Martins, 
2009). 
Another complaint of teachers in Houston was that the system 
was not transparent (Behrstock and Akerstrom, 2008). While 
standards‑based programmes are more transparent than value‑
added programmes in that teachers know the exact standards they 
are expected to meet, if these programmes are then norm‑referenced 
at the point of reward or promotion (with only a certain quota of 
eligible teachers receiving one), the lack of transparency returns, and 
teachers will demand an explanation as to why their colleague was 
promoted over them, when both have met the standards. Allowing 
only some teachers, rather than all those who met a certain standard, 
to achieve a bonus was thought responsible for the collapse of many 
performance‑related pay programmes in the 1980s (Sclafani, 2009). 
This was also a criticism of the teacher career structure in Ethiopia, 
where budget restraints meant that further screening of teachers 
who had met the standards was introduced, and resulted in increased 
competition among teachers (Tekleselassie, 2005). Sclafani even 
reports suggestions that high‑stakes comparisons among teachers 
can incentivize them to sabotage one another’s chances, by spreading 
damaging rumours about a colleague’s abilities as a teacher (Sclafani, 
2009). 
Criterion-referenced appraisal
Criterion‑referenced approaches that reward or promote any teacher 
that meets a certain standard or point score avoid these problems of 
competition and lack of transparency, and allow teachers to set goals 
for themselves, which are within their control to achieve, rather than 
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being dependent on the poor performance of their colleagues. Locke 
and colleagues (Locke et al., 1981) suggest that this goal‑setting 
approach helps to direct action and attention. However, this approach 
is less easy to manage from a budget perspective, and the lack of a quota 
can actually cause teachers to become sceptical about the viability of 
the programmes, as was the case for teachers in England and Wales 
when a new pay scale was introduced (Adnett, 2003).
One potential solution or compromise, which would allow for 
budget planning but avoid harmful competition, would be to link the 
salary rise with promotion contingent on the fixed amount of budget 
available. So, rather than competing with colleagues for promotions or 
bonuses worth a fixed amount, anyone who met the standards would 
be promoted and gain the associated status and recognition, while the 
salary rise would be smaller if many teachers met the standards in the 
same year (or larger if fewer did). The pot of money would have to be 
located at the national or regional level rather than at the school level, 
so that the promotion of colleagues in the same school would have 
only a negligible effect on other teachers’ pay rises.
Table 6. Norm-referenced versus criterion-referenced 
appraisal
Norm-referenced appraisal Criterion-referenced appraisal
Definition Teachers are compared with 
each other. Only the top 
proportion of teachers receive 
a reward or promotion, which 
could be based on who has the 
most points or other criteria.
Teachers’ skills are judged against 
criteria or standards. Any teachers 
who meet the set standards 
required for a promotion receive 
the promotion, irrespective of the 
performance of their peers.
Advantages Lower information costs; the 
cost of the programme in terms 
of rewards or promotions is 
known from the start.
Teachers are in control of their 
own progression, as they know that 
if they meet certain criteria, they 
will receive a promotion. Teachers 
can help one another without 
jeopardizing their own prospects.
Disadvantages The competition generated 
by this approach discourages 
collaboration and teamwork 
between teachers. It can also 
lead to bad feeling between 
colleagues.
Higher information costs; it is 
not known in advance how many 
teachers will meet the standards. 
This can be managed by initially 
piloting the programme to 
approximate numbers, and setting 
standards accordingly.
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Responsibility for summative appraisal decisions
This section concerns the responsibility for appraisal decisions 
for accountability purposes, such as decisions about eligibility for 
bonuses, salary raises, or promotions. In systems that use payment by 
results or take a cumulative approach, no such decision is necessary, 
because a points formula and pre‑determined cut‑off score decide such 
matters. In systems that take a holistic approach, though, someone has 
to make the decision as to whether the teacher has passed, or met the 
set criteria. Different systems take different approaches to selecting 
the personnel to be involved in this decision.
School principals
Most commonly, the school principal or a leader in the senior 
management team is involved in deciding whether or not a member 
of staff meets promotion/bonus criteria or not. Schools principals 
are involved (though not necessarily solely responsible) in countries 
including the Czech Republic, Israel, the Republic of Korea, and 
Poland. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) investigated how well principals 
could distinguish between the effectiveness of teachers (as measured by 
their value‑added scores). They found that principals could generally 
identify teachers who produced the largest and smallest standardized 
achievement gains, but had far less ability to distinguish between 
teachers in the middle of this distribution. French, Melo, and Rakow 
(1988) argue that principals should not be the primary evaluators in 
career ladder programmes, as research from across the United States 
has found that, in practice, principals give consistently high ratings to 
their staff and exercise little discrimination, even though they are able 
to do so. Similarly, Kremer and colleagues (2001, reported in Bruns 
et al., 2011) note that Kenyan head teachers gave all their staff bonuses 
for attendance, even though attendance did not improve, while Bruns 
and Luque (2014) report that school directors in Colombia give 
universally high scores to teachers as a way to avoid conflict.
There is, therefore, a danger that the subjective nature of the 
judgement means it can be affected by the personal relationship 
between principal and teacher (for better or for worse), or be open 
to corruption. This could be a particular concern in some developing 
countries, where the infrastructure to stop these practices is lacking, 
and many teachers already complain of unfair treatment by head 
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teachers. For example, in its interviews, VSO (2002) found that 
teachers in Papua New Guinea and Zambia were particularly 
concerned with the relationship between head teachers and their 
staff, giving examples of unsatisfactory interactions including unfair 
promotions. 
One way to overcome this problem is to involve others in the 
decision, either in terms of joint responsibility for the process or to 
verify the decision.
Multiple evaluators
Involving more than one evaluator also has the benefit of making 
the judgment more reliable. The Measures of Effective Teaching 
(MET) project (Kane et al., 2013) analysed videotaped lessons of 
3,000 teachers across six states in the United States, and collected 
student improvement data over two years for 1,600 of them. They 
concluded that having a second observer of classroom practice 
increases its reliability. In the Republic of Korea, the principal shares 
the responsibility for teacher appraisal for promotion purposes with 
peer evaluators (Coolahan et al., 2004), while in Australia, panels 
interviewing teachers for appointment to AST status included a fellow 
teacher (Ingvarson, 2013).
The Tennessee Career Ladder included peer evaluation by a 
teacher from outside the appraised teacher’s own district. These 
teachers were carefully selected and received three to four weeks’ 
training in their appraisal responsibilities. Teachers evaluated by their 
peers as part of the Tennessee programme rated this feature as one 
of the most positive (French, Malo, and Rakow, 1988). Conversely, 
peer evaluation in Ethiopia is carried out by colleagues from the same 
school, which has led to bad feeling where teachers feel they have been 
judged unfairly (Tekleselassie, 2005). In other countries, the principal 
shares responsibility with other personnel external to the school.
External assessors
One possible way to overcome the issue of subjectivity would be to 
have external assessors verify principals’ judgments, as is the case 
in England for teachers applying to move to another pay scale, and 
in Chile, where principals share the responsibility of appraisal with 
external accredited evaluators, a local assessment centre, and peer 
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evaluators (OECD, 2013). However, some countries, such as Austria 
and Poland, only require the judgement of external assessors in cases of 
complaint or appeal (OECD, 2013). In addition to overcoming issues 
of subjectivity, input from external assessors is also advantageous where 
there is not sufficient expertise to make such a judgement in school, as 
might be the case when senior promotion is being considered.
Another approach is to leave evaluation for accountability 
purposes completely up to external, trained assessors. This is the 
case in the United States for those states that use the Praxis III test 
for evaluation purposes (Milanowski, 2003). For this certification 
process, trained assessors interview teachers and monitor in‑class 
teaching and other professional duties. The assessors judge teachers 
against 19 criteria that fit into the categories of classroom environment, 
lesson plans, instruction, and professionalism. 
Different personnel at different levels
Involving external assessors can be quite resource‑heavy, so some 
systems use internal staff to make appraisal decisions at the lower levels 
of a career structure, such as for teachers attaining qualified teacher 
status, and only use external personnel to make decisions concerning 
promotion to higher levels. The New Australian Professional Standards 
for teachers, which are in the process of implementation, and include 
four different teacher roles: graduate, proficient, highly accomplished, 
and lead (Ingvarson, 2013). The idea is that while universities will 
decide who graduates, as they do now, and state teacher registration 
bodies will retain responsibility for certifying teachers as proficient 
after their induction period, the Australian Institute for Teaching and 
School Leadership will have responsibility for establishing a nationally 
consistent evaluation system for the roles of ‘highly accomplished’ 
and ‘lead’ teachers. New Zealand’s politicians have suggested a similar 
approach for their new teacher and head teacher roles: executive 
principals and ‘change principals’ will be appointed by an external 
panel, and then these principals will be responsible for appointing 
‘expert’ teachers (Key, 2014).
Such a practice is already in place in Estonia, where the process 
of verifying that a teacher has met standards for a new grade is called 
‘attestation’ (EURYDICE, 2010). Teachers and junior teachers have 
their grade granted by the head of the institution, senior teachers have 
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their grade granted by an attestation commission established by the 
head of the institution, and teacher methodologists have it granted by 
a commission established by the minister of education.
Different personnel for different appraisal purposes
Although most of this review has concerned summative appraisal, as 
it relates to career structures, important considerations also arise from 
the practice of formative appraisal, not least in terms of deciding who 
carries out the two different types of appraisal. Formative appraisal 
is undertaken for the purpose of improving a teacher’s teaching 
methods, and might result in support or advice from whoever is 
doing the appraising regarding potential areas for improvement. It is 
an essential part of a good education system, as it provides teachers 
with ways to improve their teaching once the necessary motivation 
has been put in place through career structures. 
Carlson (2009) points out that due to differences in the outcomes 
of these two types of teacher appraisal, linking them together is 
problematic. In formative appraisal for development, teachers 
are encouraged to self‑reflect and identify and discuss their own 
shortcomings, so that the appraiser can help them overcome them. In 
summative assessment for promotion or performance pay, the teacher 
is more likely to conceal rather than confront shortcomings, for fear of 
them affecting their promotion prospects (Mosoge and Pilane, 2014). 
For this reason, if the two are combined, teachers are less likely to 
benefit from the formative opportunity to improve. 
South Africa experienced this problem first‑hand in its 
Integrated Quality Management System. The Teacher Development 
Summit recommended delinking teacher appraisal for purposes of 
development from appraisal for purposes of remuneration and salary 
progression (South Africa, 2011). One way of delinking the two is 
to ensure that different personnel are involved in different types of 
appraisal. 
Appraisal for professional development purposes does not face 
some of the challenges related to summative assessment discussed 
above. As there is no high‑stakes consequence to this type of appraisal, 
the subjectivity of the assessor is less likely to be a problem, and there 
is less need for the appraisal to be reliable as no high‑stakes outcome 
is being decided upon. For these reasons, as well as for more practical 
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ones concerning cost and travel, formative appraisal can be carried 
out by colleagues and head teachers in the school. To avoid a situation 
where teachers hide their shortcomings, one solution would be to have 
different personnel responsible for summative assessment  –  either 
other members of staff within the school, or external assessors. In 
Shanghai, mentors and peers within the school offer feedback to 
teachers on how they can improve their lessons, but, for promotion 
purposes, the teachers are assessed by external experts. The district of 
Cincinnati, Ohio, took this one step further, by outsourcing most of its 
summative appraisal to the PRAXIS exam and paying teachers on the 
basis of this (Odden and Wallace, 2007).
Consequences of summative appraisal
Bonuses
Performance‑related pay encompasses more than just payment by 
results – it also includes programmes that offer bonuses to teachers 
in recognition of positive teacher evaluations, which encompass more 
than just student results. In practice, however, such programmes 
are rare. Most countries that use broad evaluations of teachers for 
accountability purposes employ them to determine the eligibility for 
certification or re‑certification of teacher status, which, if it is linked to 
pay, leads to a permanent increase in salary along with the new status, 
rather than a one‑off payment. 
Two systems that do offer financial bonuses based on evaluation, 
the approach used in Singapore and the Teacher Advancement Program 
(TAP) in the United States, do so in addition to providing a career 
structure with certification at different levels. Teachers in schools that 
use TAP are eligible for an annual performance bonus, which is based 
on students’ value‑added scores and observed performance in the 
classroom (Glazerman and Seifullah, 2012). Singapore’s bonuses are 
also annual, and are based on an extensive evaluation which includes 
three meetings, a portfolio, and input from senior teachers (Sclafani, 
2009). As both systems also incorporate a more sophisticated career 
structure, it is not possible to evaluate separately the impact of these 
performance bonuses on student results or teacher motivation.
One programme that does offer standalone bonuses based on 
evaluations is the Merit Award Program (MAP) in Florida. Each 
Exploring the impact of career models on teacher motivation
76
district in the state is required to allocate performance‑based pay to 
a minimum of 25 per cent of its teachers, worth 5 per cent or more of 
their base salary (Buddin et al., 2007). Performance ratings are based on 
student results and a principal’s evaluation, with fairly even weighting 
between these two methods. Unfortunately, this programme has not 
been evaluated for its impact on teacher behaviour or student results, 
although, based on an analysis of the statistical methods involved, 
Buddin and colleagues suggest that there are ‘serious challenges to 
using standardized test scores to measure teacher performance as 
part of a merit pay system’ (Buddin et al., 2007: 49). The question of 
whether bonuses for broader performance appraisals, which do not 
include student results, have a positive effect on teacher motivation or 
student results remain open.
Performance‑related pay programmes based on broader teacher 
evaluations overcome some of the criticisms of merit pay programmes 
discussed in Chapter 3. By including another measure alongside 
student results, or excluding them from consideration, the 
questionable validity of the bonus allocation mechanism is diluted 
or removed. It also goes some way to overcoming the problem of 
‘multi‑tasking’, where teachers focus only on narrow exam results, as 
teachers’ classroom practice is also being evaluated, giving them an 
incentive to work towards improvement in this area as well. 
There are still drawbacks to this approach, however. As with 
payment by results, this method can cause competition between 
teachers and discourage collaboration if the bonuses are only for 
‘top‑ranked’ teachers, as is the case in Singapore and the Teacher 
Advancement Program. An additional issue in this area is the 
potentially negative effect on the relationship between teachers and 
principal, if the evaluation relies heavily on the principal’s judgement. 
As with payment by results, this approach is likely to lead to ‘controlled’ 
motivation, potentially with the impact of undermining intrinsic or 
autonomous motivation (Deci, 1971), as the point of the bonus is to 
incentivize teachers to work harder to receive the money, rather than 
to work harder or differently for their own personal growth or for the 
good of the students.
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Salary progression
Another approach is to base salary progression on teacher appraisal. 
While this method is similar to awarding bonuses, it is usually arrived 
at in a different way. Rather than being implemented as an incentive 
to get teachers to improve performance, linking salary progression to 
appraisal usually arises out of a change to the single salary schedule. 
Whereas in the single salary schedule, salary automatically increases to 
the next level after a certain amount of time, with this approach, either 
an appraisal must be passed at the designated time, or the regularity 
with which a teacher can move up a level depends on their appraisal 
outcomes.
For example, in Germany, the state of North‑Rhine Westphalia 
is evaluating a system whereby automatic step increases have been 
replaced by step increases that occur based on the quality of teachers’ 
work (OECD, 2013). The Netherlands has a similar system. In 
another German state, Baden‑Wuertemberg, 10 per cent of teachers 
each year can progress an extra step on the salary schedule if they show 
outstanding performance, while, at the other end of the spectrum, 
poor evaluations can delay progression to the next step. St Gallen in 
Switzerland combines automatic progression within salary grades 
with an evaluation‑dependent jump to the next grade. In Zurich, 
teachers successful in their appraisal receive a 1 per cent to 3 per cent 
salary increase for each of the next four years. 
A different type of salary progression is in place in Mexico and 
in England and Wales. In Mexico, the programme Carrera Magisterial 
also pays teachers a higher salary on the basis of an evaluation; however, 
unlike the European system where this constitutes a regular part of 
a pay system which increases gradually, the increase in pay starts at 
27 per cent higher than the base wage for those who are promoted to 
‘level A’ and can reach 217 per cent of the base wage for those who 
score the highest level, E (Vegas, 2005). Teachers continue to receive 
this higher wage indefinitely. Similarly, in England and Wales, most 
teachers follow the single salary schedule (although reforms to this 
system are underway), but after a certain amount of time, teachers can 
apply to move onto a higher salary scale dependent on them passing 
an appraisal.  
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These approaches overcome the problems inherent in the single 
salary schedule, and while the appraisals result in the speeding up 
or slowing down of a salary schedule, which would have occurred 
regardless, they may be less divisive than programmes that award 
bonuses to some staff but not to others. Another advantage to this 
approach over the awarding of bonuses relates to the psychology of 
motivation. Offering an increase in salary is more likely to be seen 
as affirming competence, rather than controlling behaviour, which 
means it is less likely to undermine autonomous motivation (Deci, 
Koestner, and Ryan, 1999). Salary increases as the result of appraisal 
still introduce a direct link between appraisal and pay though. 
However, there is another approach that has more advantages in terms 
of overcoming problems inherent in both the single salary schedule 
and performance‑related pay schemes. This is the establishment 
of teacher career structures where appraisals against standards are 
followed by promotions in status, which lead to increases in salary, 
thereby providing an indirect link between appraisal and pay. The 
following section explores this approach.
Promotion 
Promoting teachers to new positions or statuses as a result of successful 
appraisal is common, to at least some degree, across many countries. 
It is recommended, by education researchers and economists alike, 
as a way to marry accountability with professionalism (Benveniste, 
Marshall, and Araujo, 2008; Delannoy and Sedlacek, 2001; Fanfani, 
2004; Ingvarson, 2012; Johnson and Paypay, 2009). Almost all 
countries have some form of promotion, as all have school principals, 
but the recommendations call for a different kind of promotion based 
on meeting certain standards (not always the case with promotion 
to principal), and which allows the teacher to remain teaching in the 
classroom. This is sometimes called ‘horizontal promotion’ (Vegas, 
2005), as the teacher is moving sideways rather than upwards, but is 
referred to here as ‘classroom‑based’ promotion.
Such an approach is based on the idea that there are certain 
standards or criteria that a teacher has to meet to become a certified 
teacher, or a more senior teacher. If a teacher is found to meet all 
of those criteria as part of their appraisal, they are promoted to the 
certified teacher or senior teacher role, and their salary increases 
according to their new status. Different models of this approach have 
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different criteria for promotion, and different responsibilities can 
come with new roles – these are discussed in Chapter 5, with examples 
of implementation in different countries. This section demonstrates 
the widespread support for this approach, and outlines why it has the 
potential to overcome the problems inherent in the single salary scale 
approach, while, at the same time, avoiding the problems associated 
with the performance‑related pay approach.
In his position paper on the future of the teaching profession 
in Victoria, Australia, Ingvarson (2012) states: ‘There are two ways 
to go about building stronger links between pay and performance: 
one is through merit pay schemes, the other is by introducing a 
rigorous professional certification system. Each is based on quite 
different assumptions about how incentives work and how they link 
to improved student achievement’ (7). He draws out the familiar 
criticisms of competitive, one‑off bonus payments, which were being 
proposed for Victorian schools in 2012, and suggests that teachers 
are more likely to benefit from professional feedback when they 
are in an environment of trust and support, which is facilitated by a 
standards‑based professional certification system (where teachers are 
promoted once they’ve achieved certain standards), but undermined 
by bonus pay schemes. 
Delannoy and Sedlacek (2001) look at the complex set of issues 
surrounding the effectiveness of Brazil’s teachers, and conclude their 
study with an overall strategy similar to Ingvarson’s suggestions for 
Victoria. They suggest setting teacher standards, and using them as a 
basis to establish a certification system around which teacher careers 
would be structured. Another World Bank study on Cambodia 
(Benveniste, Marshall, and Araujo, 2008) suggests that 
The existing compression of the salary wage and lack of promotion 
opportunities call attention to the imperative need for laying 
out within the teaching profession long‑term sustainable career 
pathways supported by an appropriate salary structure that links 
skills, professional development opportunities and performance 
outcomes with financial incentives (ix). 
Both Johnson and Papay (2009), of the Economics Policy 
Institute, and Fanfani (2004), of the International Institute for 
Education Planning (IIEP Buenos Aires), develop this idea further. 
Johnson and Papay (2009) propose a ‘Tiered Pay‑and‑Career 
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Structure’ which would consist of four tiers through which teachers 
could progress: Tier 1 – probationary teachers; Tier II – professional 
teachers with tenure; Tier III – master teachers and school‑based 
leaders; and Tier IV – school and district leaders. Each of these 
tiers would be associated with different levels of remuneration, with 
additional stipends available for teachers in Tiers III or IV who take 
on specialist roles such as staff developers or analysts of student data. 
Fanfani (2004) also suggests establishing a hierarchy of levels based 
on skills, and carving out roles for specialists within this framework 
that would allow teachers to progress in their careers without having 
to leave the classroom.
Why is this career structure approach so popular? It seems to 
provide a way to recognize effort and talent in teachers, by ensuring 
that promotion to higher tiers and, therefore, to increased salary is 
based on thorough, standards‑based evaluation. This overcomes the 
problem inherent in the single salary schedule of automatic salary 
increases being independent of effort; instead, the career structure 
model provides an incentive for the teacher to keep improving. If a 
teacher has not put in the effort or has not yet met the required standard 
for certification, they are not promoted. However, the incentive to 
improve is not purely financial. Promotion is intimately linked with 
improvement as a teacher, and gaining promotion is a recognition of 
competence, so teachers may be motivated by their desire to improve 
their teaching for the sake of the students, or by the desire to raise their 
status. Working towards certification or promotion need not therefore 
undermine autonomous motivation, so long as the environment in 
which they work is felt to be supportive (let us help you achieve this 
certification) rather than controlling (you must tick these boxes in 
order to get a pay rise). 
It is worth re‑emphasizing at this stage that such autonomous 
motivation to improve one’s skills or the outcome for one’s students 
may be unlikely to manifest itself in a situation where teachers’ 
salaries do not cover their basic needs (Maslow, 1943). Even with 
a well‑designed, standards‑based certification system, and an 
environment of interpersonal support, teachers may not be motivated 
to improve if the initial salary is so low that they are struggling to feed 
their family. In such a system, these teachers may still be motivated 
to meet the certification requirements due to the salary that comes 
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attached to promotion (giving it an advantage over single schedule 
salary systems), but, as they would perceive this as controlling, it may 
have detrimental effects on their persistence, creativity (Deci, 1987), 
and teaching style (Hein et al., 2012; Lam et al., 2010).
Another potential advantage of this career structure system is 
dependent on how it is structured. If promotion is criterion‑referenced 
(i.e. you are promoted if you meet the standards), then this system 
does not increase competition between teachers, and may even 
increase collaboration if a responsibility of more ‘senior’ teachers 
is mentoring more junior ones. If, on the other hand, promotion is 
norm‑referenced (i.e. only granted to a limited number of teachers 
depending on how they do relative to their peers), this then is open 
to the same criticism as bonus pay programmes in that it creates 
competition and a non‑supportive environment. 
There are many other variations to how ‘career structure’ 
programmes can be run. The next chapter looks at various models and 
types of career structure programmes, and gives examples of these 
from countries in which they have been implemented.





Bonuses Teachers receive a one-off 
payment if they receive a 
good evaluation. Rarely used 
without a career structure.
These can act as an extrinsic 
incentive for teachers, 
but encourage controlled 
motivation and discourage 
collaboration. 
Salary progression Teachers move through the 
existing salary structure 
at different rates, based on 
their evaluation.
This prevents bad/idle teachers 
from progressing automatically 
through the salary scale. 
Promotion Teachers are promoted to 
new roles and titles based 
on their evaluation, with a 
salary rise attached.
This makes the link between 
performance and pay indirect, 






Most career structures that have been proposed, and many that have 
been implemented, utilize a similar basic career ladder format. Teacher 
trainees typically have to gain certification or licensing of some kind 
to pass their initial teacher training and become a qualified teacher. 
Some systems just have one position of ‘qualified teacher’ and revert 
to the single salary schedule, but others conceptualize this as merely 
the first step on a career ladder. Teachers can then progress through a 
series of increasingly senior statuses or job roles by qualifying for each 
one sequentially (with promotion criteria varying by country). Pay 
may increase incrementally each year in between these career steps, 
but the awarding of the next level is usually accompanied by a more 
substantial leap in salary. 
Types of career ladder
The National Association of State Boards of Education in the United 
States published a policy update on state‑wide teacher career structures 
in 2002, and suggested that most career ladder initiatives could be 
placed in one of three categories (as reported by Plucker, Zapf, and 
McNabb, 2005):
• Performance‑based ladders: As teachers demonstrate increased 
competence, they progress to different or more complex levels of 
work. Teachers may progress through a series of levels that may 
include novice teacher, career teacher, and master teacher. 
• Professional development ladders: Advancement is determined 
based on the amount of additional knowledge and skills teachers 
develop over the course of their career. Skills may be obtained 
through university coursework, professional development 
activities, advanced degrees, or NBPTS certification.
• Job enlargement ladders: Teachers are allowed to take increased 
responsibility for non‑classroom‑related activities. Activities may 
include curriculum development, supervising and mentoring 
beginning teachers, and serving as a professional development 
trainer or lead teacher.
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These categories correspond closely to Conley and Odden’s 
(1995) descriptions of performance‑based pay, knowledge‑ 
and skills‑based pay, and jobs‑based pay. In both descriptions, 
there is some ambiguity in terms of the distinction between 
performance‑based ladders and professional development‑based 
ladders. Performance‑based ladders do not require promotion to 
be based on student results (although it can be), but rather on any 
teacher appraisal that measures a teacher’s effectiveness. Professional 
development ladders, meanwhile, require participation in training or 
the obtaining of qualifications, without the impact of these on teaching 
quality necessarily being assessed. 
This literature review found that although these types describe 
common features of career ladders in different countries, it is rare for 
career ladders to fall into just one category; most systems draw on 
elements of at least two of these categories. It might, therefore, be best 
to think of these descriptions as idealized ‘types’ of career structure 
with which systems can have features in common, rather than being 
mutually exclusive categories.
All of the career ladders discussed in this chapter have 
performance‑based elements, though many of them also have 
professional development elements and job enlargement elements. 
This is because career ladders without performance‑based elements 
contribute to the issues discussed in Chapter 1, as they constitute the 
key features of the single salary schedule. This is the most common type 
of career structure, in which the only way to progress is to gain further 
qualifications, or to take on non‑teaching tasks and be promoted out 
of the classroom into managerial positions. 
Systems with some form of established career ladder involving a 
performance element are found in the Czech Republic, England and 
Wales, Estonia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, 
Shanghai (China), Singapore, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Arizona, Illinois, and Missouri in the United States.
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Career ladders with this 
feature include some kind 
of teacher evaluation, on 
which promotion or salary 
progression is based.
Links performance to pay, 
which can be motivating for 
good teachers and attract 
people to the profession.
- It can be a struggle to get this implemented 
if teachers are on an existing contract that 
guarantees regular pay rises.
- If designed badly, this feature can lead to 




Career ladders with this feature 
require staff to undertake 
certain training or professional 
development in order to be 
promoted. 
This ensures staff are 
continually learning 
throughout their career, and 
allows the system to require 
certain knowledge or skills for 
certain roles
- The usefulness of this approach depends on the 
quality of the training, and whether the learning is 
evaluated. 
- Without follow up, teachers can see attendance as 
a box-ticking exercise. 
- Training by itself is not enough to ensure quality. 




Career ladders with this 
feature attach new roles or 
responsibilities to teachers’ 
promotions, such as mentoring 
less experienced teachers or 
leading a planning team. 
This encourages better 
teachers to take responsibility 
for the improvement of 
weaker teachers, or for the 
improvement of the school. 
Depending on the type of responsibilities given, 
there might not be enough of these roles available 




Performance-based requirements for promotion
Chapter 4 showed that appraisal outcomes can be based on a number 
of methods, such as teacher observation, parent reviews, and student 
results. It also highlighted different approaches to how these methods 
were used to derive a final appraisal outcome, be that using a cumulative 
approach where results from different methods were added up, or a 
holistic approach where an overall judgement is made based on the 
outcomes from different methods. Most career ladder systems use a 
holistic, standards‑based approach to appraisal, where a decision is 
made as to whether each teacher has met certain standards necessary 
for that level of promotion. Dinham, Ingvarson, and Kleinhenz (2008) 
claim that this is an essential feature of an appraisal system if it is to 
have a positive effect on education.
Because all career ladders, by definition, include at least 
one promotion possibility beyond being a certified teacher, they 
usually have different criteria for different levels of promotion. In 
career structures with a performance element, the criteria include 
increasing the skill and knowledge levels that teachers have to meet 
in order to move to the next promotion level. Some countries have, 
therefore, come up with different standards that apply to each stage, 
which teachers are appraised against when applying for promotion. 
For example, the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers 
(AITSL, 2013) include different standards for the four career stages 
(graduate, proficient, highly accomplished, and lead). The state of 
Ohio’s Standards for the Teaching Profession (Ohio, 2015) contain 
indicators that differentiate between ‘standard’, ‘accomplished’, and 
‘distinguished’ teacher levels. This not only ensures that teachers at 
higher levels have better knowledge and skills than teachers at lower 
levels, but also provides a framework that enables teachers to see what 
they are aiming for, and around which professional development can 
be based. 
Professional development-based requirements for promotion
Some systems require teachers to have completed a certain amount 
of professional development in addition to passing an appraisal, in 
order to be eligible for a promotion. The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Ghana, the Republic of Korea, and Portugal all require participation 
in some form of professional development, while other countries, 
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such as Poland, describe in‑service teacher training as indispensable 
for teachers’ promotion, although not compulsory (OECD, 2013). 
Some systems do things slightly differently, and use professional 
development certificates as the sole requirement for higher salary or 
promotion, while still having a ‘performance‑based’ element due to 
required professional development courses, including an evaluation 
of teaching. The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
in the United States is used by several states for such a purpose. To 
become a board‑certified teacher, teachers have to take a test of 
content knowledge, and create three portfolios including student 
work, teacher reflections, and video recordings of their lessons 
(NBPTS, 2015a). If they are successful, they may receive a pay rise or 
a promotion, although legislation in this area varies by state. In Ohio, 
gaining national board certification counts as part of the requirements 
for attaining the lead professional educator licence. This type of 
scheme provides recognition of teaching quality for those that want it, 
and where it leads to a promotion or salary increase may incentivize 
teachers to reach that standard. However, this only applies to a small 
proportion of teachers as these certificates are voluntary, and in most 
states, salary raises do not depend on having one. 
Job enlargement-based consequences of promotion
Most career ladders also include some job‑enlargement element. This 
review did not come across any career ladders where teachers gained a 
new status without also gaining some additional responsibility, perhaps 
because those countries that increase salary as a result of appraisal 
without expecting the teacher to take on any new responsibilities do 
not accord these teachers a new status, they just link salary directly to 
appraisal and move them up a salary grade. Such systems are described 
in Chapter 4 under the sub‑heading ‘Salary progression’. 
In some systems, teachers are required to take on extra 
responsibilities after their promotion, which is based on passing 
a standards‑based appraisal. Such responsibilities might include 
mentoring other teachers, running professional development in 
school, curriculum development, and appraising other teachers. In 
Colombia, Cuba, and Singapore, the responsibilities of high‑grade 
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teachers include working with teachers in other schools in the area. In 
the Czech Republic, it works slightly differently. If a teacher performs 
certain activities that are typically carried out by teachers of a higher 
grade, this can lead to a promotion. 
In most countries, there is also a traditional, management‑based 
career ladder, where promotion to new roles requires applying for 
advertised vacancies, and competing with colleagues. This ensures 
that only as many teachers are promoted as are needed to fulfil certain 
roles, such as head of department or school principal. A variant of this 
approach was taken in many of the career structures in America during 
the 1980s (Conley and Odden, 1995), where new non‑teaching roles 
(e.g. head of curriculum) were added to the more traditional managerial 
positions, and teachers competed to apply for them. Conley and 
Odden (1995) point out that in education, job‑based pay (where you 
are paid more because of new responsibilities) is most evident in those 
positions requiring administrative tasks, and suggest that this can have 
a number of detrimental outcomes. First, it implies that teaching is 
less important or difficult than the administrative positions to which 
teachers are promoted. Second, job‑based pay removes teachers from 
classrooms and therefore introduces quotas for these roles (as not 
everyone can do this). Third, there is a disjuncture in skills if teachers 
are promoted on the basis of outstanding teaching skills, and moved 
into a position that requires different skills, such as management.
Singapore13 has a sensible solution to these problems, while still 
incorporating job‑based pay into its career structure. In Singapore, 
there are three ladders, including one for teachers that want to stay 
in the classroom, and one for leadership. In the teaching track, as 
the extra responsibilities teachers take on are pedagogical in nature 
(such as coaching other teachers) they continue as a classroom 
teacher, except at the highest rung on this ladder (master teachers). 
On the leadership track and specialist track, teachers are promoted for 
different skills, while head teachers and ministry officials look out for 
those with leadership potential or specialist skills and nurture these 
through training programmes.
13. Singapore’s career structure is explained in more detail in Factsheet 5. 
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Steps and streams
Singapore has the most sophisticated structure in terms of the numbers 
of steps or roles, and the number of ladders or streams. A diagram of 
the structure is provided in Figure 3.
Figure 3.  Singapore’s career structure
Source: Ministry of Education, Singapore: 
www.moe.gov.sg/careers/teach/career‑information
Box 1. Cuba’s pedagogical promotions
In Cuba, there is a promotion track based on pedagogical expertise. 
• Pedagogical leaders (jefe de circulo pedagógico) are based at the school 
level, and lead teachers’ teamwork and exchange of practice in school.
• Methodological leaders (metodologo) are based at the municipal level, and 
work with schools within their districts to develop strategies for improved 
student learning.
(Bruns and Luque, 2014)
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The three streams – the teaching track, the leadership track, 
and the senior specialist track – allow teachers a choice as to how 
their career develops. The number of steps is also impressive, with at 
least four in each stream, and the leadership track potentially allows 
for progression all the way up to the post of Director‑General of 
Education. The Republic of Korea also has three streams, but only at 
the higher administrative levels (all teachers must progress through 
Grade 2 and Grade 1 teacher status before choosing a senior stream 
of vice principal and principal, researcher and senior researcher, or 
supervisor and school inspector).
Most other career ladders have only two streams – the traditional 
stream that leads to senior management positions and becoming a 
principal, and the usually newer stream that leads up through more 
advanced teacher levels, with teaching remaining central to the job. 
Systems and proposed systems in Arizona and Illinois (United States), 
Australia, the Czech Republic, England and Wales, Estonia, Ghana, 
the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Shanghai 
(China), the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and parts of Switzerland 
are structured like this.
Four steps seems to be a popular choice, with Australia, Estonia 
and Poland opting to have four steps in their career ladder. New 
Zealand’s prime minister introduced four new roles in a speech in 
January 2014 (Key, 2014), though it is not yet clear how they will fit 
together in a career ladder. Jordan’s proposed teachers’ career charter 
has seven steps in its teaching stream, and a further six steps in the 
educational management stream (Ghazleh, n.d).
Other innovative career ladders not included in the table are 
those that mainly follow a traditional jobs‑based structure, which 
requires teachers to move into management positions, but has just 
one step or position that allows teachers to be promoted without 
moving out of the classroom. Colombia has ‘master teachers’, who 
are carefully selected and then observed by other teachers, as well as 
being responsible for outreach and support visits to nearby schools 
(Bruns and Luque, 2014). This appears to have been successful, 
with Colombia the only country in the Latin America region where 
students in rural schools outperform their peers in cities (Bruns and 
Luque, 2014). 
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Table 9. Teacher career ladders by selected country
System Teacher career ladders*
Australia (proposed) Graduate teacher
Proficient teacher 





































*Ladders that involve promotion without leaving the classroom completely. These countries 




Box 2. The danger of just one step in the career ladder in Mexico
The Carrera Magisterial in Mexico introduced a single step up for teachers identified 
as ‘excellent’, which, while more of a salary increase than a new position, highlights 
an issue with ladders of just one step. The EFA Global Monitoring Report (EFA, 
2014) suggests that Carrera Magisterial is unlikely to have contributed much to 
the improvement in learning outcomes in Mexico over the past few years, as, once 
teachers had qualified for this promotion, they had no incentive to continue to 
improve.
Duration of promotion 
One way around this problem is to give the promotion an expiry date, 
and require teachers to re‑apply for or verify their status after a certain 
number of years. For example, the National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards certificate in America lasts for 10 years, at which 
point teachers have to re‑certify if they want to retain NBPTS status 
(NBPTS, 2015b). This re‑certification requirement is designed with 
the assumption that teachers’ practice can deteriorate, meaning that 
the same qualities and skills that earned the certification initially 
need to be reassessed after a period of time. Teachers can apply for 
re‑certification with the board, which restores their certified status if 
they pass the evaluation. 
Ecuador’s teacher career reform overcomes the issue of skill 
deterioration by requiring that teachers either achieve further 
promotion to the next career stage, or re‑certify at the same level every 
four years. If they do not successfully re‑certify, they are downgraded to 
the stage below (Bruns and Luque, 2014). New Zealand’s teachers gain 
provisional registration once they have completed teacher training and 
gain a job, and then work towards full registration. Once they are fully 
registered, they have to renew their practising certificate every three 
years, which involves appraisal against the registered teacher criteria 
by a professional leader, who then attests to the teachers’ council 
that the teachers’ practising certificate can be renewed (Haig, 2015). 
Similarly, in the Catholic sector of the Northern Territory in Australia, 
teachers are now required to re‑register with the NTTRB (teacher 
registration board) every five years, which involves putting together 
a portfolio of professional development and study undertaken during 
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that time, related to their role and performance as a teacher (Marshall, 
Cole and Zbar, 2012).
Jordan’s proposed career structure takes a slightly different 
approach to addressing the same problem. Their teachers will be able 
to choose whether to take an accelerated path, which would see them 
meeting the requirements for each promotion in three years, or a 
normal path which gives them five years between promotions to meet 
the requirements. If teachers are unable to meet these requirements, 
they are given an additional two years (which puts them on the slow 
path), but if they are not able to meet them within this time, they lose 
their teaching position (Ghazleh, n.d.).
Voluntary appraisal for promotion
Some systems have decided to make elements of new career ladders 
voluntary. In Australia, the first two roles of ‘graduate’ and ‘proficient’ 
are compulsory, but teachers can choose whether to apply for the 
‘highly accomplished’ or ‘lead teacher’ positions (Ingvarson, 2013).
Other systems have retained the single salary schedule in full, 
with teachers’ pay increasing yearly irrespective of evaluation, but 
have added on a voluntary ‘career structure’ element. Teachers still 
progress up the salary scale based on years of teaching, but there is 
also a voluntary process of certification which teachers can undergo, 
sometimes with several levels. Passing this certification (which 
involves evaluation of teaching) can lead to teachers being moved 
onto a higher salary scale. This is the case in many American states 
for teachers who have passed the National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards. This system does provide incentives for some 
teachers to improve their practice, but it is an expensive option, and 
it does not stop unmotivated teachers from progressing up the salary 
scale regardless.
Another programme that uses ‘add‑on’ certification is Chile’s 
Excellence in Teaching programme. Teachers can volunteer to be 
evaluated for ‘excellent teacher’ status, which involves taking a test 
and producing a portfolio, including video recordings of lessons. The 
teachers are judged against teacher standards, but there is a quota 
which determines how many teachers can receive the award each year. 
Successful teachers receive a salary supplement for four years, at which 




The body of research evidence on teacher career ladders is small and 
mainly consists of evaluations of state‑level policies in the United 
States. In their report on teacher policy in Latin America, Bruns and 
Luque (2014) claim that there is no experimental evidence on career 
path reforms, either in Latin America or globally. Although several 
countries have implemented teacher career structures, some of which 
are well established (e.g. Singapore), this review was able to find only 
one publically available quantitative evaluation of a national career 
structure programme, in Portugal. One difficulty with drawing any 
conclusions about the effectiveness or otherwise of teacher career 
ladder programmes in general is that there are so many internal and 
external variables which may contribute to their success or failure. 
Rather than looking to prove or disprove career ladders as a concept, a 
better approach is therefore to look at the individual features of career 
structures that are successful, and those that are unsuccessful, in order 
to learn about their design.
Arizona teacher career programme
Arizona’s teacher career programme consists of central legislation 
which applies to all districts taking part in the programme. This 
legislation commits these districts to running career structures based 
on the following principles (Arizona, 2015): 
• Levels and steps must come with specific criteria for placement.
• More than one person should be involved in the placement 
decision.
• Placement should be based on increasingly high levels of pupil 
attainment. 
• Placement should be based on increasingly high levels of teaching 
skills.
• Placement should be based on increasingly high levels of 
responsibility.
• The programme should provide adequate professional 
development opportunities.
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Each participating district is then left to design their own 
career programme around these principles, but has to submit their 
plans intermittently to the state authorities to ensure they meet the 
requirements of the legislation. As can be seen from the legislation, 
the Arizona teacher career programme is holistic (standards‑based) 
and criterion‑referenced (with no competition for promotions), and 
has features of job‑enlargement and performance‑based pay. The 
latter is specified in two ways: pupil attainment and teaching skills. In 
practice, most districts do not use high‑stakes tests to measure pupil 
attainment, but instead use internal school level assessments. Teaching 
skills are usually evaluated by classroom observations and portfolios, 
which are submitted to a board external to the school. 
As only 28 of the state’s districts took part in the programme due 
to funding issues, a number of researchers have taken advantage of 
the fact that this allows for experimental comparisons between those 
that took part and those that did not. In 1994, Sloat compared student 
performance in the original 14 districts that took part and non‑career 
ladder districts. He found that career ladder districts out‑performed 
non‑career ladder districts in four areas: 
1. Drop‑out rate: From 0.04 per cent to 1.86 per cent lower dropout 
rates in career ladder districts between 1985/86 and 1991/92.
2. Graduation rate: 5 per cent higher graduation rates for career 
ladder districts in 1991 and 8 per cent higher in 1992. 
3. ITBS composite NCE scores: 7.95 per cent higher composite 
NCE scores in career ladder districts in 1988, 8.14 per cent 
higher in 1990, and 9.10 per cent higher in 1991.
4. 1993 ASAP average scores: Ranges from 4.67 per cent to 
5.81  per  cent higher Grade 8 average ASAP scores in 1993 
reading, mathematics, and writing assessments (Sloat, 1994).
As participation in the career ladder programme was voluntary 
for existing teachers in career ladder districts, Sloat (1994) was also 
able to compare the performance of students in the classrooms of 
career ladder teachers with those of non‑career ladder teachers. 
He found that, in 12 of the 14 career ladder districts, the students 
receiving instruction from teachers participating in career ladder 
programmes had higher achievement at K‑6 than students receiving 
instruction from non‑career ladder teachers. Across all districts, the 
NCE scores for students receiving instruction from career ladder 
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teachers were 1.7 per cent higher than the NCE scores for students in 
non‑CL classrooms (Sloat, 1994).
In 2002, Sloat conducted another comparison, this time including 
all 28 participating districts and comparing them to other districts. This 
time he found that career ladder districts out‑performed non‑career 
ladder districts at every grade level (2–8), in reading, language, and 
mathematics, as indicated by the mean and median scores.  The level 
of difference in mean scores indicated was significant, statistically 
speaking, for every grade level and in every subject area except for 6th 
grade reading.
Earlier research from Braver (1989) shows that this is not 
due to the participating states getting better results irrespective of 
the programme. Braver compared average student achievement in 
career ladder districts before and after the career ladder programme 
was introduced, and found that average scores increased after the 
introduction of the programme. This change in achievement was 
consistent for the three years measured after the introduction of the 
programme.
Missouri teacher career ladder
The Missouri teacher career ladder is one of the longest‑surviving 
teacher career structures in the United States. It is based around 
teachers attaining Stage 1, Stage 2, and Stage 3, which come with salary 
supplements of up to $1,500, $3,000, and $5,000 a year, respectively. 
Eligibility for promotion has elements of performance‑based, 
professional development‑based, and jobs‑based structures. Teachers 
are assessed by administrators from their school using an evaluation 
tool – the Performance Based Teacher Evaluation Instrument (PBTE) – 
which has 20 criteria spanning six areas (Silman and Glazerman, 2009): 
1. engaging students in class, 
2. correctly assessing students,
3. exhibiting content knowledge,
4. professionalism  in  the  school, 
5. participation  in  professional  development,  
6. adherence to the district’s education mission. 
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As there is only a single set of criteria which applies across 
the different levels, teachers applying for level 1 just need to meet 
the criteria, whereas teachers applying for levels 2 or 3 are required 
to show performance above the expected level for between 10 per 
cent and 15  per cent of the criteria. This makes the programme 
standards‑based to an extent, but leaves significant room for ambiguity 
where administrators have to decide what counts as performance 
above the expected level. As these criteria are the same for levels 2 and 
3, most of the difference between the levels is, therefore, based on the 
professional development and jobs‑based elements. 
Booker and Glazerman (2009) analysed nine years of student 
test results in maths and reading for the state’s 524 districts, in 
order to compare achievement levels in career ladder districts with 
non‑career ladder districts. They controlled for prior district scores in 
their analysis, and also carried out within‑district comparison, using 
the variation in district programme participation over time. They 
concluded that there was a positive association between a district’s 
involvement in the programme and its test scores, but that the 
estimates were small for maths scores and not statistically significant 
for reading scores. 
Possible reasons for this uninspiring result were explored by 
Silman and Glazerman (2009) who carried out a qualitative case study 
of the Missouri teacher career ladder programme, conducted four 
focus groups with teachers, and interviewed officials in 15 randomly 
selected districts. Silman and Glazerman reported frequent 
mentions in focus groups and interviews of collaboration between 
administrators and teachers regarding the PBTE, such as teachers 
choosing when they would be observed and administrators ensuring 
that career‑ladder teachers met benchmarks for advancement in 
order to avoid confrontation. This is a reminder of the importance of 
having more than one evaluator and including external assessors to 
avoid personal relationships affecting appraisal outcomes. Silman and 
Glazerman found ‘little evidence that the PBTE is applied rigorously 
or implemented uniformly in a way that would motivate teachers to 
raise their performance’ (27).  
The other criteria for promotion in this programme are based on 
teachers taking on additional responsibilities and completing certain 
forms of professional development. The additional responsibilities have 
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to ‘exceed the norm for the profession’, and therefore have to take place 
outside classroom time, and are measured by the hour. For teachers, 
‘Career Ladder payments were seen as a reward for longevity and 
completion (with documentation) of a set of allowable activities such as 
tutoring, after‑school activities, or approved professional development’ 
(Silman and Glazerman, 2009: 27). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the 
nature of appraisal, 49 per cent of participating teachers were at the top 
level of the ladder in 2002, earning an extra $5,000 a year (Cornett and 
Gaines, 2002). 
Portugal’s performance-related pay programme
In 2007, Portugal oversaw the break‑up of its single salary schedule 
into two pay scales, a higher and a lower scale (Martins, 2010). The 
gap between the two was particularly large, and successful teachers 
moving from the lower scale to the higher would see their pay 
increase by 25 per cent from €2,000 a month to €2,500 a month. 
The progression from one scale to the next was based on individual 
teacher performance variables, including student performance, 
parental feedback, teacher attendance, professional development 
attendance, managerial responsibilities, and involvement in research 
projects. Once again, these requirements drew on elements from all 
three ‘types’ of career ladder: performance‑based, jobs‑based, and 
professional development‑based. However, even if a teacher did well 
in these areas (which are combined in a cumulative fashion), they 
were not guaranteed a place on the upper scale, as there was a quota 
as to how many places were available each year. This meant that the 
scheme was norm‑referenced, and put teachers in competition with 
one another for these places.
Martins (2010) carried out a difference‑in‑differences analysis of 
this new programme, drawing on two control groups: schools which 
were exposed to a lighter version of the intervention, and schools 
which were not exposed to the programme at all (private schools). 
The result of this analysis showed that the reform led to a signiﬁcant 
and sizable relative decline in student achievement, based on national 
exams in which all schools took part. Drawing on further analysis of 
early retirement across public schools, Martins suggests that the reason 
for this decline was ‘the disruption of teacher cooperation created by 
tournaments for promotions and increased administrative workloads, 
both resulting in job dissatisfaction’ (Martins, 2010: 25). Both of 
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these factors should also therefore be borne in mind with regard to 
the design of teacher career structures.
Indonesia’s teacher certification
In 2005, Indonesia introduced a comprehensive teacher law. This 
reform covered a number of linked‑up areas related to the quality of 
the teaching profession, with the aim of giving teaching a ‘professional’ 
status. Reforms included the development of teacher standards, the 
requirement for all teachers to meet a minimum standard of a four‑year 
degree before becoming certified, and the establishment of a course of 
additional professional training after the four‑year degree. All teachers 
are required to be formally certified, either through a portfolio of 
the teacher’s education and achievements, or through a remedial 90‑
hour course. Fundamental to this reform was the introduction of a 
‘professional allowance’ granted to teachers once they are certified, 
which constitutes a significant addition to teachers’ salaries, and will 
approximately double the wage bill of the government in years to 
come (Cerdan‑Infantes and Makarova, 2013). 
Once teachers are certified, their salaries increase based on 
their annual performance appraisal scores – another reform brought 
in by the teacher law. Teachers’ knowledge and skills are evaluated 
annually against the teacher standards, and professional development 
is suggested based on their professional needs.
The effects of this teacher law were examined recently in a 
review by the World Bank (Chang et al., 2013). It found that teacher 
certification and the doubling of teacher income had not led to the 
expected effects in terms of better teaching and better learning. There 
was no difference found in pedagogy or student outcomes between 
those primary school teachers who were certified, and those who 
were uncertified. This is consistent with the research discussed in 
Chapter  2, which suggests that raising teacher salaries alone (in 
those countries where the salary already covered basic needs) is not 
enough to improve teacher quality (Abd‑El‑Fattah, 2010; Bennell 
and Akyeampong, 2007; Delannoy and Sedlacek, 2001; Michaelowa, 
2002). Why the certification failed to have an effect on teaching and 
learning is more puzzling.
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However, increasing salary and introducing certification do seem 
to have had an effect on increasing the attractiveness of the profession. 
Chang and colleagues (2013) report that better candidates (those 
with better qualifications) are applying to teacher training institutions 
since the teacher law came into place. Applications to teacher training 
institutions have been increasing year on year faster than the national 
average. However, the supply of new teacher trainees has only kept up 
with the increase in demand, so the potentially beneficial effects of 
competition for places has not yet materialized (Chang et al., 2013). 
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Chapter 6 
Lessons for design and implementation
Several of the lessons for design drawn out by evaluations and 
reviews of teacher career structures have already been discussed 
when considering different methods and approaches to appraisal, as 
the appraisal process is central to performance‑based teacher career 
structures. These lessons will be briefly revisited here, before other 
design considerations specific to teacher career ladders are discussed.
In its report on attracting and retaining qualified teachers within 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the World 
Bank (2012) drew out key lessons from the implementation of 
teacher career ladders, some of which correspond to the best practices 
in appraisal discussed earlier. It suggests that for advancement to be 
credible, advancement decisions should: (i) involve  peers, school 
principals, and any other actors agreed by key stakeholders, including 
teachers’ unions; and (ii) use multiple sources of  objective, valid, and 
reliable evidence of performance. Having multiple evaluators ensures 
the decision‑making process is reliable and less subjective, while the 
use of multiple sources allows the overall outcome to overcome the 
weaknesses of individual methods. 
Another key lesson for the OECS was the importance of clear 
evaluation criteria – clarity in what teachers need to do or show to 
earn a promotion (as opposed to how this is assessed and by who) 
(World Bank, 2012). As noted previously, different systems have 
defined a whole host of criteria that teachers must meet, including 
certain student scores, participating in professional development, and 
scoring by parents and supervisors. However, an important issue faced 
by several systems was the complexity of the evaluation criteria. North 
Carolina’s career structure plan was suspended because of difficulties 
in implementing its complex evaluation system, and Cincinnati’s 
programme also faced criticism that the evaluation criteria were too 
complicated for teachers to understand (Cornett and Gaines, 2002).
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Box 3. Australia’s Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) status
Australia introduced Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) status in 1990. These ASTs 
were paid between 4 per cent and 10 per cent more than the top of the salary 
scale at the time, in recognition of their superior teaching performance. However, 
according to Ingvarson (2013), implementation of this policy failed across most 
states because the salary increases were too small, and teachers were often given 
extra responsibilities and became stressed (even though the intention was that they 
would continue with classroom teaching). 
Although this innovation formed part of national policy, standards and 
evaluation criteria for AST status were left up to local authorities, which lacked 
the expertise or resources necessary to develop and trial methods that were valid 
and reliable. Consequently, the most common evaluation method consisted of 
an interview, with a panel including the school principal, a colleague, a local 
government representative, and a teacher from another school. As teaching 
evaluations were not considered, it became difficult for panels to grant AST status 
without seeming biased. Accordingly, they approved almost everyone who applied 
who was eligible, leading to a loss of credibility. 
One solution to this is to have a standards‑based evaluation criteria, 
where there are clear skills, knowledge, and practices that teachers 
must have or be doing in order to earn a promotion. The OECD 
report, Teachers for the 21st Century (OECD, 2013), suggests that 
teacher appraisals need teacher standards in order to be fair and 
reliable. It contends that the main reference standards for teacher 
appraisals are usually:
• professional profiles of teachers or teaching standards 
(general profile of competencies for teachers), including 
specialised profiles for particular types of teachers (e.g. level 
of education, subject);
• a set of general and professional duties of teachers, including 
job descriptions;
• at the school level, a school development plan, internal 
regulations and the annual activity plan (OECD, 2013: 21).
How these competencies are demonstrated (i.e. through lesson 
observations or portfolios) can be left to the local district or the 
teacher themselves, but assessors should be trained in determining 
whether or not the standards have been met. This is in contrast to a 
cumulative approach, where each different appraisal method is worth 
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a certain number of points, or is weighted differently, leading to a lack 
of transparency. 
Finally, evidence from Martins’ (2010) appraisal of the 
Portuguese reform and from psychological theory supports the 
suggestion that bonuses or promotions as a result of appraisal should 
be criterion‑referenced (based on standards), without the introduction 
of quotas, which lead to competition. In Portugal, this competition, in 
combination with an increased workload, led to a decrease in student 
results, as it discouraged collaboration between teachers. 
Difficulty of standards and professional development
Another important issue for the design of teacher career structures is 
the ease with which teachers can be promoted. Mistakes can be made 
in both directions. If standards are so low, or appraisal procedures so 
lax, that the majority of teachers that apply receive promotion, then 
this reduces the status of the role, costs more, and can reduce the 
credibility of the programme with teachers. For example, 90 per cent 
of teachers in Texas qualified for the first two levels of the state’s 
proposed career structure. Subsequently, Texas never implemented 
the top rungs of the proposed structure, due to the cost of paying 90 
per cent of teachers a bonus and the scepticism that arose among staff 
that nine out of 10 teachers merited the award (Cornett and Gaines, 
2002). The Advanced Skills Teacher status in Australia was met with 
similar scepticism when most teachers that applied were accepted 
(Ingvarson, 2013). Vegas points out that making promotion too easy 
also reduces the incentive for teachers to improve learning in their 
classrooms, as they would expect to receive it anyway (Vegas, 2005).
Conversely, if the criteria for promotion are set too high, or not 
many teachers are eligible to apply, the effect on motivation would 
also be minimal, as teachers would just not bother trying, or worse, 
become further stressed or overloaded. In Colombia (see Factsheet 2), 
few teachers are choosing to apply for promotion, despite the 
substantial salary increase. Ome (2012; reported in Bruns and Luque, 
2014) suggests that this was partly because promotion is too difficult 
to attain, with only a fifth of teachers succeeding. 
Delannoy and Sedlacek (2001) suggest that the vision of what is 
expected from teachers ‘should be pitched at a realistic level’ (58). This 
is especially important for implementation in developing countries 
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where initial teacher training may be limited and skills low. Teachers 
need to see that the next rung up on the ladder is achievable, so the 
standards for the lowest rungs on the ladder need to be set relative 
to the current skills of the teaching population, and, where jobs‑
based elements are additional to a teachers’ normal workload, they 
should be given time in lieu. An example of a place where this has not 
happened is Ethiopia, where teachers complain that the expectations 
set by the career ladder are too high, and ignore their time constraints 
(Tekleselassie, 2005). One eighth‑grade teacher is quoted thus:
Teachers spend most of the time in the classroom; in the class 
of eighty, ninety or even hundred students what spare time is 
there to do other than conducting classes? You know, I don’t even 
have enough time to provide feedback on class or homework 
assignments for every student. Now, they tell us to do research, to 
participate in several extracurricular activities, and still worse, to 
participate in community activities. Either we have to meet these 
requirements or lose our promotion. What do you expect us to 
do under such constraining circumstances? Pretend as though 
we had done what actually we didn’t? What? (Tekleselassie, 
2005: 624). 
Decisions about how easy or hard the criteria for promotion are 
should also be based on the financial resources available. If only a small 
pot of money is available for the scheme, standards could be set higher 
so that fewer teachers attain the highest levels with the highest salaries. 
In a report for the Business Council of Australia (BCA), Dinham, 
Ingvarson, and Kleinhenz (2008) carried out such an analysis for 
Australia, and suggested that equilibrium in a national certification 
system for Australia’s teachers would see around 30  per  cent of 
teachers at the ‘highly accomplished’ level and 10 per cent at the ‘lead 
teacher’ level. They made clear, though, that this equilibrium would 
be attained by the setting of standards at variable levels of difficulty 
for the different levels of promotion, and did not recommend the 
establishment of a quota for the number of teachers allowed at each 
level.
Professional development
Even with a perfectly designed teacher career ladder, with clearly 
described teacher standards or requirements that each teacher must 
meet to move up at each level, teachers may find themselves unable to 
Exploring the impact of career models on teacher motivation
104
meet these standards without high‑quality professional development. 
Heneman III (1998) conducted a qualitative review into what teachers 
in a district in North Carolina thought about the performance‑pay plan 
there, and found that although teachers felt generally positive about 
the plan, they felt unsure about their pedagogical ability to meet the 
expected student achievement goals. They felt that they had sufficient 
resources, but lacked the opportunities for team teaching and planning, 
best practice information‑gathering, and professional development, 
among other things. A similar issue was reported by Tekleselassi with 
Ethiopia’s career structure (see Factsheet 4) – teachers were required 
to carry out tasks such as research that they had not been trained to do.
This relates to Bennell and Akyeampong’s (2007) distinction 
between ‘will‑do’ motivation and ‘can‑do’ motivation. These teachers 
appear to be in a situation where they have the former but lack the 
latter, described by Bennell and Akyeampong thus: ‘a teacher may be 
highly committed to the attainment of the school’s learning goals, but 
she may lack the necessary competencies to teach effectively, which 
ultimately becomes de‑moralising and de‑motivating’ (40). Whereas, 
if teachers lack the competencies but are ‘passing’ new standards 
anyway, then such a system becomes merely bureaucratic hurdle and 
will not improve the education of the children as intended. Ensuring 
access to professional development is therefore crucial for the success 
of any new career structure. In its key lessons for the implementation 
of teacher career ladders, the World Bank (2012: 45) suggests 
that teacher professional development ‘should be part of the plan, 
including provision for release time, financing aspects etc.’ Singapore’s 
career structure (see Factsheet 5) manages this element very well. 
Before teachers are promoted, they are required to attend professional 
development courses that are specifically designed to prepare them 
for the role for which they are applying.
It is important that professional development opportunities 
align with the criteria or standards for teachers defined by the career 
ladder. Having such a career ladder can support the organization of 
professional development by providing clear direction. Dinham, 
Ingvarson, and Kleinhenz (2008), suggest that a professional 
development system should have the following four elements as a 
minimum: 
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• Teaching standards that set out in detail what is to be expected 
of teachers.  
• Teacher development ‘milestones’ with recognition and 
incentives for those that achieve them.  
• Resources for teachers’ professional development linked to the 
requirements of the standards.
• A legitimate and voluntary professional certification process 
based on authentic performance evaluations.
Financial aspects 
Many career ladders fail due to lack of funding. It is important to 
examine the cost implications prior to implementation, and make 
adequate budget provisions. With some career structure designs, 
greater spending on teacher salaries is inevitable. For example, designs 
in US states where new roles were introduced, in addition to the 
single salary structure, meant that this cost additional money, and 
teachers continued to receive pay rises based on time teaching and 
qualifications, in addition to anything they earned through achieving 
the new levels (Cornett and Gaines, 2002). In contrast, Arizona’s 
teacher career ladder legislation (see Factsheet 1) required districts 
to restructure teacher pay, rather than add the ladders to the existing 
structure. This was said to be key to the stability of Arizona’s teacher 
plan (Cornett and Gaines, 2002), although Arizona’s programme also 
required extra funding.
If designed in such a way that money for the higher rungs on the 
career ladder comes from money that would have been spent on the 
longest‑serving teachers (regardless of performance), it is possible to 
design a new teacher compensation system with the same long‑term 
salary costs as the current system (Hawley Miles, Pennington, and 
Bloom, 2015). In fact, theoretically, it would be possible (though 
not desirable or practical) to spend less money on teacher salaries 
under a career ladder, if the same salary increases that teachers would 
automatically get under the single salary schedule were only granted to 
those who passed a stringent appraisal at each level. In reality, though, 
such a system would not be accepted by teachers (in bargaining, the 
risk of not receiving automatic increases has to at least be offset by 
the possibility to earn more than they would have gained for excellent 
performance), and the salary situation in many developing countries 
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is already so constrained that any perceived cut would worsen teacher 
shortages and further demoralize teachers. Whether or not the salary 
bill increases, the introduction of an effective programme is likely 
to come with additional long‑term costs to pay for professional 
development aligned with teacher standards, and administrative costs 
for assessment and record‑keeping (Milanowski, 2003).
There is also likely to be an initial transition cost when 
implementing a new system, for two reasons. First, there will be some 
teachers in the current system at or near the top of the salary scale 
for whom the new system would lead to a pay cut. Systems, such as 
Cincinnati, that have tried to force all (but a relatively small number of 
very senior teachers) teachers onto the new plan have unsurprisingly 
met with resistance from teachers’ unions, which damages teacher 
buy‑in (Milanowski, 2003). Others, instead, have opted to continue 
to pay those teachers until their retirement or for a few phase‑in years 
(keeping their salaries constant if not continuing to raise them), 
making the career ladder programme voluntary for these teachers, 
and introducing the plan as compulsory for newer teachers (Hawley 
Miles, Pennington, and Bloom, 2015). Second, for the successful 
implementation of a new teacher career ladder, whoever is performing 
the teacher appraisals must be adequately trained, as the quality of 
this training is paramount. In Indonesia, a delay in funding meant that 
training courses were hastily designed and inefficient, and led to an 
almost 100 per cent pass rate at the end of training (implying, in this 
case, a lack of discretion in assessment decisions) (Chang et al., 2013).
How the career structure is designed affects not only how much 
money is spent, but the predictability of spending on teacher salaries 
each year. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, norm‑referenced 
appraisal (where only a certain number of teachers are promoted 
dependent on their relative performance) often allows more certainty 
regarding the amount required than criterion‑referenced appraisal 
(where any teacher who meets the standards is promoted). 
In Ethiopia (see Factsheet 4), a criterion‑referenced system 
is used where teachers must meet certain criteria before being 
promoted. However, at the highest levels, a norm‑referenced appraisal 
is used – only the best of those that meet the criteria are promoted. 
This allows for more certainty about budgets, but without introducing 
competition and reducing collegiality between teachers up to the 
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highest levels of the career ladder (at which point, competing teachers 
may come from different schools anyway). 
In Estonia (see Factsheet 3), a criterion‑referenced system is used 
throughout the career ladder, but local authorities can still predict 
exactly how much will be spent on salaries, as the salaries are not fixed. 
Teachers are guaranteed a minimum salary, and guaranteed that their 
promotion will be accompanied by a salary increase, but the exact 
amount granted to each teacher depends on the number of teachers 
at each level. 
Ownership and management of reform
While teachers need to understand the framework for evaluation, 
they also need to ‘buy in’ to the career programme and see it as 
something fair and worthwhile if it is to have any positive impact on 
teacher motivation or skills. To achieve this it is essential to ensure the 
involvement of teachers and their representatives in the initial design 
and development of the programme. Without this ‘buy‑in’ from a 
critical mass of teachers, a new teacher compensation system will not 
succeed (Cornett and Gaines, 2002; World Bank, 2012). This is not 
always the case with policy changes affecting teachers, and a survey 
by VSO in Malawi, Papua New Guinea, and Zambia found that the 
insufficient involvement of teachers’ representatives in policy‑making 
was a major cause of dissatisfaction (VSO, 2002).
Dellanoy and Sedlacek (2001) point out that all known reforms 
have required bargaining with teachers’ unions over ‘acquired rights’, 
as teachers move from a system where they were guaranteed pay rises 
to one where this is dependent on appraisal. They offer three pieces of 
guidance on this process, from the state of Connecticut: 
First, a critical pre‑condition is the existence of a social consensus 
about the need for reform. ... Second, the need for differentiated 
pay scales (according to performance) should be balanced with 
the need to ensure that teacher salaries are competitive at the 
market level (taking into account monetary and non‑monetary 
benefits). Finally, the vision of what is expected from teachers, the 
‘social contract’, should be pitched at a realistic level (Dellanoy 
and Sedlacek, 2001: 58).
Good communication and timely information‑sharing are also 
important for continued teacher buy‑in, especially for those who have 
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not been directly involved in the process of implementation and design. 
The World Bank (2012) suggests that ‘teachers should be informed 
clearly, promptly and in detail about the evaluation procedures and 
related policies’ (45).
Although teachers and their union representatives should be 
involved in and have input into the design of the evaluation system, 
they should not be solely responsible for its performance unless they 
have the necessary expertise (e.g. as part of a professional body of 
teachers). Based on the lessons from the implementation of the AST 
programme in Australia, Invargson (2013) suggests that 
there is a need for a clear separation between the certification 
system, which should be regulated by a professional body, 
and systems for deciding on the pay to be associated with that 
certification, which should rightly be negotiated between 
teachers unions and local authorities (248). 
The certification system, consisting of some form of criteria and 
the processes by which teachers will be judged to have met the criteria, 
should be designed by experts in evaluation design, with input from 
stakeholders, to ensure that the system is valid and reliable, and reflects 
the wisdom gained from teachers’ experiences.  
In Arizona, the state passed legislation which determined a clear 
framework for how systems should be designed, but left districts to 
decide exactly how this was to be implemented in their local areas 
(Driscoll, 2015). Once districts had designed their own programmes, 
they were submitted to the state authorities for approval against the 
legislation. The right balance between central guidance and local 
flexibility will depend on the skill level of local authorities, how 
much autonomy authorities and schools are used to and expect, 
and how easy it is to hold local districts accountable to the centrally 
mandated elements of the programme (which will, in part, depend on 
the geography of the country). While local leaders will have a better 
understanding of the school context and teachers’ abilities and needs, 
the central government will have more expertise in programme design 
and can align teacher evaluation systems with national‑level goals.
Fullan and Miles (1992) remind us, however, that it is especially 
unwise to mandate important changes, as these require motivation, 
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skill, and discretionary judgement on the part of those who must 
change (teachers and school leaders).
Implementation plan
Implementing a teacher career structure is a substantial undertaking, 
and the process of implementation itself needs planning, along with 
the design (World Bank, 2012). The process requires substantial 
commitment from the main actors involved, including education 
authorities at central and local levels, teachers’ unions, universities, 
and so on, as well as consensus among these groups about the 
standards or criteria that define teacher quality, and how they will be 
measured (OECD, 2013). A particularly important stakeholder to 
get on board from the outset is the Ministry of Finance. Unless the 
reform is adequately costed and budgeted, it will not be implemented. 
Enough time needs to be given for the proper training of evaluators 
(whether these are school staff or external authorities), and for schools 
and teachers to prepare and understand the new system, the rationale 
behind it, and the standards which they will need to work towards. 
Too often, reforms are ad hoc, and uncoordinated with one another. 
Time and attention should be given to how the proposed reform 
aligns with other educational reforms, to ensure that the overall effect 
is coherent and that different policies are pulling in the same direction 
(Fullan and Miles, 1992). 
To help with successful implementation, it is useful to pilot the 
system in a smaller part of the state, as this allows any difficulties or 
oversights to be ironed out before the programme is rolled out on a 
wider scale. This approach also helps with budget planning, as it allows 
authorities to more accurately estimate the proportion of teachers able 
to pass at each level, and to adjust salary promises accordingly ahead 
of the main roll out in order to keep the salary bill within budget.
Other obstacles 
There are other potential obstacles to be aware of in the design and 
implementation of a new career structure. In many countries, teachers 
are civil servants, and their pay, therefore, is based on pay scales 
which are common across the civil service. This could add an element 
of challenge in implementing a new career structure, as other civil 
service professionals might expect to follow suit. With regards to the 
Exploring the impact of career models on teacher motivation
110
relationship between the teachers’ career structure and the rest of the 
civil service, one option would be to replicate Ethiopia’s approach, and 
have teacher salaries remain within the general framework, but move 
teachers to another civil service salary scale on promotion. Another 
(by no means easy) option would be to create an entirely separate 
salary scale for teachers.
Another likely obstacle concerns the availability or otherwise of 
suitable people to carry out teacher evaluations. Promotions based 
on any ‘holistic’ evaluation (that goes beyond narrow measures such 
as student results) rely to a certain extent on the judgement of more 
senior professionals. If there is a lack of knowledge or understanding 
of what good teaching looks like among principals and local education 
authorities, the process of promotion based on quality of teaching 
becomes fraught with difficulty. In this scenario, it is very important 
that sufficient training is given to these professionals (or whoever 
is to be responsible for evaluating teachers for promotion) prior to 
the introduction of a new career structure. If the career structure is 
implemented before this happens, there is a danger that if the wrong 
people are promoted initially, teachers could lose trust in the fairness 
of the system before it is even fully implemented.
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Conclusion
This literature review set out to examine the available research 
concerning the organization of teacher careers, and made the 
assumption that, where salaries are sufficient to meet teachers’ basic 
needs, specific models of teacher career organization could play a 
role in improving the motivation of teachers in their daily work, 
and in raising the appeal of the profession. This section draws some 
brief conclusions regarding the five research questions set out in the 
introduction.
What are the specific problems linked to the organization  
of teacher careers in developing countries?
By far the most common way to organize teacher careers in developing 
and developed countries is the single salary schedule. Problems with 
this structure are widely discussed in the literature, and include: a lack 
of correlation between the factors used for promotion (certificates 
and experience) and teacher effectiveness; a lack of accountability 
for quality of teaching; the demotivating effect on the colleagues of 
less dedicated teachers who are automatically promoted; a flat salary 
structure that makes the profession less attractive to the most able; 
a lack of opportunities for career progression without leaving the 
classroom; and a limited sense of self‑determination among teachers. 
Changing the career structure for teachers to a system that includes 
promotion opportunities that allow teachers to continue teaching, 
and that links promotion to the quality of teaching, could therefore 
potentially address all of these problems, if designed correctly. 
In addition to teachers whose pay follows this single salary 
schedule, many developing countries also have contract teachers who 
are employed to meet the increasing demand for teachers, but who 
often lack the qualifications required of civil service teachers. This 
situation creates a dual problem: students taught by these teachers 
do not have the benefit of a qualified teacher with teacher training, 
and qualified teachers feel the status of the profession is lowered by 
the admission of less‑qualified candidates to the profession. Changing 
the teacher career structure could potentially help to address these 
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problems. If contract teachers were considered to be on the first rung of 
a career ladder and could access training to allow them to be promoted 
to full teacher status, this would give them a route to become fully 
qualified. And if qualified teachers were known as such, or had the 
opportunity to become ‘lead teachers’ or ‘master teachers’, they could 
differentiate themselves professionally from those less qualified.
How are the motivation and organization of careers linked?
The single salary structure does not, in itself, provide any motivation 
for teachers to work hard or improve their teaching quality, as whether 
they do this or not has no effect on their career outcomes or pay. 
Teachers in these systems rely on their internal motivation to perform 
well for their students, as the single salary structure is effectively 
demotivating, as discussed above. 
Types of motivation can be classified along a scale, from 
controlled (acting because of an external pressure) to autonomous 
(acting out of an intrinsic desire for a certain outcome). Extrinsic 
incentives, such as monetary bonuses based on specific outcomes, can 
undermine autonomous motivation. This should be avoided due to 
the positive effects of autonomous motivation on problem‑solving, 
persistence, and creativity. 
The task for any career structure, therefore, is to encourage 
autonomous motivation through the creation of an environment that 
encourages competence, autonomy, and good interpersonal relations, 
while, at the same time, holding teachers accountable for the quality of 
their teaching. This can be achieved by including extrinsic incentives 
and disincentives, for those who remain unmotivated, in a way that is 
not perceived as controlling to those who are already autonomously 
motivated. In other words, accountability for teaching quality is 
needed, but it must be perceived as supportive and conducive to the 
autonomy of all teachers willing to try to improve their practice, so 
that it does not undermine their autonomous motivation. This sounds 
challenging, but some career structures seem to achieve this balance.
What are the different models of teacher career organization 
around the world?
Beyond the single salary structure, with its experience‑based pay rises 
and administrative promotions (to school leadership and out of the 
Conclusion
113
classroom), there are three main models of teacher career organization. 
These all link pay with teaching quality in some way, but vary in terms 
of how direct that link is, and how much they allow for conditions of 
autonomy and supportive relationships. 
Performance‑related pay models give teachers one‑off bonuses, 
based on either their students’ results or a broader appraisal of 
teacher performance. Another model is a variation on the single salary 
structure, where salary rises at key points (e.g. every three years) are 
dependent on passing an appraisal. Sometimes the standards they 
are appraised against become more challenging, the longer they’ve 
been in the profession. The final model is that of the career ladder. 
Here teachers do not rise up the pay scale by passing an appraisal, but 
rather take on a new status or role, such as ‘lead teacher’, having met 
the required standards to do so. Their pay reflects their new position. 
There are, of course, variations within these three models, relating, for 
example, to who evaluates the teachers, the features of the standards, 
whether professional development is mandatory, and whether new 
positions come with additional responsibilities.
Which are the most successful models, according to the 
available research?
The research on all of these models is limited to the extent that no firm 
conclusions can be drawn. The research on performance‑related pay 
suggests that it is largely ineffective, with most of the 29 American states 
that implemented PBR programmes in 1986 having since dropped or 
diluted them. However, two studies on performance‑related pay for 
individual teachers in India and Israel suggest that it can raise student 
results. Whether or not this success was due to signalling effort (effort 
for short‑term results rather than genuine learning) is an important 
and, as yet, unresolved question. In developed countries, performance‑
related pay for teachers has unfortunately been associated with 
teaching to the test, teachers leaving ‘difficult’ schools and, in some 
cases, cheating. 
The career ladder structure is a more promising model, in that 
it allows the possibility of linking pay to performance indirectly, 
and offer teachers a pathway for professional growth. But there 
are significant variations within the career ladder structure used 
by different countries, and different features are likely to result in 
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different outcomes. Only three career ladder programmes have 
been quantitatively evaluated. Arizona’s model was standards‑based, 
criterion‑referenced, and had multiple, external evaluators involved 
in promotion decisions. It was successful at reducing the drop‑out 
rate, improving the graduation rate, and improving student scores, 
relative to districts that did not take part. Missouri’s model included 
teacher standards, but these remained identical at different levels of 
promotion, and teachers were assessed by administrators in their own 
school. Results in maths improved only marginally, and in reading not 
at all, which evaluators put down to a lack of rigour in the application 
of the evaluation procedure, due to collusion between administrators 
and teachers. Portugal introduced a nation‑wide career structure in 
which teachers had to pass an evaluation to move from a lower pay 
scale to a higher pay scale. This appraisal decision was cumulative, 
and norm‑referenced, putting the teachers in competition with one 
another, with the result that student scores actually decreased after the 
introduction of the programme. 
It is very important to note that the success of this model probably 
depends on a number of important preconditions: sufficient financial 
resources, a reliable and transparent teacher evaluation system, strong 
legislative and regulatory frameworks, and so on. Particular care must 
therefore be taken to consider the socio‑cultural and socio‑economic 
contexts of developing countries. More research is needed to assess 
how career ladder models function in these particular contexts.
What are the lessons for the design and implementation  
of career ladder systems?
This research, and qualitative reports on other career structures, give 
us clues as to what features might be most effective in the design of 
teacher careers. 
Holistic (standards‑based), criterion‑referenced evaluation for 
teachers seems to be more effective than cumulative, norm‑referenced 
evaluation, at least at the lower levels of the career ladder. 
Criterion‑referenced evaluation has implications for finances, as 
it means that anyone who meets the standards can be promoted 
(and therefore receive a higher salary), but this uncertainty can be 
overcome in two ways. Either an additional norm‑referenced process 
can be introduced to select between teachers who have met the 
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standards at the highest levels, introducing some competition but 
keeping costs down, or a pay rise can be guaranteed for anyone who 
meets the criteria, but the extent of this pay rise can be based on the 
available budget. 
Evaluation against standards should be carried out by at least two 
people. At lower levels of the career ladder, it makes practical sense for 
teachers to be evaluated by senior members of the school, however at 
middle and higher levels it would be preferable if the evaluation was 
at least reviewed by an external assessor. These external assessors and 
school‑based assessors should be trained in how to make judgements 
against standards before the career structure is implemented. 
With regard to the design of standards themselves, teachers or 
teacher representatives should be involved, and the standards set 
should be realistic and take into account the time constraints on 
teachers in classrooms. The standards at the lower end of the ladder 
need to be attainable for almost all teachers, while the standards at 
the higher end of the scale can be more aspirational, but should still 





Arizona’s teacher career programme was jointly developed in 1984 by policy-
makers, union representatives, teachers, and other stakeholders, and was made into 
legislation. In 1985, the state selected 14 school districts to take part in a five-year 
pilot programme. Following this, a further 14 districts opted to participate in the 
programme, but beyond this, no further districts were able to take part due to a lack 
of funding. The districts taking part in the programme account for about a third of 
students in Arizona.
What does the career structure look like?
In Arizona, individual districts that take part are required to design their own 
career structure, based on regulations that form part of state legislation. The Career 
Ladder Program consists of levels and steps, each of which has its own salary range, 
but as the number of levels and steps is not specified by the legislation, this varies 
across the 28 districts.
Each district has to reapply every year to the State Career Ladder Advisory 
Committee to have their career structures approved against the legislation. Staff 
from the Arizona Department of Education also provide technical assistance to 
district personnel in the administration of their programmes.
What is movement through the career structure based on? 
With regard to the basis for teacher pay, the legislation requires that Career Ladder 
programmes provide for:
• increasingly high levels of pupil academic progress as measured by 
objective criteria;
• increasingly high levels of teaching skills;
• increasingly high levels of teacher responsibility.
Teacher pay is therefore both jobs-based and performance-based. The legislation 
also requires that each district include adequate and appropriate professional 
development opportunities to help teachers reach the skill levels required for 
the next step. Although completion of professional development is not part of 
the legislative requirements for moving through the levels, some of the districts 
count completion of certain professional development activities among the teacher 
responsibilities laid out at each level.
How does this work in practice?
The legislation specifies that promotion should be based on more than one measure 
of teacher performance, and that this must include instructional performance, pupil 
academic progress, and instructional responsibilities. In practice, most districts use 
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classroom-based measures of student academic progress rather than external tests. 
Teachers are usually required to create portfolios gathering evidence of their skills 
and competencies. 
The legislation states that at least two people must be involved in placement 
decisions to ensure reliability, and an appeal procedure must be put in place. 
Portfolios are often submitted to district-level committees made up of teachers (at 
the higher levels of the career structure) and parents, who decide whether a teacher 
has met the criteria for the level.
Criteria differ for each district, although all are based on the key requirements 
stipulated in the legislation. All teachers that meet the criteria are promoted, 
as is normal for a criterion-referenced system. The state actively encourages 
collaboration and teamwork. With regard to the jobs-based component, districts 
have a continuum of responsibilities which teachers must take on as they advance 
up the levels. 
Are there other bonuses or allowances?
In 1994/95, a statute revision was enacted that allowed all districts to participate 
in an additional incentive component.  All employees are eligible to participate in 
this programme at the school site level (including non-teaching staff).  It is up to 
districts to determine who receives the incentive.
What are the financial implications?
State-appropriated funding is derived by a formula based primarily on student 
counts. At full implementation, districts may increase their base funding level by 
up to 5.5 per cent, depending on compliance with requirements. The programme is 
also subsidised by district taxes.
Has this programme been evaluated?
Yes, school districts that take part in the programme have been compared with 
those that do not, and found to have significantly higher student results in almost 
all grades and subjects (Stoat, 1994; 2002). For more information, see Chapter 5. 
Are there any problems or issues with this programme?
No new districts have been able to join the programme since 1994 due to lack of 
funding. In 2010, one district that was unable to join the programme filed a lawsuit 
against the state, and the judge ruled that it was unconstitutional to enable some 
districts to access this funding but not others. The state therefore had to expand 
the funding to all districts that wanted to participate or repeal the programme. It 
chose to do the latter (due to lack of funding), and the Career Ladder Program is 
now being phased out.





What does the career structure look like?
Colombia’s Estatuto de Profesionalización Docente (EPD) programme was 
introduced in 2002, marking a change from the previous seniority-based system. 
Teachers begin on one of three different grades, based on their level of education. 
Each of these grades has four wage levels (A, B, C, and D), which can be worked 
through over the course of a teacher’s career, based on his or her competence. As 
of 2011, across all three grades, 94 per cent of teachers are on the lowest wage level 
(A). 
What is movement through the career structure based on? 
Moving from one salary level to the next requires: 
• at least three years in service; 
• scoring at least 60 per cent on the compulsory annual performance 
assessments over the previous two years; 
• scoring 80 or higher on the EPD’s assessment of competencies, which 
covers behavioural, pedagogical, and discipline-specific competencies. 
As a result, the career structure is performance-based only – not jobs-based or 
professional development-based. No professional development is required, although 
it may well be helpful in attaining the required competencies. Promotion does not 
depend on or result in extra responsibilities.
How does this work in practice?
School directors formally appraise every teacher each year, and teachers are 
rated out of 100 on a combined assessment of skills and academic qualifications. 
However, appraisal for promotion only happens every three years (at most), and is 
managed by the national testing agency (Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación 
de la Educación) and sub-national governments. 
The outcome of the EPD appraisal is decided cumulatively (adding together 
points from different aspects of the appraisal), with a threshold score of 80 required 
for promotion. While this officially makes the promotion decision criterion-
referenced, promotions are contingent on the available budget, with those with the 
highest scores given priority. Any teacher who scores less than 60 two years in a row 
is dismissed. 
Promotions are difficult to achieve. In 2011, less than 19 per cent of candidates 
passed the threshold required for promotion to a higher salary level (B, C, or D), 
and less than 22 per cent achieved promotion to a higher grade. 
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What are the financial implications?
Salary increases with promotion are substantial. For example, base salaries for 
wage level D within Grade 2 are 81 per cent higher than for level A. However, few 
teachers qualify for promotions, and even if they do there is no guarantee they will 
receive this pay rise, as promotions are budget dependent. This makes Colombia’s 
wage bill more sustainable, but puts teachers in competition with one another, 
which could be a reason why fewer than 60 per cent of teachers chose to take the 
2011 EPD assessment.
Has this programme been evaluated?
Evaluation of this programme has been difficult due to the lack of reliable 
pre-reform data. To get around this issue, Ome (2012) used regression analysis to 
correlate school-level test results with the presence of EPD teachers. He found that 
schools with a higher share of EPD teachers had lower dropout rates and slightly 
higher test scores in some grades and disciplines, but that the correlations were 
inconsistent.
Are there any problems or issues with this programme?
Not many teachers are choosing to apply for promotion, despite promotions coming 
with a significant salary increase. This could be because the standards are too high 
(with roughly a fifth of teachers achieving promotion in 2011) or because salary 
increases are not guaranteed. While this is good for the budget, it could mean that 
most teachers are not motivated by this scheme.





What does the career structure look like?
There are four occupational grades (ametijärk) for teachers in Estonia: junior 
teacher, teacher, senior teacher, and teacher-methodologist. Until now, the teacher’s 
base-salary has been in direct correlation with the appointed grade.
What is movement through the career structure based on? 
The junior teacher grade is granted to anyone who has met the qualification 
requirements for being a teacher, and movement to teacher status requires one 
year of effective work as a junior teacher. In order to move to the senior teacher or 
teacher-methodologist grade, teachers must have worked effectively as a teacher at 
the lower level for three years consecutive, and have undertaken a minimum of 160 
hours of professional training in the past five years. 
Teachers’ qualifications are taken into account in the decision and, for the 
higher levels, existing responsibilities, such as being part of working groups or 
carrying out pedagogical research, are considered part of the promotion criteria. 
For example, a teacher should already have completed some mentoring of younger 
teachers in order to be appointed to the senior teacher position. The competencies 
and qualification requirements for each grade are laid out by the government 
regulation, Framework Requirements for Teachers’ Training.
This career structure is professional development-based and jobs-based, but 
does not include a performance-based element beyond the evaluation component 
that is included in the professional development courses. 
How does this work in practice?
The jobs-based element takes a different approach to many countries, with 
responsibilities given to teachers as a result of promotion, rather than being part 
of the criteria for promotion. The process of verifying a teacher’s credentials to 
move to the next grade is known as attestation. There is a sense that whoever 
conducts the attestation is just verifying the teacher’s own self-evaluation against 
the requirements to confirm that they are already at a certain grade level, rather 
than promoting them per se. If the teacher chooses to apply for attestation, they 
submit a written application along with documents confirming their fulfilment of 
the requirements.
Different personnel are responsible for teacher attestation at different levels. 
Teachers and junior teachers have their grade granted by the head of the institution, 
senior teachers have their grade granted by an attestation commission established 
by the head of the institution, and teacher methodologists have it granted by a 
commission established by the Minister of Education. Movement to higher grades is 
criterion-based, so anyone that meets the requirements for each level is promoted. 
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What are the financial implications?
There is no fixed salary level for each teacher grade, although it is guaranteed 
that teachers in higher grades will be paid more. Decisions regarding progression 
to grades are made independently of budgetary decisions, with the exact salaries 
shared out from a lump salary sum given to the local authority, based on an 
agreement between local authority representatives and teacher unions as to the 
minimum salary for each grade. 
This system allows for promotions with a guaranteed pay rise (although not an 
exact figure), without a quota or upper limit on promotions, while keeping salary 
expenditure constant and predictable.
Has this programme been evaluated?
No. Estonia’s PISA results have improved significantly over the past 10 years, 
although there is no guarantee that this is related to their teacher career structure.
Are there any problems or issues with this programme?
In his study on the assessment of primary teaching in Estonia, Mannamaa (2010) 
suggests that ‘the general opinion is that the system does not provide sufficient 
information to guide the development of teachers’ performance’ (226). The Estonian 
government has since implemented a project entitled Raising the Qualifications of 
General Education Teachers (2008–2014), which aims to support the professional 
development of general education teachers throughout their careers.






What does the career structure look like?
The career ladder, as described by Tekleselassie in 2005, included four steps or ranks: 
teacher, senior teacher, associate leader teacher, and lead teacher. Since 2005, the 
salary scale has changed: teachers at each of these levels are paid more, and those 
with second degrees are paid substantially more, but the four ranks on the career 
ladder remain (Ethiopian Teachers Association, 2012).
What is movement through the career structure based on? 
To move to the next step on the ladder, teachers have to meet various requirements: 
being effective in teaching; diligence in improving one’s profession and willingness 
to share experience with others; ability to evaluate the curricular materials at 
school level and to adapt them to local needs; ability to give support and to evaluate 
students’ behavioural changes; and cooperation with the school community and 
parents. Since 2012, teacher have been able to apply for the next step after three 
years (previously, it was four years).
How does this work in practice?
Whether or not a teacher has met these requirements is variably determined 
by evaluations from principals, colleagues, parents, and students, with every 
requirement evaluated by at least two of these groups. To be promoted to the most 
senior positions of associate leader teacher and lead teacher, teachers must also 
produce a research report, and take on additional administrative roles (such as 
head of department).
What are the financial implications?
While this career structure is mainly criterion-referenced, in that teachers have 
to meet certain criteria to be promoted, there is not enough money to pay all the 
teachers who successfully meet the criteria for the most senior positions. As a result, 
there is further screening for these positions, ensuring the programme is more 
financially manageable, but making the career structure norm-referenced (and 
therefore introducing competition) at the highest levels. 
Has this programme been evaluated?
It has not been evaluated quantitatively, but Tekleselassie conducted interviews 
about this policy with seven teachers from seven regions of Ethiopia. As he was 
concerned with the differences between the original single scale salary structure 
and the new career scheme that replaced it, the majority of his participants were 
long-serving teachers who had experienced both schemes. 
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A potential concern with this sample is that those teachers who have been 
teaching the longest are the most likely to dislike performance-based career 
structures, as under the single salary scheme they were automatically paid more 
for their experience, whereas under the new scheme they have to meet certain 
standards to receive a higher salary. Nevertheless, the specifics of their complaints 
about the new scheme provide useful lessons for other countries implementing new 
career structures for teachers.
Are there any problems or issues with this programme?
The first complaint reported by Tekleselassie was that the policy did not take into 
account the time constraints of teachers. These teachers were already teaching 
large classes, and so struggling for time to mark all the students’ homework and 
classwork, but the policy also demanded that they do research projects and take 
part in community activities in order to progress. The second complaint was related 
to this: that teachers lacked the skills or training to meet the requirements. They 
were expected to conduct research but did not have research skills training, and 
were provided with very little on-the-job training regardless.
Principals were also reported to lack the time and skills necessary to carry out 
evaluations. As principals are elected to their role by teachers, rather than promoted 
based on evaluations, teachers also reported that principals have other motivations 
which may conflict with their motivation to promote the best teachers.
Other criticisms of the programme were related to the personnel involved in 
teacher evaluation. Parents are involved in teacher evaluation, which, it is argued, 
is not a good measure, as parents have little involvement with teachers and therefore 
base their scores on what they are told by the school principal. Peer evaluation 
is also criticized, as, according to the teachers interviewed by Tekleselassie, peer 
evaluation erodes the sense of collegiality, and at the higher-level teachers find 
themselves in competition with one another.





What does the career structure look like?
Singapore’s career structure has three tracks: the teaching track, the leadership 
track, and the specialist track. The teaching track includes the roles of senior teacher, 
lead teacher, master teacher, and principal master teacher. For most of the roles on 
this track, teachers continue teaching in schools, though master teachers are based 
in the Academy for Singapore Teachers and work with many schools. The leadership 
track encompasses subject/level head, head of department, vice-principal, principal, 
cluster superintendent, deputy director, director, and director-general of education. 
The specialist track also includes roles that take teachers out of the classroom, and, 
in many cases, out of the school where employees work on curriculum development 
and other policies. The roles in this track are senior specialist 1, senior specialist 2, 
lead specialist, principal specialist, and chief specialist. Movement up each track is 
accompanied by a rise in basic pay.
What is movement through the career structure based on? 
There is a matrix of descriptors called the ‘Behavioural Indicators Document’, which 
describes the competencies required at each level, and was designed in collaboration 
with organizational psychologists. The ladders are performance-based, professional 
development-based and jobs-based. Teachers are evaluated yearly based on student 
outcomes (quality of teaching, holistic development), staff outcomes (working 
with others, sharing resources), and organizational outcomes (contributing to 
school life), and given a grade from A–E. This grade is decided on by the appraisal 
panel, made up of the senior management team, and is relevant when applying for 
promotion. It also determines the teacher’s annual bonus.
Appointment to a higher level also depends on the completion of certain forms 
of professional development, which can include courses of six months for certain 
positions (although teachers have to be recommended to take these courses). Some 
of these courses are specifically role-based. For example, there is a course for those 
who have been selected by the ministry for promotion to principal, before they are 
appointed to this role. Promotion is also jobs-based, as each new level comes with 
new responsibilities – dependent on the track – and, in some cases, teachers must 
start carrying out these responsibilities before being officially appointed to the new 
position. 
How does this work in practice?
Movement to the next level is considered an appointment rather than an 
achievement of certification. There is a quota determining how many teachers 
can reach each level, and the Ministry of Education ultimately decides who gets 
promoted, based on the criteria outlined above. Teachers can put in a preference 
for which track they would like to pursue, but the Ministry can decide that they are 
more suited to a different track.
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What are the financial implications?
This is a time-intensive system, as teachers are thoroughly evaluated every year, 
and their grade is decided upon by a panel of people. This means that the system 
is also expensive, as there needs to be enough senior teachers to carry out all of 
these evaluations. Singapore also put a lot of resources into their professional 
development, which goes hand in hand with the different tracks. However, although 
it is expensive, the system is predictable, as the Ministry controls who is promoted 
and to which level.
Has this programme been evaluated?
Not publically. 
Are there any problems or issues with this programme?
The evaluation process takes place yearly and is thorough, meaning teachers spend 
a lot of time compiling evidence. Some teachers also complain that due to the non-
teaching elements of the evaluation, they feel pressured to take on the leadership 
of extra-curricular courses and projects, which takes time away from planning 
lessons. 
Sources: Singapore, 2015; Lye, 2015. 
126
References




Abd‑El‑Fattah, S.M. 2010. ‘Longitudinal effects of pay increase on 
teachers’ job satisfaction: A motivational perspective’. In: The 
Journal of International Social Research, 3(10), 11–21.
Adelabu, M.A. 2005. Teacher motivation and incentives in Nigeria. 
London: DFID.
Adnett, N. 2003. ‘Commentary. Reforming teachers’ pay: Incentive 
payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy’. In:  Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 27(1), 145–157. Retrieved from:
 http://doi.org/10.1093/cje/27.1.145
AITSL (Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership). 




Akyeampong, K.; Asante, K. 2005. Teacher motivation and incentives: 
A profile of Ghana. University of Sussex: Centre for International 
Education.
Alam, M.T.; Farid, S. 2011. ‘Factors affecting teachers’ motivation’. 
International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(1), 298–304.
Amabile, T.M.; Goldfarb, P.; Brackfield, S.C. 1990. ‘Social influences on 
creativity: Evaluation, coaction, and surveillance’. In: Creativity 
Research Journal, 3(1), 6–21.
Arizona. 2015. Department of Education. Arizona Career Ladder 





Behrstock, E.; Akerstrom, J. 2008. Performance pay in Houston. 
Washington, DC: Center for Educator Compensation Reform.
Bénabou, R.; Tirole, J. 2003. ‘Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation’. In: 
The Review of Economic Studies, 70(3), 489–520. 
Benveniste, L.; Marshall, J.; Araujo, M.C. 2008. Teaching in Cambodia. 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia: World Bank.
Bennell, P. 2004. Teacher motivation and incentives in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia. Brighton: Knowledge and Skills for Development.
Bennell, P.; Akyeampong, K. 2007. Teacher motivation in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. Researching the Issues, 71. Retrieved from: 
 http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/175028/Default.aspx
Bennell, P.; Mukyanuzi, F. 2005. Is there a teacher motivation crisis in 
Tanzania? Brighton: Knowledge and Skills for Development. 
Booker, K.; Glazerman, S. 2009. Does the Missouri Teacher Career Ladder 
Program raise student achievement? Mathematica Policy Research, 
Inc. Retrieved from: http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED507469
Braver, M.W. 1989. ‘Executive summary: Impact of the Arizona 
Career Ladder Pilot on student achievement’. Paper presented at 
the Arizona Legislature, Senate Education Committee, Phoenix, 
February 1990. 
Bruns, B., Filmer, D.; Patrinos, H. A. 2011. Making schools work: New 
evidence on accountability reforms. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Bruns, B.; Luque, J. 2014. Great teachers: How to raise student learning in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Bryk, A.S.; Schneider, B. 2002. Trust in schools: A core resource for 
improvement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Buddin, R., McCaffrey, D.F., Kirby, S.N.; Xia, N. 2007. Merit pay for 
Florida teachers. Retrieved from: 
 www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR508.html
Caena, F. 2011. Literature review: Quality in teachers’ continuing 





Carlson, B. 2009. ‘School self‑evaluation and the “critical friend” 
perspective’. In: Educational Research and Review, 4(3), 78–85.
Casassus, J.; Cusato, S.; Froemel, J.E.; Palafox, J.C. 2002. First 
international comparative study of language, mathematics, and 
associated factors for students in the third and fourth years of primary 
school. Santiago: LLECE 
CEPPE (Centre of Study for Policies and Practices in Education). 
2013. Learning standards, teaching standards and standards for 
school principals: A comparative study. OECD Education Working 
Papers, 99. Chile: OECD. 
Cerdan‑Infantes, P.; Makarova, Y. 2013. Spending more or spending 
better: Improving education financing in Indonesia. Jakarta: World 
Bank.
Chang, M.C.; Al‑Samarrai, S.; de Ree, J.; Shaeffer, S.; Stevenson, R.; 
Ragatz, A.B. 2013. Teacher reform in Indonesia: The role of politics 
and evidence in policy making. Washington DC: World Bank.
Clotfelter, C.T.; Glennie, E. J.; Ladd, H.F.; Vigdor, J.L. 2008. ‘Teacher 
bonuses and teacher retention in low‑performing schools’. In: 
Public Finance Review, 36(1), 63–87.
Cobbold, C. 2006. ‘Attracting and retaining rural teachers in Ghana: 
The premise and promise of a district sponsorship scheme’. In: 
Journal of Education for Teaching, 32(4), 453–469. Retrieved 
from: http://doi.org/10.1080/02607470600982142
Conley, S.; Odden, A. 1995. ‘Linking teacher compensation to teacher 
career development’. In: Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 17(2), 219–237.
Coolahan, J.; Santiago, P.; Phair, R.; Ninomiya, A. 2004. Attracting, 
developing, and retaining effective teachers. Country note: Korea. 
Paris: OECD Publishing.
Cornett, L.M.; Gaines, G.F. 2002. Quality teaching: Can incentive 




Cullen, J.B.; Reback, R. 2006. Tinkering toward accolades: School 
gaming under a performance accountability system. Working Paper, 
12286. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Retrieved from: www.nber.org/papers/w12286
Davidson, E. 2007. ‘The pivotal role of teacher motivation in Tanzanian 
education’. In: The Educational Forum, 71(2), 157–166. 
Deci, E.L. 1971. ‘Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic 
motivation’. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18(1), 
105–115. 
Deci, E.L.; Koestner, R.; Ryan, R. M. 1999. ‘A meta‑analytic review 
of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on 
intrinsic motivation’. In: Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), 627–668.
Deci, E.L.; Ryan, R.M. 1985. ‘Cognitive evaluation theory’. In: E.L. Deci 
and R. M. Ryan (Eds), Intrinsic motivation and self-determination 
in human behavior (pp. 43–85). New York: Springer US. 
Dee, T. S.; Keys, B.J. 2005. ‘Dollars and sense: What a Tennessee 
experiment tells us about merit pay’. In: Education Next, 5(1), 
60–67.
Deere, D.; Strayer, W. 2001. Putting schools to the test: School 
accountability, incentives and behaviour. Working Paper, 
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University. 
Delannoy, F.; Sedlacek, G. 2001. Brazil: Teachers development and 
incentives: A strategic framework. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Dembele, M.; Schwille, J. 2006. ‘Can the global trend toward 
accountability be reconciled with ideals of teacher 
empowerment? Theory and practice in Guinea’. International 
Journal of Educational Research, 45(4‑5), 302–314. 
Devcota, B. 2005. Is there a teacher motivation crisis in Nepal? London: 
DFID.
Dinham, S., Ingvarson, L.; Kleinhenz, E. 2008. Teaching talent: The best 





Driscoll, B. 2015. Personal communication, March.
EFA (Education for All). 2014. Teaching and learning: Achieving quality 
for all. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
Ethiopian Teachers Association. 2012. ‘Teachers’ salary scale 




EURYDICE. 2010. Organization of the education system in Estonia 
2009/10. Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, 
European Commission. 
Fanfani, E.T. 2004. ‘Teaching careers in Latin America: A Survey in 
Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay’. In: International Institute for 
Education Planning Newsletter, January–March 2004: 3–4.
Figlio, D.; Getzler, L. 2002. Accountability, ability and disability: Gaming 
the system? National Bureau for Economic Research Working 
Paper 9307. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
French, R.L.; Malo, G.E.; Rakow, E.A. 1988. ‘What we have learned 
from Tennessee’s career ladder experience’. In: Educational 
Leadership, 46(3), 70–73.
Fullan, M.G.; Miles, M.B. 1992. ‘Getting reform right: What works 
and what doesn’t’. In: Phi Delta Kappan, 73(10), 745–752. 
Gagné, M.; Deci, E.L. 2005. ‘Self‑determination theory and work 
motivation’. In: Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(4), 
331–362. 
Gannicott, K. 2009. Secondary teacher policy research in Asia: Teacher 
numbers, teacher quality: Lessons from secondary education in Asia. 
Bangkok: UNESCO Bangkok.
Garrett, R.M. 1999. Teacher job satisfaction in developing countries. 
London: DFID. Retrieved from: 
 http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED459150
Ghazleh, M.A. n.d. Teacher professional development policies in Jordan. 
Jordan: Ministry of Education.
References 
131
Glazerman, S.; Seifullah, A. 2012. An evaluation of the Chicago Teacher 
Advancement Program after four years: Final report. Mathematica 
Policy Research, Inc. Retrieved from: 
 http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED530098
Glewwe, P.; Holla, A.; Kremer, M. 2009. Performance incentives: Their 
growing impact on K-12 education. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press.
Glewwe, P.; Ilias, N.; Kremer, M. 2003. Teacher incentives. Working 
Paper, 9671. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Retrieved from: www.nber.org/papers/w9671
Goldhaber, D.D. 2007. ‘Everyone’s doing it, but what does teacher 
testing tell us about teacher effectiveness’. In: Journal of Human 
Resources, 42(4): 765–794.
Goldhaber, D.D.; Brewer, D. J. 2000. ‘Does teacher certification 
matter? High school teacher certification status and student 
achievement’. In: Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 
22(2): 129–45.
Gorozidis, G.; Papaioannou, A.G. 2014. ‘Teachers’ motivation to 
participate in training and to implement innovations’. In: Teaching 
and Teacher Education, 39, 1–11. 
Haig, T. Personal communication, March 2015.
Hanushek, E.A.; Rivkin, S.G. 2012. ‘The distribution of teacher 
quality and implications for policy’. Annual Review of Economics, 
4(1), 131–157.
Hawley Miles, K.; Pennington, K.; Bloom, D. 2015. Do more, add 
more, earn more: Teacher salary redesign lessons from 10 first-mover 
districts. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.
Hein, V.; Ries, F.; Pires, F.; Caune, A.; Heszteráné Ekler, J.; Emeljanovas, 
A.; Valantiniene, I. 2012. ‘The relationship between teaching styles 
and motivation to teach among physical education teachers’. In: 
Journal of Sports Science & Medicine, 11(1), 123–130.
Heneman III, H. 1998. ‘Assessment of the motivational reactions 
of teachers to a school‑based performance award program’. In: 
Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 12(1), 43–59.
References
132
Heneman III, H.; Milanowski, A.; Kimball, S.; Odden, A. 2006. 
Standards-based teacher evaluation as a foundation for knowledge- 
and skill-based pay. Philadelphia, PA: Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education. 
Herzberg, F. 2008. One more time: How do you motivate employees? 
Boston, Mass: Harvard Business Press.
Hyde, K.; Muito, M.; Muito G. 2005. Teacher motivation and incentives 
in Kenya, Nairobi. Brighton: KSD.
INEE (Inter‑Agency Network for Education in Emergencies). 2008. 
Guidance notes on teacher compensation in fragile states, situations 
of displacement and post-crisis recovery. INEE. Retrieved from: 
 http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/files/
GN_Teacher_Comp_2013_Eng.pdf
Ingvarson, L. 2012. Comments on DEECD discussion paper: New 




___. 2013. ‘Reforming career paths for Australian teachers’. In: 
M. Akiba (Ed.), Teacher reforms around the world: Implementations 
and outcomes. International Perspectives on Education and Society, 
19 (pp.  237–273). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.
Ingvarson, L; Chadbourne, R. 1994. ‘The career development model 
of teacher evaluation’. In: L. Ingvarson and R. Chadbourne 
(Eds), Valuing teachers’ work: New directions in teacher appraisal. 
Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research.  
Jacob, B.A. 2002. Accountability, incentives and behavior: The impact of 
high-stakes testing in the Chicago public schools. NBER Working 
Paper, 8968. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Retrieved from: www.nber.org/papers/w8968
Jacob, B.A.; Lefgren, L. 2005. What do parents value in education? An 
empirical investigation of parents’ revealed preferences for teachers. 
NBER Working Paper, 11494. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 




Jacob, B.A.; Lefgren, L. 2008. ‘Can principals identify effective 
teachers? Evidence on subjective performance evaluation in 
education.’ In: Journal of Labor Economics, 26(1), 101–136. 
Jacob, B.A.; Levitt, S.D. 2003. ‘Rotten apples: An investigation of the 
prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating’. In: The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(3), 843–877. 
Jacob, B.A.; Walsh, E. 2011. ‘What’s in a rating?’ In: Economics of 
Education Review, 30(3), 434–448. 
Jessop, T.; Penny, A. 1998. ‘A study of teacher voice and vision in the 
narrative of rural South African and Gambian primary school 
teachers’. In: International Journal of Educational Development, 
18(5), 393–403.
Johnson, S.M.; Papay, J.P. 2009. Redesigning teacher pay: A system for 
the next generation of educators. Washington, DC: Economic 
Policy Institute.
Kane, T.J.; McCaffrey, D.F.; Miller, T.; Staiger, D.O. 2013. Have we 
identified effective teachers? Validating measures of effective teaching 
using random assignment. Washington, DC: Institute of Education 
Sciences.
Keitheile, M.; Mokubung, M. 2005. The SACMEQ II project in 
Botswana: A study of the conditions of schooling and the quality of 
education. Harare, Zimbabwe: SACMEQ.
Kellough, E.J.; Lu, H. 1993. ‘The paradox of merit pay in the public 
sector: Persistence of a problematic procedure’. In: Review of 
Public Personnel Administration 13(2): 45–64. 
Key, J. 2014. PM John Key’s full speech to the West Auckland Business 
Club. New Zealand Herald, 23 January. Retrieved from:
 www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1&objectid=11190903
Klassen, R.M.; Perry, N.E.; Frenzel, A.C. 2012. ‘Teachers’ relatedness 
with students: An underemphasized component of teachers’ 




Koretz, D.; Barron, S.; Mitchell, K.; Stecher, B.M. 1996. Perceived 
effects of the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from: 
 www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR792.html
Koretz, D.M. 2002. ‘Limitations in the use of achievement tests as 
measures of educators’ productivity’. In: The Journal of Human 
Resources, 37(4), 752–777. 
Lam, S.; Cheng, R.W.; Choy, H.C. 2010. ‘School support and teacher 
motivation to implement project‑based learning’. In: Learning 
and Instruction, 20(6), 487–497. 
Lavy, V. 2004. Performance pay and teachers’ effort, productivity and 
grading ethics. NBER Working Paper, 10622. Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from: 
 www.nber.org/papers/w10622
Locke, E.A.; Shaw, K.N.; Saari, L.M.; Latham, G.P. 1981. ‘Goal setting 
and task performance: 1969–1980’. In: Psychological Bulletin, 
90(1), 125–152. 
Lye, L. Personal communication, March 2015.
Mannamaa, I. 2010. ‘Assessing teachers’ performance in pre‑primary 
and primary schools in Estonia’. In: Questions of Quality. CECDE 
International Conference 2004: Conference proceedings. Dublin: 
Centre for Early Childhood Development and Education.
Marshall, G.; Cole, P.; Zbar, V. 2012. Teacher performance and 
development in Australia: A mapping and analysis of current 
practise. Melbourne: Australian Institute for Teaching and School 
Leadership.
Martins, P.S. 2009. Individual teacher incentives, student achievement and 
grade inflation. SSRN Scholarly Paper, ID 1359987. Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network. 
Martins, P.S. 2010. Individual teacher incentives, student achievement and 
grade inflation. London: Centre for the Economics of Education, 
London School of Economics.




McGraw, K.O. 1978. ‘The detrimental effects of reward on 
performance: A literature review and a prediction model’. In: 
M. R. Lepper and D. Greene (Eds), The hidden costs of reward 
(pp. 33–60). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
McKenzie, P.; Santiago, P.; Sliwka, P.; Hiroyuki, H. 2005. Teachers 
matter: Attracting , developing and retaining effective teachers. Paris: 
OECD. 
Michaelowa, K. 2002. Teacher job satisfaction, student achievement, and 
the cost of primary education in francophone sub-Saharan Africa. 
HWWA Discussion Paper. Retrieved from: 
 www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/19349
Milanowski, A. 2003. The varieties of knowledge and skill-based pay 
design: A comparison of seven new pay systems for K-12 teachers. 
CPRE Research Report Series (RR‑050). Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, Consortium for Policy Research in 
Education.
Milkovich, G.T.; Wigdor, A.K. 1991. Pay for performance: Evaluating 
performance appraisal and merit pay. Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press.
Mosoge, M.J.; Pilane, M.W. 2014. ‘Performance management: The 
neglected imperative of accountability systems in education’. In: 
South African Journal of Education, 34(1), 1–18.
Muralidharan, K.; Sundararaman, V. 2009. Teacher performance pay: 
Experimental evidence from India. NBER Working Paper 15323. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Murnane, R.J.; Cohen, D.K. 1986. ‘Merit pay and the evaluation 
problem: Why most merit pay plans fail and a few survive’. In: 
Harvard Educational Review 56(1), 1–18.
National Examinations and Qualifications Centre. 2009. Raising the 






NBPTS (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards). 2015a. 
About certification. Retrieved from: 
 http://boardcertifiedteachers.org/about‑certification
___. 2015b. Renewal. Retrieved from: 
 http://boardcertifiedteachers.org/renewal
Odden, A.; Wallace, M. 2007. Rewarding teacher excellence: A teacher 
compensation handbook for state and local policy makers. Madison: 
Consortium for Policy Research in Education.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development). 
2009. Evaluating and rewarding the quality of teachers: International 
practices. Paris: OECD. 
___. 2013. Teachers for the 21st Century: Using evaluation to improve 
teaching. Paris: OECD.




Ome, A. 2012. Meritocracia en la Carrera Docente: Evidencia para 
Colombia. Estudios sobre  la calidad de la Educación en 
Colombia. Bogota: ICFES. [Reported in English in Bruns and 
Luque, 2014]
Orr, D.; Westbrook, J.; Pryor, J.; Durrani, N.; Sebba, J.; Adu‑Yeboah, 
C. 2013. What are the impacts and cost-effectiveness of strategies 
to improve performance of untrained and under-trained teachers in 
the classroom in developing countries? Technical Report. London: 
University of London.
Oxford Dictionaries. 2015. ‘Career’. Retrieved from: www.
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/career.
Pakistan. 2000. Ministry of Education, EFA Assessment Committee. 
Education for All 2000 assessment: Country report. Bangkok: 
UNESCO PROAP.
Pelletier, L.G.; Séguin‑Lévesque, C.; Legault, L. 2002. ‘Pressure from 
above and pressure from below as determinants of teachers’ 




Perry, J.L. 1986. ‘Merit pay in the public sector: The case for a failure 
of theory’. In: Review of Public Personnel Administration 7(1): 
57–69.
Perry, J.L.; Engbers, T.A.; Jun, S.Y. 2009. ‘Back to the future? 
Performance‑related pay, empirical research, and the perils of 
persistence’. In: Public Administration Review, 69(1), 39–51. 
Plucker, J.A.; Zapf, J.S.; McNabb, S.A. 2005. Rewarding teachers for 
students’ performance: Improving teaching through alternative 
teacher compensation programs. Education Policy Brief, 3(5). 
Bloomington, IN: Center for Evaluation and Education Policy.
Podgursky, M.J.; Springer, M.G. 2007. ‘Teacher performance pay: A 
review’. In: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4), 
909–950. 
Porter, L.W.; Lawler, E.E. 1968. Managerial attitudes and performance. 
Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press and Richard D. Irwin.
Prendergast, C. 1999. ‘The provision of incentives in firms’. In: Journal 
of Economic Literature, 37(1), 7–63.
Ramachandran, V.; Pal, M.; Jain, S.; Shekar, S.; Sharma, J. 2006. Teacher 
motivation in India. Working Paper. Retrieved from: 
 http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/esswpaper/id_3a306.htm 
Reeve, J.; Bolt, E.; Cai, Y. 1999. ‘Autonomy‑supportive teachers: How 
they teach and motivate students’. In: Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 91(3), 537–548. 
Rivkin, S.G.; Hanushek, E.A.; Kain, J.F. 2005. ‘Teachers, schools, and 
academic achievement’. In: Econometrica, 73(2), 417–458. 
Roth, G.; Assor, A.; Kanat‑Maymon, Y.; Kaplan, H. 2007. ‘Autonomous 
motivation for teaching: How self‑determined teaching may lead 
to self‑determined learning’. In: Journal of Educational Psychology, 
99(4), 761–774. 
Ryan, R.M.; Deci, E. L. 2000. ‘Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: 
Classic definitions and new directions’. In: Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 25(1), 54–67. 
References
138
Ryan, R. M.; Mims, V.; Koestner, R. 1983. ‘Relation of reward 
contingency and interpersonal context to intrinsic motivation: A 
review and test using cognitive evaluation theory’. In:  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45(4), 736–750. 
Salifu, I. 2014. ‘Barriers to teacher motivation for professional practice 
in the Ghana education service’. In: Policy Futures in Education, 
12(5), 718–729.
Sanders, W.L.; Rivers, J.C. 1996. Cumulative and residual effects of 
teachers on future student academic achievement: Research progress 
report. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee, Value‑Added 
Research and Assessment Center.
Sclafani, S. 2009. Evaluating and rewarding the quality of teachers: 
International practices. Paris: OECD. 
Sherry, H. 2008. Teachers’ voice: A policy research report on teachers’ 
motivation and perceptions of their profession in Nigeria. London: 
VSO. Retrieved from: 
 www.eldis.org/go/home&id=36683&type=Document#.
VQ9B_‑Gxdcw
Shulman, L.S.; Shulman, J.H. 2004. ‘How and what teachers learn: A 
shifting perspective’. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 36(2), 257–
271. 
Silman, T.; Glazerman, S. 2009. Teacher bonuses for extra work: A profile of 
Missouri’s Career Ladder Program. Mathematica Policy Research, 
Inc. Retrieved from: http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED507471
Singapore. 2015. Ministry of Education. Career information. Retrieved 
from: www.moe.gov.sg/careers/teach/career‑info/
Sloat, E.F. 1994. Measures of student achievement and related outcomes: 
Group 1 Career Ladder school districts. Phoenix, AZ: Arizona 
Department of Education.
___. 2002. Comparative student achievement between Career Ladder 
and non-Career Ladder districts on the spring 2001 Stanford 9, 




South Africa. 2011. Department of Basic Education. Integrated strategic 
planning framework for teacher education and development in South 
Africa, 2011–2025. Pretoria. 
Springer, M.G.; Hamilton, L.; McCaffrey, D.F.; Ballou, D.; Le, V.‑N.; 
Pepper, M.; Lockwood, J.R.; Stecher, B.M. 2010. Teacher pay for 
performance: Experimental evidence from the Project on Incentives 
in Teaching. Nashville, TN: National Center on Performance 
Incentives. Retrieved from: 
 www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reprints/2010/
RAND_RP1416.pdf
Springer, M.G.; Pane, J. F.; Le, V.‑N.; McCaffrey, D.F.; Burns, S.F.; 
Hamilton, L.S.; Stecher, B. 2012. ‘Team pay for performance: 
Experimental evidence from the Round Rock Pilot Project on 
Team Incentives’. In: Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 
34(4), 367–390.
Tekleselassie, A.A. 2005. ‘Teachers’ career ladder policy in Ethiopia: 
An opportunity for professional growth or “a stick disguised as 
a carrot?”’ In: International Journal of Educational Development, 
25(6), 618–636. 
Tin, L.G.; Hean, L.L.; Leng, Y.L. 1996. ‘What motivates teachers?’ In: 
New Horizons in Education, 37(1), 19–27.
UNESCO. 2010. Methodological guide for the analysis of teacher issues. 
Teacher training initiative for sub-Saharan Africa (TTISSA). 
Teacher policy development guide. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
___. 2014. Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all. EFA Global 
Monitoring Report 2013/2014. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. 
___. 2005. Education for All: The quality imperative. EFA Global 
Monitoring Report 2005. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). 2012. The global demand 
for primary teachers – 2012 update: Projections to reach universal 
primary education by 2015. UIS Information Bulletin, 10. 
Montreal: UNESCO‑UIS.
___. 2013. A teacher for every child: Projecting global teacher needs from 
2015 to 2030. UIS Fact Sheet, 27. Montreal: UNESCO‑UIS.
References
140
Van Eekelen, I.M.; Vermunt, J.D.; Boshuizen, H.P.A. 2006. ‘Exploring 
teachers’ will to learn’. In: Teaching and teacher education, 22(4), 
408–423. 
Vegas, E. 2005. Incentives to improve teaching: Lessons from Latin 
America. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas). 2002. What makes teachers tick? A 
policy research report on teachers’ motivation in developing countries. 
London: VSO.
Wilson, S.M.; Floden, R.E.; Ferrini‑Mundy, J. 2002. ‘Teacher 
preparation research: An insider’s view from the outside’. In: 
Journal of Teacher Education, 53(3), 190–204. 
Woessmann, L. 2001. ‘Why students in some countries do better’. In: 
Education Matters, 1(2), 67–74. Retrieved from: 
 http://educationnext.org/
whystudentsinsomecountriesdobetter/
World Bank. 2012. Attracting and retaining qualified teachers in the 
OECS. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Yuan, K.; Le, V.‑N.; McCaffrey, D.F.; Marsh, J. A.; Hamilton, L.S.; 
Stecher, B.M.; Springer, M. G. 2013. ‘Incentive pay programs do 
not affect teacher motivation or reported practices results from 
three randomized studies’. In: Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 35(1), 3–22. 
Zembylas, M.; Papanastasiou, E. 2006. ‘Sources of teacher job 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction in Cyprus’. Compare: A Journal of 
Comparative and International Education, 36(2), 229–247. 
IIEP publications and documents
More than 1,500 titles on all aspects of educational planning have been 
published by the International Institute for Educational Planning. 
A comprehensive catalogue is available in the following subject 
categories:
Educational planning and global issues 
General studies – global/developmental issues
Administration and management of education 
Decentralization – participation – distance education 
– school mapping – teachers
Economics of education 
Costs and financing – employment – international cooperation
Quality of education 
Evaluation – innovation – supervision
Different levels of formal education 
Primary to higher education
Alternative strategies for education 
Lifelong education – non‑formal education – disadvantaged groups 
– gender education
Copies of the Catalogue may be obtained on request from:
IIEP, Publications and Communications Unit
info@iiep.unesco.org
Titles of new publications and abstracts may be consulted online: 
www.iiep.unesco.org
The International Institute for Educational Planning
The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is an international centre for 
advanced training and research in the field of educational planning. It was established by 
UNESCO in 1963 and is financed by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions from Member 
States. In recent years the following Member States have provided voluntary contributions to 
the Institute: Argentina, Australia, Denmark, France, India, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The Institute’s aim is to contribute to the development of education throughout the 
world, by expanding both knowledge and the supply of competent professionals in the field 
of educational planning. In this endeavour the Institute cooperates with training and research 
organizations in Member States. The IIEP Governing Board, which approves the Institute’s 
programme and budget, consists of a maximum of eight elected members and four members 
designated by the United Nations Organization and certain of its specialized agencies and 
institutes.
Chairperson: 
Nicholas Burnett (United Kingdom/ United States of America)
Managing Director, Results for Development Institute, Washington DC, United States 
of America
Designated Members: 
Josephine Bourne (United Kingdom)
Associate Director, Education Programme Division, United Nations Children’s Fund, 
New York, United States of America
James Campbell (United Kingdom)
Director, Health Workforce, World Health Organization Executive Director, Global 
Health Workforce Alliance, Geneva, Switzerland
Takyiwaa Manuh (Ghana)
Director, Social Development Division, United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Juan Manuel Moreno (Spain)
Lead Education Specialist, Middle East and North Africa Department, World Bank, 
Madrid
Elected Members:
Madiha Al-Shaibani (Oman) 
Minister of Education, Muscat, Oman
Rukmini Banerji (India) 
Chief Executive Officer of Pratham Education Foundation, ASER Centre, New Delhi, 
India
Valérie Liechti (Switzerland) 
Education Policy Adviser, Education Focal Point, Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), West Africa Division, 
Berne
Dzingai Mutumbuka (Zimbabwe) 
Chair, Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA)
Jean-Jacques Paul (France)
Professor of Economics of Education, Deputy Rector, University of Galatasaray, 
Istanbul, Turkey
José Weinstein Cayuela (Chile) 
Professor and Director Doctorate in Education, Diego Portales University, Santiago, 
Chile
Hyun-Sook Yu (Republic of Korea) 
Senior Research Fellow, Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI), Seoul
Inquiries about the Institute should be addressed to: 
The Office of the Director, International Institute for Educational Planning, 
7–9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Paris, France
About the Book
If a qualified and motivated teaching force is key to achieving the 
Education 2030 goals, teacher career structures may represent a powerful 
leverage to improve teachers’ motivation.
What is the relation between teacher motivation and organization of careers? 
What models of teacher career organization exist around the world? Which 
are most successful according to available research? What lessons can be 
drawn for the design and implementation of career ladder systems?
Drawing on the experience of a wide range of countries, this book explores 
the links between career structures and teacher motivation, identifying 
different models of teacher career organization and related implementation 
challenges. It offers valuable guidance to educational planners and human 
resource managers seeking ways to make the teaching career more attractive 
to potential candidates and to motivate those already on the job.
About the Author
Lucy Crehan began her career teaching Science at a secondary school in 
London, before becoming interested in education policy and studying for her 
Master’s in Education at the University of Cambridge. She then spent time 
researching education systems in six countries on four continents, the basis for 
her second book, Cleverlands. She now works as part of a team at Education 
Development Trust (UK), advising governments on education reform.
ISBN: 978-92-803-1405-2
Management of teachers
Exploring the impact of 
career models on teacher 
motivation
Exploring the im
pact of career m




Cov_Teacher motivation and careers.indd   All Pages 10/10/2016   11:58:54
